File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Outsourcing a two-level service process

TitleOutsourcing a two-level service process
Authors
KeywordsApplications
Business Services
Industries
Information Systems
It Policy And Management
Outsourcing
Queues
Issue Date2012
PublisherINFORMS. The Journal's web site is located at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org
Citation
Management Science, 2012, v. 58 n. 8, p. 1569-1584 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper studies outsourcing decisions for a two-level service process in which the first level serves as a gatekeeper for a second level of experts. The objective of the system operator (the client) is to minimize the sum of staffing costs, customer waiting costs, and mistreatment costs due to unsuccessful attempts by a gatekeeper to solve the customer's problem. The client may outsource all or part of the process to a vendor, and first-best contracts exist when the client outsources only gatekeepers or experts. When the client outsources the entire system as a two-level process, a client-optimal contract may not exist unless the exogenous system parameters satisfy a particular (and unlikely) coordination condition. In addition, optimal incentive-compatible contracts exist when the vendor's structure choice (one level or two levels) can deviate from the client's preference. Finally, we numerically examine how vendor structure choice and labor cost advantages influence the client's optimal outsourcing option. © 2012 INFORMS.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164754
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.741
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.384
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLee, HHen_HK
dc.contributor.authorPinker, EJen_HK
dc.contributor.authorShumsky, RAen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:09:04Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:09:04Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_HK
dc.identifier.citationManagement Science, 2012, v. 58 n. 8, p. 1569-1584en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164754-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies outsourcing decisions for a two-level service process in which the first level serves as a gatekeeper for a second level of experts. The objective of the system operator (the client) is to minimize the sum of staffing costs, customer waiting costs, and mistreatment costs due to unsuccessful attempts by a gatekeeper to solve the customer's problem. The client may outsource all or part of the process to a vendor, and first-best contracts exist when the client outsources only gatekeepers or experts. When the client outsources the entire system as a two-level process, a client-optimal contract may not exist unless the exogenous system parameters satisfy a particular (and unlikely) coordination condition. In addition, optimal incentive-compatible contracts exist when the vendor's structure choice (one level or two levels) can deviate from the client's preference. Finally, we numerically examine how vendor structure choice and labor cost advantages influence the client's optimal outsourcing option. © 2012 INFORMS.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherINFORMS. The Journal's web site is located at http://mansci.pubs.informs.orgen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofManagement Scienceen_HK
dc.subjectApplicationsen_HK
dc.subjectBusiness Servicesen_HK
dc.subjectIndustriesen_HK
dc.subjectInformation Systemsen_HK
dc.subjectIt Policy And Managementen_HK
dc.subjectOutsourcingen_HK
dc.subjectQueuesen_HK
dc.titleOutsourcing a two-level service processen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLee, HH: hhlee@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLee, HH=rp01556en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.1110.1503en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84865528752en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros208901en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84865528752&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume58en_HK
dc.identifier.issue8en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1569en_HK
dc.identifier.epage1584en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000307528100009-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLee, HH=35757543400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPinker, EJ=6603181996en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridShumsky, RA=6602407835en_HK

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats