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Article: Oligopolistic competition of gencos in reactive power ancillary service provisions

TitleOligopolistic competition of gencos in reactive power ancillary service provisions
Authors
KeywordsMathematical Problem With Complementarity Constraints
Multi-Leader-Follower Games
Reactive Power
Strategic Offering
Supply Function Equilibrium
Issue Date2009
PublisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=59
Citation
Ieee Transactions On Power Systems, 2009, v. 24 n. 3, p. 1256-1265 How to Cite?
AbstractThe need for a market based approach for reactive power procurement has been recognized by FERC. Due to the localized characteristic of reactive power, regulatory mechanisms are necessary to mitigate the possibility of holding market power by generators. The regulator is responsible for devising the regulatory mechanisms that provide incentives to generators to supply reactive power while preventing the abuse of market power. This paper proposes a mathematical model to simulate the strategic behavior of generators supplying reactive power while considering the system operator's schedule. The proposed method can be used by the regulator to simulate the market behavior in the reactive power supply. We further study how regulatory policies affect the strategic behavior. An alternative price cap method has been proposed and tested in the numerical example to mitigate the effect of strategic behavior of generators in reactive power procurement by the system operator. The numerical examples are tested on the Nordic 32-bus system. © 2009 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155533
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.342
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.126
ISI Accession Number ID
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Council of Hong KongHKU 7196/07E
TPWRS-00821-2008
Funding Information:

This work was supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under Grant HKU 7196/07E. Paper no. TPWRS-00821-2008.

References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChitkara, Pen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhong, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorBhattacharya, Ken_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:33:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:33:58Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citationIeee Transactions On Power Systems, 2009, v. 24 n. 3, p. 1256-1265en_US
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155533-
dc.description.abstractThe need for a market based approach for reactive power procurement has been recognized by FERC. Due to the localized characteristic of reactive power, regulatory mechanisms are necessary to mitigate the possibility of holding market power by generators. The regulator is responsible for devising the regulatory mechanisms that provide incentives to generators to supply reactive power while preventing the abuse of market power. This paper proposes a mathematical model to simulate the strategic behavior of generators supplying reactive power while considering the system operator's schedule. The proposed method can be used by the regulator to simulate the market behavior in the reactive power supply. We further study how regulatory policies affect the strategic behavior. An alternative price cap method has been proposed and tested in the numerical example to mitigate the effect of strategic behavior of generators in reactive power procurement by the system operator. The numerical examples are tested on the Nordic 32-bus system. © 2009 IEEE.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=59en_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions on Power Systemsen_US
dc.rightsIEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Copyright © Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-
dc.rights©2009 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectMathematical Problem With Complementarity Constraintsen_US
dc.subjectMulti-Leader-Follower Gamesen_US
dc.subjectReactive Poweren_US
dc.subjectStrategic Offeringen_US
dc.subjectSupply Function Equilibriumen_US
dc.titleOligopolistic competition of gencos in reactive power ancillary service provisionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhong, J:jinzhong@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhong, J=rp00212en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TPWRS.2009.2023266en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-68349133312en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros162822-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-68349133312&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume24en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage1256en_US
dc.identifier.epage1265en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000268282600016-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChitkara, P=7801585418en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhong, J=13905948700en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridBhattacharya, K=7101600850en_US

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