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Article: A rule of reason approach to the antitrust issues of the Google book search settlement

TitleA rule of reason approach to the antitrust issues of the Google book search settlement
Authors
KeywordsGoogle Book Search
GBS settlement
Copyright
Copyright collective
Copyright licensing
Antitrust
Rule of reason
Less restrictive alternative
Competition law
Issue Date2011
PublisherDePaul University College of Law.
Citation
Depaul Business and Commercial Law Journal, 2011, v. 10 n. 1, p. 1-53 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines, from an antitrust perspective, the recent controversy of the Google Book Search (GBS) settlement in its broader context of copyright collective administration. It argues that courts should view competitive concerns of the settlement pertaining to exclusivity and pricing as ancillary restraints to an overall procompetitive copyright collective, and hence courts should analyze the settlement using the rule of reason instead of condemning it as per se illegal under antitrust law. In particular, I will examine closely the following five issues: (1) How does the GBS settlement relate to ASCAP/BMI blanket licensing in the music performance context and copyright collective arrangements in general? (2) Why should courts apply the rule of reason (as opposed to a per-se illegal rule) to analyze anticompetitive features of the GBS settlement and other copyright collectives? (3) What is the proper antitrust baseline against which a rule-of-reason analysis is conducted? More precisely, should an antitrust court ask whether a collective scheme is overall efficiency-enhancing or should look it for a “less restrictive alternative” which is equally capable of achieving procompetitive goals, albeit in a less anticompetitive manner? (4) How should a court identify and weigh anticompetitive justifications and procompetitive objectives of an ancillary restraint? How can a “reverse” rule of reason be adopted to help courts and parties to identify efficiency modifications to an existing collective arrangement? (5) What would be the result if the rule-of-reason analysis is applied in the specific context of the GBS settlement in evaluating the competitive effects of allegedly anticompetitive restraints and proposed modifications?
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/163576
ISSN
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKwok, KHF-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-05T06:47:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-05T06:47:17Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationDepaul Business and Commercial Law Journal, 2011, v. 10 n. 1, p. 1-53-
dc.identifier.issn1542-2763-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/163576-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines, from an antitrust perspective, the recent controversy of the Google Book Search (GBS) settlement in its broader context of copyright collective administration. It argues that courts should view competitive concerns of the settlement pertaining to exclusivity and pricing as ancillary restraints to an overall procompetitive copyright collective, and hence courts should analyze the settlement using the rule of reason instead of condemning it as per se illegal under antitrust law. In particular, I will examine closely the following five issues: (1) How does the GBS settlement relate to ASCAP/BMI blanket licensing in the music performance context and copyright collective arrangements in general? (2) Why should courts apply the rule of reason (as opposed to a per-se illegal rule) to analyze anticompetitive features of the GBS settlement and other copyright collectives? (3) What is the proper antitrust baseline against which a rule-of-reason analysis is conducted? More precisely, should an antitrust court ask whether a collective scheme is overall efficiency-enhancing or should look it for a “less restrictive alternative” which is equally capable of achieving procompetitive goals, albeit in a less anticompetitive manner? (4) How should a court identify and weigh anticompetitive justifications and procompetitive objectives of an ancillary restraint? How can a “reverse” rule of reason be adopted to help courts and parties to identify efficiency modifications to an existing collective arrangement? (5) What would be the result if the rule-of-reason analysis is applied in the specific context of the GBS settlement in evaluating the competitive effects of allegedly anticompetitive restraints and proposed modifications?-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherDePaul University College of Law.-
dc.relation.ispartofDepaul Business and Commercial Law Journal-
dc.subjectGoogle Book Search-
dc.subjectGBS settlement-
dc.subjectCopyright-
dc.subjectCopyright collective-
dc.subjectCopyright licensing-
dc.subjectAntitrust-
dc.subjectRule of reason-
dc.subjectLess restrictive alternative-
dc.subjectCompetition law-
dc.titleA rule of reason approach to the antitrust issues of the Google book search settlementen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailKwok, KHF: khfkwok@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.hkuros217700-
dc.identifier.volume10-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage53-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.ssrn1961967-

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