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Article: Do objects depend on structures?

TitleDo objects depend on structures?
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
British Journal For The Philosophy Of Science, 2012, v. 63 n. 3, p. 607-625 How to Cite?
AbstractOntic structural realists hold that structure is all there is, or at least all there is fundamentally. This thesis has proved to be puzzling: What exactly does it say about the relationship between objects and structures? In this article, I look at different ways of articulating ontic structural realism in terms of the relation between structures and objects. I show that objects cannot be reduced to structure, and argue that ontological dependence cannot be used to establish strong forms of structural realism. At the end, I show how a weaker, but controversial, form of structural realism can be articulated on the basis of ontological dependence. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161413
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.738
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.267
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWolff, Jen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-24T08:31:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-24T08:31:35Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_HK
dc.identifier.citationBritish Journal For The Philosophy Of Science, 2012, v. 63 n. 3, p. 607-625en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0007-0882en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161413-
dc.description.abstractOntic structural realists hold that structure is all there is, or at least all there is fundamentally. This thesis has proved to be puzzling: What exactly does it say about the relationship between objects and structures? In this article, I look at different ways of articulating ontic structural realism in terms of the relation between structures and objects. I show that objects cannot be reduced to structure, and argue that ontological dependence cannot be used to establish strong forms of structural realism. At the end, I show how a weaker, but controversial, form of structural realism can be articulated on the basis of ontological dependence. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Scienceen_HK
dc.titleDo objects depend on structures?en_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWolff, J: jwolff@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWolff, J=rp01643en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/bjps/axr041en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84864684434en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros220245-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84864684434&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume63en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage607en_HK
dc.identifier.epage625en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000307174000006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWolff, J=55328896300en_HK

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