File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

Supplementary

Conference Paper: Earnings News, Managerial Talent, and Information Transfers

TitleEarnings News, Managerial Talent, and Information Transfers
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherThe American Accounting Association (AAA).
Citation
The 2012 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Midyear Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 6-7 January 2012 How to Cite?
Abstract
We examine whether earnings news triggers significant information transfers between firms linked by managerial talent. We find that the stock prices of a firm are positively associated with the news in the management forecasts issued by another firm that hires its CEO as an outside independent director (i.e., the advisee). Consistent with a market learning process, we find that the strength of information transfers is a function of the perceived influence of the CEO as an outside director as well as the uncertainty about CEO ability. Analyses on pseudo firms rule out any potential industry linkages as an alternative explanation. Supplemental evidence of reverse information transfers further confirms the learning effects.
DescriptionSession 5.5: Management Forecasts
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/165799

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYeung, Een_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 2012 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Midyear Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 6-7 January 2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/165799-
dc.descriptionSession 5.5: Management Forecasts-
dc.description.abstractWe examine whether earnings news triggers significant information transfers between firms linked by managerial talent. We find that the stock prices of a firm are positively associated with the news in the management forecasts issued by another firm that hires its CEO as an outside independent director (i.e., the advisee). Consistent with a market learning process, we find that the strength of information transfers is a function of the perceived influence of the CEO as an outside director as well as the uncertainty about CEO ability. Analyses on pseudo firms rule out any potential industry linkages as an alternative explanation. Supplemental evidence of reverse information transfers further confirms the learning effects.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherThe American Accounting Association (AAA).-
dc.relation.ispartofFinancial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Midyear Meetingen_US
dc.titleEarnings News, Managerial Talent, and Information Transfersen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailWang, X: wangxacy@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWang, X=rp01555en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros206783en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats