Conference Paper: Exploring the sustainability of credit-incentivized peer-to-peer content distribution

File Download Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
Supplementary
  • Basic View
  • Metadata View
  • XML View
TitleExploring the sustainability of credit-incentivized peer-to-peer content distribution
AuthorsQiu, X1
Huang, W1
Wu, C1
Li, Z2
Lau, FCM1
KeywordsCredit-based system
Peer-to-peer content distribution
Queueing network
Content distribution
Content distribution systems
Issue Date2012
PublisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000212
CitationThe 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW 2012), Macau, China, 18-21 June 2012. In Proceedings of the 32nd ICDCSW, 2012, p. 118-126 [How to Cite?]
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.40
AbstractCredit-based incentives were proposed to incite peer contributions in P2P content distribution systems. Their effectiveness was extensively analyzed from a game theory perspective. Little attention however has been paid to a potential threat to such systems - the possible condensation of credits in a small number of peers over time. Credits condensation puts system sustainability on the line: many peers gradually run out of credits and cannot keep up a decent download rate. We study the sustainability of credit-based P2P systems running for a long period of time. We first introduce a new queueing network based model for credit circulation in a P2P content trading market. This model enables the study of credit system sustainability via examining the stability of stochastic traffic flows in a network of queues. We show that a stable job circulation, i.e., an equilibrium market state, always exists. A sufficient and necessary condition for asymptotic condensation at equilibrium is proved. We analyze the degree of condensation in finite networks using the Gini index, and relate condensation to P2P network protocols and parameters. Our theoretical results are verified and supported by extensive simulations under realistic settings. We propose counter-actions for preventing and mitigating credit condensation. © 2012 IEEE.
DescriptionThe 4th International Workshop on Hot Topics in Peer-to-Peer Computing and Online Social Networking (HotPOST) was held in conjunction with IEEE ICDCS 2012
ISSN1545-0678
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.40
DC Field
Value
dc.contributor.authorQiu, X
dc.contributor.authorHuang, W
dc.contributor.authorWu, C
dc.contributor.authorLi, Z
dc.contributor.authorLau, FCM
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-16T06:03:06Z
dc.date.available2012-08-16T06:03:06Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractCredit-based incentives were proposed to incite peer contributions in P2P content distribution systems. Their effectiveness was extensively analyzed from a game theory perspective. Little attention however has been paid to a potential threat to such systems - the possible condensation of credits in a small number of peers over time. Credits condensation puts system sustainability on the line: many peers gradually run out of credits and cannot keep up a decent download rate. We study the sustainability of credit-based P2P systems running for a long period of time. We first introduce a new queueing network based model for credit circulation in a P2P content trading market. This model enables the study of credit system sustainability via examining the stability of stochastic traffic flows in a network of queues. We show that a stable job circulation, i.e., an equilibrium market state, always exists. A sufficient and necessary condition for asymptotic condensation at equilibrium is proved. We analyze the degree of condensation in finite networks using the Gini index, and relate condensation to P2P network protocols and parameters. Our theoretical results are verified and supported by extensive simulations under realistic settings. We propose counter-actions for preventing and mitigating credit condensation. © 2012 IEEE.
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version
dc.descriptionThe 4th International Workshop on Hot Topics in Peer-to-Peer Computing and Online Social Networking (HotPOST) was held in conjunction with IEEE ICDCS 2012
dc.description.otherThe 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW 2012), Macau, China, 18-21 June 2012. In Proceedings of the 32nd ICDCSW, 2012, p. 118-126
dc.identifier.citationThe 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW 2012), Macau, China, 18-21 June 2012. In Proceedings of the 32nd ICDCSW, 2012, p. 118-126 [How to Cite?]
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.40
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICDCSW.2012.40
dc.identifier.epage126
dc.identifier.hkuros202419
dc.identifier.issn1545-0678
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84866407846
dc.identifier.spage118
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/160084
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000212
dc.publisher.placeUnited States
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops Proceedings
dc.rightsInternational Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops Proceedings. Copyright © IEEE Computer Society.
dc.rights©2012 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
dc.subjectCredit-based system
dc.subjectPeer-to-peer content distribution
dc.subjectQueueing network
dc.subjectContent distribution
dc.subjectContent distribution systems
dc.titleExploring the sustainability of credit-incentivized peer-to-peer content distribution
dc.typeConference_Paper
Author Affiliations
  1. The University of Hong Kong
  2. University of Calgary