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Conference Paper: Equilibria of GSP for range auction

TitleEquilibria of GSP for range auction
Authors
KeywordsOnline auctions
Nash equilibria
Envy-free
Valuations
Issue Date2012
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/
Citation
The 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591 How to Cite?
AbstractPosition auction is a well-studied model for analyzing online auctions for internet advertisement, in which a set of advertisers bid for a set of slots in a search result page to display their advertisement links. In particular, it was proved in [10,11] that the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for position auction has many interesting properties. In this paper, we extend these results to range auction, in which a bidder may specify a range of slots he is interested in. We prove GSP for range auction has an envy free equilibrium, which is bidder optimal and has the minimum pay property. Further, this equilibrium is equal to the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We also show that the social welfare of any equilibrium of GSP for range auctions is not far from the optimal; it is at least 1/2 of the optimal. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
DescriptionLNCS v. 7434 has title: Computing and combinatorics: 18th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2012, Proceedings
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164931
ISBN
ISSN
2005 Impact Factor: 0.402
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.252

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTing, HFen_US
dc.contributor.authorXiang, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:12:28Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:12:28Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-642-32240-2-
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164931-
dc.descriptionLNCS v. 7434 has title: Computing and combinatorics: 18th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2012, Proceedings-
dc.description.abstractPosition auction is a well-studied model for analyzing online auctions for internet advertisement, in which a set of advertisers bid for a set of slots in a search result page to display their advertisement links. In particular, it was proved in [10,11] that the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for position auction has many interesting properties. In this paper, we extend these results to range auction, in which a bidder may specify a range of slots he is interested in. We prove GSP for range auction has an envy free equilibrium, which is bidder optimal and has the minimum pay property. Further, this equilibrium is equal to the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We also show that the social welfare of any equilibrium of GSP for range auctions is not far from the optimal; it is at least 1/2 of the optimal. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Scienceen_US
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.comen_US
dc.subjectOnline auctions-
dc.subjectNash equilibria-
dc.subjectEnvy-free-
dc.subjectValuations-
dc.titleEquilibria of GSP for range auctionen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailTing, HF: hfting@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailXiang, X: xiang@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityTing, HF=rp00177en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-32241-9_49-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84865637736-
dc.identifier.hkuros210456en_US
dc.identifier.volume7434-
dc.identifier.spage580en_US
dc.identifier.epage591en_US
dc.publisher.placeGermany-
dc.description.otherThe 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591-

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