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Postgraduate Thesis: Knowledge and description
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TitleKnowledge and description
 
AuthorsWang, Qin
王沁
 
Issue Date2012
 
PublisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)
 
AbstractIt has been debated whether knowledge attributions are descriptions of the world. Descriptivists argue that they are. Non-cognitivists discover that knowledge attributions have characteristics that are not shared by paradigm cases of descriptions. Most forms of non-cognitivism therefore deny that knowledge attributions are descriptions of the world. This thesis approaches the debate using data from the ordinary use of language. It is argued that a prominent form of descriptivism, attributor contextualism, is in conflict with treating ordinary use of simple knowledge attributions as true. This treatment of ordinary language is adopted by prominent contextualists, and is what distinguishes contextualism from its main rival, invariantism. The conflict is generalized to descriptivism in general so that either descriptivism or the treatment of simple ordinary use of the language as true has to be given up. Various arguments for and against such treatment of ordinary language and descriptivism’s alternative, non-cognitivism, are examined respectively. It is held that although many forms of non-cognitivism are problematic, whether non-cognitivism is a true thesis still remains open. It is also argued that despite its initial plausibility, the treatment of simple ordinary use of indicative language as true is not as attractive as it first appears to be. Since we are not forced to accept treating simple ordinary knowledge attributions as true, as far as the conflict between the two goes, we are not forced to give up descriptivism, either. However, non-cognitivism remains an attractive alternative to descriptivism.
 
AdvisorsHawley, P
Deutsch, ME
 
DegreeMaster of Philosophy
 
SubjectKnowledge, Theory of.
Description (Philosophy)
 
Dept/ProgramPhilosophy
 
DC FieldValue
dc.contributor.advisorHawley, P
 
dc.contributor.advisorDeutsch, ME
 
dc.contributor.authorWang, Qin
 
dc.contributor.author王沁
 
dc.date.hkucongregation2012
 
dc.date.issued2012
 
dc.description.abstractIt has been debated whether knowledge attributions are descriptions of the world. Descriptivists argue that they are. Non-cognitivists discover that knowledge attributions have characteristics that are not shared by paradigm cases of descriptions. Most forms of non-cognitivism therefore deny that knowledge attributions are descriptions of the world. This thesis approaches the debate using data from the ordinary use of language. It is argued that a prominent form of descriptivism, attributor contextualism, is in conflict with treating ordinary use of simple knowledge attributions as true. This treatment of ordinary language is adopted by prominent contextualists, and is what distinguishes contextualism from its main rival, invariantism. The conflict is generalized to descriptivism in general so that either descriptivism or the treatment of simple ordinary use of the language as true has to be given up. Various arguments for and against such treatment of ordinary language and descriptivism’s alternative, non-cognitivism, are examined respectively. It is held that although many forms of non-cognitivism are problematic, whether non-cognitivism is a true thesis still remains open. It is also argued that despite its initial plausibility, the treatment of simple ordinary use of indicative language as true is not as attractive as it first appears to be. Since we are not forced to accept treating simple ordinary knowledge attributions as true, as far as the conflict between the two goes, we are not forced to give up descriptivism, either. However, non-cognitivism remains an attractive alternative to descriptivism.
 
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version
 
dc.description.thesisdisciplinePhilosophy
 
dc.description.thesislevelmaster's
 
dc.description.thesisnameMaster of Philosophy
 
dc.identifier.hkulb4786989
 
dc.languageeng
 
dc.publisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)
 
dc.relation.ispartofHKU Theses Online (HKUTO)
 
dc.rightsThe author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works.
 
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 
dc.source.urihttp://hub.hku.hk/bib/B47869896
 
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory of.
 
dc.subject.lcshDescription (Philosophy)
 
dc.titleKnowledge and description
 
dc.typePG_Thesis
 
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<item><contributor.advisor>Hawley, P</contributor.advisor>
<contributor.advisor>Deutsch, ME</contributor.advisor>
<contributor.author>Wang, Qin</contributor.author>
<contributor.author>&#29579;&#27777;</contributor.author>
<date.issued>2012</date.issued>
<description.abstract>&#65279;It has been debated whether knowledge attributions are descriptions of the world.

Descriptivists argue that they are. Non-cognitivists discover that knowledge

attributions have characteristics that are not shared by paradigm cases of

descriptions. Most forms of non-cognitivism therefore deny that knowledge

attributions are descriptions of the world.

This thesis approaches the debate using data from the ordinary use of language.

It is argued that a prominent form of descriptivism, attributor contextualism, is

in conflict with treating ordinary use of simple knowledge attributions as true.

This treatment of ordinary language is adopted by prominent contextualists, and

is what distinguishes contextualism from its main rival, invariantism. The

conflict is generalized to descriptivism in general so that either descriptivism or

the treatment of simple ordinary use of the language as true has to be given up.

Various arguments for and against such treatment of ordinary language and

descriptivism&#8217;s alternative, non-cognitivism, are examined respectively. It is

held that although many forms of non-cognitivism are problematic, whether

non-cognitivism is a true thesis still remains open. It is also argued that despite

its initial plausibility, the treatment of simple ordinary use of indicative

language as true is not as attractive as it first appears to be.

Since we are not forced to accept treating simple ordinary knowledge

attributions as true, as far as the conflict between the two goes, we are not

forced to give up descriptivism, either. However, non-cognitivism remains an

attractive alternative to descriptivism.</description.abstract>
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<publisher>The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)</publisher>
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<rights>The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works.</rights>
<rights>Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License</rights>
<source.uri>http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B47869896</source.uri>
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<subject.lcsh>Description (Philosophy)</subject.lcsh>
<title>Knowledge and description</title>
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<description.thesislevel>master&apos;s</description.thesislevel>
<description.thesisdiscipline>Philosophy</description.thesisdiscipline>
<description.nature>published_or_final_version</description.nature>
<date.hkucongregation>2012</date.hkucongregation>
<bitstream.url>http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/161549/1/FullText.pdf</bitstream.url>
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