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Conference Paper: Trial incentive in sequential litigation

TitleTrial incentive in sequential litigation
Authors
KeywordsTrial
Settlement
Learning
Sequential Litigation
Issue Date2012
Citation
The 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Stanford, CA., 18-19 May 2012. How to Cite?
AbstractWe analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may sequentially face multiple plaintiffs. Subsequent potential plaintiffs learn about their chances of winning from the initial trial outcome. A trial in the initial case is like an experiment that the defendant can run that would induce plaintiffs’ learning. We show that the initial case can go to trial in equilibrium when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. The possibility of meritless lawsuits further raises the attraction of trials. We also show that when the initial plaintiff’s attorney may represent future clients, trials are more likely both because the attorney gains from learning, and because his ability to attract future clients may depend on how much his initial client receives.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/160850
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBernhardt, Den_US
dc.contributor.authorXu, Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-16T06:22:13Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-16T06:22:13Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Stanford, CA., 18-19 May 2012.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/160850-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may sequentially face multiple plaintiffs. Subsequent potential plaintiffs learn about their chances of winning from the initial trial outcome. A trial in the initial case is like an experiment that the defendant can run that would induce plaintiffs’ learning. We show that the initial case can go to trial in equilibrium when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. The possibility of meritless lawsuits further raises the attraction of trials. We also show that when the initial plaintiff’s attorney may represent future clients, trials are more likely both because the attorney gains from learning, and because his ability to attract future clients may depend on how much his initial client receives.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Law and Economics Association Conference 2012en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectTrial-
dc.subjectSettlement-
dc.subjectLearning-
dc.subjectSequential Litigation-
dc.titleTrial incentive in sequential litigationen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailXu, Z: zfxu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityXu, Z=rp01117en_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.1987266-
dc.identifier.hkuros203917en_US
dc.identifier.ssrn1987266-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 140123-

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