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Article: Avian influenza virus infections in humans

TitleAvian influenza virus infections in humans
Authors
Issue Date2006
PublisherAmerican College of Chest Physicians. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.chestjournal.org
Citation
Chest, 2006, v. 129 n. 1, p. 156-168 How to Cite?
AbstractSeroepidemiologic and virologic studies since 1889 suggested that human influenza pandemics were caused by H1, H2, and H3 subtypes of influenza A viruses. If not for the 1997 avian A/H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong of China, subtype H2 is the likely candidate for the next pandemic. However, unlike previous poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza due to H5 that were controlled by depopulation with or without vaccination, the presently circulating A/H5N1 genotype Z virus has since been spreading from Southern China to other parts of the world. Migratory birds and, less likely, bird trafficking are believed to be globalizing the avian influenza A/H5N1 epidemic in poultry. More than 200 human cases of avian influenza virus infection due to A/H5, A/H7, and A/H9 subtypes mainly as a result of poultry-to-human transmission have been reported with a > 50% ease fatality rate for A/H5N1 infections. A mutant or reassortant virus capable of efficient human-to-human transmission could trigger another influenza pandemic. The recent isolation of this virus in extrapulmonary sites of human diseases suggests that the high fatality of this infection may be more than just the result of a cytolcine storm triggered by the pulmonary disease. The emergence of resistance to adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) and recently oseltamivir while H5N1 vaccines are still at the developmental stage of phase I clinical trial are causes for grave concern. Moreover, the to-be pandemic strain may have little cross immunogenicity to the presently tested vaccine strain. The relative importance and usefulness of airborne, droplet, or contact precautions in infection control are still uncertain. Laboratory-acquired avian influenza H7N7 has been reported, and the laboratory strains of human influenza H2N2 could also be the cause of another pandemic. The control of this impending disaster requires more research in addition to national and international preparedness at various levels. The epidemiology, virology, clinical features, laboratory diagnosis, management, and hospital infection control measures are reviewed from a clinical perspective.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/157438
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 5.94
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.176
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWong, SSYen_US
dc.contributor.authorYuen, KYen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:49:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:49:58Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.citationChest, 2006, v. 129 n. 1, p. 156-168en_US
dc.identifier.issn0012-3692en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/157438-
dc.description.abstractSeroepidemiologic and virologic studies since 1889 suggested that human influenza pandemics were caused by H1, H2, and H3 subtypes of influenza A viruses. If not for the 1997 avian A/H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong of China, subtype H2 is the likely candidate for the next pandemic. However, unlike previous poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza due to H5 that were controlled by depopulation with or without vaccination, the presently circulating A/H5N1 genotype Z virus has since been spreading from Southern China to other parts of the world. Migratory birds and, less likely, bird trafficking are believed to be globalizing the avian influenza A/H5N1 epidemic in poultry. More than 200 human cases of avian influenza virus infection due to A/H5, A/H7, and A/H9 subtypes mainly as a result of poultry-to-human transmission have been reported with a > 50% ease fatality rate for A/H5N1 infections. A mutant or reassortant virus capable of efficient human-to-human transmission could trigger another influenza pandemic. The recent isolation of this virus in extrapulmonary sites of human diseases suggests that the high fatality of this infection may be more than just the result of a cytolcine storm triggered by the pulmonary disease. The emergence of resistance to adamantanes (amantadine and rimantadine) and recently oseltamivir while H5N1 vaccines are still at the developmental stage of phase I clinical trial are causes for grave concern. Moreover, the to-be pandemic strain may have little cross immunogenicity to the presently tested vaccine strain. The relative importance and usefulness of airborne, droplet, or contact precautions in infection control are still uncertain. Laboratory-acquired avian influenza H7N7 has been reported, and the laboratory strains of human influenza H2N2 could also be the cause of another pandemic. The control of this impending disaster requires more research in addition to national and international preparedness at various levels. The epidemiology, virology, clinical features, laboratory diagnosis, management, and hospital infection control measures are reviewed from a clinical perspective.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican College of Chest Physicians. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.chestjournal.orgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofChesten_US
dc.subject.meshAnimalsen_US
dc.subject.meshDisease Outbreaksen_US
dc.subject.meshDisease Transmission, Infectiousen_US
dc.subject.meshHumansen_US
dc.subject.meshIncidenceen_US
dc.subject.meshInfluenza A Virus, H5n1 Subtype - Pathogenicityen_US
dc.subject.meshInfluenza A Virus, H7n7 Subtype - Pathogenicityen_US
dc.subject.meshInfluenza In Birds - Transmissionen_US
dc.subject.meshInfluenza, Human - Epidemiology - Transmission - Virologyen_US
dc.subject.meshPoultryen_US
dc.subject.meshRna, Viral - Geneticsen_US
dc.subject.meshWorld Healthen_US
dc.subject.meshZoonosesen_US
dc.titleAvian influenza virus infections in humansen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWong, SSY:samsonsy@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailYuen, KY:kyyuen@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWong, SSY=rp00395en_US
dc.identifier.authorityYuen, KY=rp00366en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1378/chest.129.1.156en_US
dc.identifier.pmid16424427-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-33144461911en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros118582-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-33144461911&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume129en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage156en_US
dc.identifier.epage168en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000234944900026-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWong, SSY=13310021400en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYuen, KY=36078079100en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike880553-

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