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Article: Price competition and coordination in a multi-echelon supply chain

TitlePrice competition and coordination in a multi-echelon supply chain
Authors
KeywordsChannel Structure
Multi-Echelon Supply Chain
Nash Game
Power Structure
Pricing
Stackelberg Game
Issue Date2010
PublisherInternational Association of Engineers. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.engineeringletters.com/
Citation
Engineering Letters, 2010, v. 18 n. 4 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper studies price coordination problem in a three-echelon supply chain composed of a single supplier, a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Three types of channel structures are considered, namely, the decentralized, the semi-integrated, and the integrated. Two power structures are studied for the decentralized and the semi-integrated channels. The leader-follower power structure is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer always takes the leadership, while the independent power structure is treated as a simultaneous non-cooperative game (simply Nash game). We explore the effects of power structures, channel structures and market parameters on equilibrium prices and profits. The results show that the manufacturer or the integrated members had better take the channel leadership. We also find that the integration for the manufacturer and the retailer cannot always improve their profits in a monopoly. Besides, when product cost is larger than a certain echelon, the chain members' profits will increase as the market becomes more sensitive to the retail price.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155939
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.241
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Yen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuang, GQen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:38:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:38:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.citationEngineering Letters, 2010, v. 18 n. 4en_US
dc.identifier.issn1816-093Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155939-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies price coordination problem in a three-echelon supply chain composed of a single supplier, a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Three types of channel structures are considered, namely, the decentralized, the semi-integrated, and the integrated. Two power structures are studied for the decentralized and the semi-integrated channels. The leader-follower power structure is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer always takes the leadership, while the independent power structure is treated as a simultaneous non-cooperative game (simply Nash game). We explore the effects of power structures, channel structures and market parameters on equilibrium prices and profits. The results show that the manufacturer or the integrated members had better take the channel leadership. We also find that the integration for the manufacturer and the retailer cannot always improve their profits in a monopoly. Besides, when product cost is larger than a certain echelon, the chain members' profits will increase as the market becomes more sensitive to the retail price.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherInternational Association of Engineers. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.engineeringletters.com/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofEngineering Lettersen_US
dc.subjectChannel Structureen_US
dc.subjectMulti-Echelon Supply Chainen_US
dc.subjectNash Gameen_US
dc.subjectPower Structureen_US
dc.subjectPricingen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg Gameen_US
dc.titlePrice competition and coordination in a multi-echelon supply chainen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailHuang, GQ:gqhuang@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, GQ=rp00118en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-78649935985en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-78649935985&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume18en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.publisher.placeHong Kongen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, Y=36572019900en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, GQ=7403425048en_US

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