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Article: Let the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and information
Title | Let the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and information |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Publisher | University of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE |
Citation | Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 54 n. 4, p. S347-S365 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Under information asymmetry, lemons tend to be overpriced. Yet how much
of an overpricing premium the lemons can command is contingent on the
underlying legal institutions. A set of transaction data from Hong Kong’s housing
market reveals that durable lemons are overpriced by 6.7 and 9.9 percent
under the rules of “let the seller beware” (caveat venditor) and “let the buyer
beware” (caveat emptor), respectively. Switching the legal regime from the former
to the latter produces a 32.3 percent increase in the overpricing premium.
However, this does not suggest that caveat venditor is necessarily amore efficient
legal doctrine. New information disclosure institutions are emerging to deal
with the lemons problem. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164570 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.295 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chau, KW | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Choy, LHT | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T08:06:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T08:06:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 54 n. 4, p. S347-S365 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-2186 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164570 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Under information asymmetry, lemons tend to be overpriced. Yet how much of an overpricing premium the lemons can command is contingent on the underlying legal institutions. A set of transaction data from Hong Kong’s housing market reveals that durable lemons are overpriced by 6.7 and 9.9 percent under the rules of “let the seller beware” (caveat venditor) and “let the buyer beware” (caveat emptor), respectively. Switching the legal regime from the former to the latter produces a 32.3 percent increase in the overpricing premium. However, this does not suggest that caveat venditor is necessarily amore efficient legal doctrine. New information disclosure institutions are emerging to deal with the lemons problem. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Law and Economics | en_US |
dc.title | Let the buyer or seller beware: measuring lemons in the housing market under different doctrines of law governing transactions and information | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Chau, KW: hrrbckw@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Chau, KW=rp00993 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/661941 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 207997 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 54 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | S347 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | S365 | en_US |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-2186 | - |