Wireless LAN spectrum allocation modeling in auction-based game approach

Abstract

Wireless LAN development in recent years has called for more efficient spectrum allocation methods. Two novel Wireless LAN spectrum allocation models, namely the Combination of Single-slot Second-Price Sealed Auction (CSSA) and the Multi-slot Vickrey Auction versus Homogeneous Objects (MVAH), are established. Both models utilize auction principles. Wireless spectrum is time-slotted and spectrum users, i.e. bidders, compete to obtain the time slots. Each bidder is assigned a virtual credit budget at the beginning of the auction. Bidders compete for each slot in every bidding trial or all slots in one bidding trial, according to the bidding rule of adopted allocation model. And all auction participants behave non-cooperatively. The revenues of all auction participants as well as revenue of the whole allocation system are formulated in game approach. The bidding strategy formula for single bidder is thereafter derived by differentiating the revenue formula under budget limit. Each bidder adjusts its bids equal to the best response bids which are computed from the bidding strategy formula. By calculating all participants' revenue throughout the whole auction, the allocation pattern is therefore formed and system efficiency values for both allocation models are computed and compared. © 2011 IEEE.