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Conference Paper: A discriminative bid-cap setting method for ex ante market power regulation

TitleA discriminative bid-cap setting method for ex ante market power regulation
Authors
Feng, DZhong, JGan, D
KeywordsBenchmark Regulation
Bidcap
Electricity Market
Market Power Mitigation
Must Run Ratio
Optimal Bidding
Residue Demand
Issue Date2007
Citation
2007 Ieee Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Pes, 2007 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PES.2007.386126
AbstractDue to the oligopoly characteristics of power generation and the inelasticity of electric demand, a whole-sale electricity spot market needs a "benchmark regulation". A novel quantitative method is proposed in this paper to set bid-caps based on the residue demand analysis and the optimal bidding analysis of individual generators. The proposed method employs a discriminative framework for more efficient market regulation. The results of the case study demonstrate that the proposed method can prevent market power exercising while minimizing the interference with the market. The proposed bid-cap setting method is potentially useful for market power mitigation. © 2007 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/158507
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFeng, Den_US
dc.contributor.authorZhong, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorGan, Den_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:59:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:59:59Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.citation2007 Ieee Power Engineering Society General Meeting, Pes, 2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/158507-
dc.description.abstractDue to the oligopoly characteristics of power generation and the inelasticity of electric demand, a whole-sale electricity spot market needs a "benchmark regulation". A novel quantitative method is proposed in this paper to set bid-caps based on the residue demand analysis and the optimal bidding analysis of individual generators. The proposed method employs a discriminative framework for more efficient market regulation. The results of the case study demonstrate that the proposed method can prevent market power exercising while minimizing the interference with the market. The proposed bid-cap setting method is potentially useful for market power mitigation. © 2007 IEEE.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartof2007 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, PESen_US
dc.subjectBenchmark Regulationen_US
dc.subjectBidcapen_US
dc.subjectElectricity Marketen_US
dc.subjectMarket Power Mitigationen_US
dc.subjectMust Run Ratioen_US
dc.subjectOptimal Biddingen_US
dc.subjectResidue Demanden_US
dc.titleA discriminative bid-cap setting method for ex ante market power regulationen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhong, J:jinzhong@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhong, J=rp00212en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PES.2007.386126en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-42549111091en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-42549111091&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridFeng, D=7401981343en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhong, J=13905948700en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridGan, D=7005499404en_US

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