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Article: Reliability management model based on principal-agent mechanism

TitleReliability management model based on principal-agent mechanism
Authors
KeywordsElectricity Market
Principal-Agent Theory
Reliability
Issue Date2007
PublisherZhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuehui. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.dwjs.com.cn
Citation
Zhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuebao/Proceedings Of The Chinese Society Of Electrical Engineering, 2007, v. 27 n. 1, p. 19-24 How to Cite?
AbstractThe paper analyzes the problem of inefficient allocation of reliability resources in the terms of public goods under traditional regulatory environment, which is resulted from power enterprises' monopoly status and the lack of customers' involvement. To improve the efficiency of allocation, this paper applies principal-agent mechanism into the relationship of customers and power enterprises, and then studies the configuration of key parameters of incentive contract and the influence over the power companies' effort from the information perspective. In addition, the decision-making behaviors of agent, participation of principal and dynamic relationship of the corresponding contracts, are analyzed modally. Numerical results show that different incentive contracts can guide power enterprises to maintain and guarantee the tendency to the optimal level of power system reliability which are designed by customers according to the different information states and risk attitudes. Furthermore, it is proved that the mechanism can fully reveal the reliability demand information and promote the optimal allocation of reliability resources.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155366
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.881
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, WMen_US
dc.contributor.authorKang, CQen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhong, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorHu, ZHen_US
dc.contributor.authorCheng, Len_US
dc.contributor.authorXia, Qen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:33:05Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:33:05Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.citationZhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuebao/Proceedings Of The Chinese Society Of Electrical Engineering, 2007, v. 27 n. 1, p. 19-24en_US
dc.identifier.issn0258-8013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155366-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the problem of inefficient allocation of reliability resources in the terms of public goods under traditional regulatory environment, which is resulted from power enterprises' monopoly status and the lack of customers' involvement. To improve the efficiency of allocation, this paper applies principal-agent mechanism into the relationship of customers and power enterprises, and then studies the configuration of key parameters of incentive contract and the influence over the power companies' effort from the information perspective. In addition, the decision-making behaviors of agent, participation of principal and dynamic relationship of the corresponding contracts, are analyzed modally. Numerical results show that different incentive contracts can guide power enterprises to maintain and guarantee the tendency to the optimal level of power system reliability which are designed by customers according to the different information states and risk attitudes. Furthermore, it is proved that the mechanism can fully reveal the reliability demand information and promote the optimal allocation of reliability resources.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherZhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuehui. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.dwjs.com.cnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofZhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuebao/Proceedings of the Chinese Society of Electrical Engineeringen_US
dc.subjectElectricity Marketen_US
dc.subjectPrincipal-Agent Theoryen_US
dc.subjectReliabilityen_US
dc.titleReliability management model based on principal-agent mechanismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhong, J:jinzhong@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhong, J=rp00212en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34147217422en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-34147217422&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume27en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage19en_US
dc.identifier.epage24en_US
dc.publisher.placeChinaen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLin, WM=55186137200en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKang, CQ=7402312938en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhong, J=13905948700en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHu, ZH=7404211556en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridCheng, L=25644430300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXia, Q=7202871531en_US

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