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Article: The curious model of internal monitoring mechanisms of listed corporations in China: The sinonisation process

TitleThe curious model of internal monitoring mechanisms of listed corporations in China: The sinonisation process
Authors
KeywordsDual Monitoring System
Independent Director
Sinonisation
Supervisory Board
Issue Date2011
PublisherTMC Asser Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=EBR
Citation
European Business Organization Law Review, 2011, v. 12 n. 3, p. 469-507 How to Cite?
AbstractAbstract Corporate governance in China has gone through enormous changes since China embraced the idea of market economy in 1978. Most of these changes were initially inspired by the German and Japanese but more recently by the Anglo-American systems. There have been varying degrees of success and failure in this process. What are the reasons behind its success and failure? What is the way forward? In this article, we focus on the evolution of internal monitoring mechanisms in listed companies to explain that the process of borrowing foreign law in China is not a simple process of convergence or persistence, as is believed by the convergence and persistence schools. It is a process of what we call sinonisation and this is the reason behind its success and failure. As we attempt to explain, the sinonisation process is the right approach for China given its current state of economic, social and political development. Thus, it is not helpful to critique the Chinese system from the convergence or persistence perspective. China needs to develop its own model and the sinonisation process allows this to happen. However, Chinese law-makers and reformers need to recognise the weaknesses in the sinonisation process and take steps to remove these impediments in order for a workable model to be developed. © 2011 Copyright T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/156014
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.222
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.202
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGoo, SHen_US
dc.contributor.authorHong, FXen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:39:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:39:29Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Business Organization Law Review, 2011, v. 12 n. 3, p. 469-507en_US
dc.identifier.issn1566-7529en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/156014-
dc.description.abstractAbstract Corporate governance in China has gone through enormous changes since China embraced the idea of market economy in 1978. Most of these changes were initially inspired by the German and Japanese but more recently by the Anglo-American systems. There have been varying degrees of success and failure in this process. What are the reasons behind its success and failure? What is the way forward? In this article, we focus on the evolution of internal monitoring mechanisms in listed companies to explain that the process of borrowing foreign law in China is not a simple process of convergence or persistence, as is believed by the convergence and persistence schools. It is a process of what we call sinonisation and this is the reason behind its success and failure. As we attempt to explain, the sinonisation process is the right approach for China given its current state of economic, social and political development. Thus, it is not helpful to critique the Chinese system from the convergence or persistence perspective. China needs to develop its own model and the sinonisation process allows this to happen. However, Chinese law-makers and reformers need to recognise the weaknesses in the sinonisation process and take steps to remove these impediments in order for a workable model to be developed. © 2011 Copyright T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherTMC Asser Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=EBRen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Business Organization Law Reviewen_US
dc.subjectDual Monitoring Systemen_US
dc.subjectIndependent Directoren_US
dc.subjectSinonisationen_US
dc.subjectSupervisory Boarden_US
dc.titleThe curious model of internal monitoring mechanisms of listed corporations in China: The sinonisation processen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailGoo, SH:shgoo@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityGoo, SH=rp01248en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1566752911300055en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-82655162509en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros210521-
dc.identifier.hkuros195982-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-82655162509&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage469en_US
dc.identifier.epage507en_US
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridGoo, SH=55221386600en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHong, FX=54415734700en_US

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