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Article: Let the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and information

TitleLet the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and information
Authors
Issue Date2011
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE
Citation
Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 54 n. 4, p. S347-S365 How to Cite?
AbstractUnder information asymmetry, lemons tend to be overpriced. Yet how much of an overpricing premium the lemons can command is contingent on the underlying legal institutions. A set of transaction data from Hong Kong’s housing market reveals that durable lemons are overpriced by 6.7 and 9.9 percent under the rules of “let the seller beware” (caveat venditor) and “let the buyer beware” (caveat emptor), respectively. Switching the legal regime from the former to the latter produces a 32.3 percent increase in the overpricing premium. However, this does not suggest that caveat venditor is necessarily amore efficient legal doctrine. New information disclosure institutions are emerging to deal with the lemons problem.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164570
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.446
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.175

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChau, KWen_US
dc.contributor.authorChoy, LHTen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:06:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:06:17Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 54 n. 4, p. S347-S365en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-2186-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164570-
dc.description.abstractUnder information asymmetry, lemons tend to be overpriced. Yet how much of an overpricing premium the lemons can command is contingent on the underlying legal institutions. A set of transaction data from Hong Kong’s housing market reveals that durable lemons are overpriced by 6.7 and 9.9 percent under the rules of “let the seller beware” (caveat venditor) and “let the buyer beware” (caveat emptor), respectively. Switching the legal regime from the former to the latter produces a 32.3 percent increase in the overpricing premium. However, this does not suggest that caveat venditor is necessarily amore efficient legal doctrine. New information disclosure institutions are emerging to deal with the lemons problem.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLEen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Law and Economicsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleLet the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChau, KW: hrrbckw@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChau, KW=rp00993en_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/661941-
dc.identifier.hkuros207997en_US
dc.identifier.volume54en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spageS347en_US
dc.identifier.epageS365en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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