File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: A Signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets

TitleA Signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherAcademy of Management. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aom.pace.edu/amjnew
Citation
Academy Of Management Journal, 2012, v. 55 n. 3, p. 667-683 How to Cite?
AbstractThis article extends signaling theory to research on acquisition premiums and investigates the value that newly public targets capture in post-IPO acquisitions. We complement previous research on acquisition premiums by suggesting that signals about targets can enhance sellers' gains by reducing acquirers' offer price discounting that is due to information asymmetries. Specifically, we argue that target firms can engage in interorganizational relationships (e.g., associations with prominent investment banks, venture capitalists, and alliance partners) that function as signals and enhance sellers' gains. Empirical evidence shows that the benefits of such signals apply to domestic and cross-border deals alike and that these benefits are even greater for IPO targets selling their companies to acquirers based in different industries. © 2012 Academy of Management Journal.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161281
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 6.233
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 10.317
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorReuer, JJen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTong, TWen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, CWen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-24T08:29:12Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-24T08:29:12Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_HK
dc.identifier.citationAcademy Of Management Journal, 2012, v. 55 n. 3, p. 667-683en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0001-4273en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161281-
dc.description.abstractThis article extends signaling theory to research on acquisition premiums and investigates the value that newly public targets capture in post-IPO acquisitions. We complement previous research on acquisition premiums by suggesting that signals about targets can enhance sellers' gains by reducing acquirers' offer price discounting that is due to information asymmetries. Specifically, we argue that target firms can engage in interorganizational relationships (e.g., associations with prominent investment banks, venture capitalists, and alliance partners) that function as signals and enhance sellers' gains. Empirical evidence shows that the benefits of such signals apply to domestic and cross-border deals alike and that these benefits are even greater for IPO targets selling their companies to acquirers based in different industries. © 2012 Academy of Management Journal.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAcademy of Management. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aom.pace.edu/amjnewen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofAcademy of Management Journalen_HK
dc.titleA Signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targetsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.5465/amj.2010.0259en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84862230492en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84862230492&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume55en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage667en_HK
dc.identifier.epage683en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1948-0989-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000305072700008-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats