File Download
Supplementary

Others: Platform, meet apps: pricing and quality under cross-sided externalities

TitlePlatform, meet apps: pricing and quality under cross-sided externalities
Authors
KeywordsTwo-sided markets
Externalities
Quality control
Issue Date2012
AbstractOur study is motivated by the observation that two-sided platforms often exercise control on access to and transactions on at least one side of the market. For example, Apple's rigorous approval process and recent policies that prohibit cross-platform app-building tools is an indication of imposing control on both access and quality of its app market. Extant literature on two-sided markets fails to accommodate platform’s interventions on participation by either side (i.e. consumers and sellers of complementary products) of the market because it typically focuses on a homogeneous population. Our work aims to bridge this gap and provides the underlying rationale for the platform firm’s governance structure and optimal pricing decisions.
DescriptionWorking papers series
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161245
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSin, RG-
dc.contributor.authorJia, J-
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T09:20:20Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T09:20:20Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/161245-
dc.descriptionWorking papers series-
dc.description.abstractOur study is motivated by the observation that two-sided platforms often exercise control on access to and transactions on at least one side of the market. For example, Apple's rigorous approval process and recent policies that prohibit cross-platform app-building tools is an indication of imposing control on both access and quality of its app market. Extant literature on two-sided markets fails to accommodate platform’s interventions on participation by either side (i.e. consumers and sellers of complementary products) of the market because it typically focuses on a homogeneous population. Our work aims to bridge this gap and provides the underlying rationale for the platform firm’s governance structure and optimal pricing decisions.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectTwo-sided markets-
dc.subjectExternalities-
dc.subjectQuality control-
dc.titlePlatform, meet apps: pricing and quality under cross-sided externalitiesen_US
dc.typeOthersen_US
dc.identifier.emailSin, RG: rays@hku.hk-
dc.description.naturepreprint-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage40-
dc.identifier.ssrn2044551-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats