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Article: Provable security for cryptographic protocols - exact analysis and engineering applications

TitleProvable security for cryptographic protocols - exact analysis and engineering applications
Authors
Issue Date1998
PublisherI O S Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.iospress.nl/html/09266801.php
Citation
Journal Of Computer Security, 1998, v. 6 n. 1-2, p. 23-52 How to Cite?
AbstractWe develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from provable-security-style proofs of security. The approach is illustrated with a simple, yet useful protocol. Our main result provides the first published proof of an exact probabilistic relationship between a high-level protocol and multiple cryptographic primitives. This exact relationship enables us to rigorously derive concrete recommendations on the bitlengths of cryptographic keys and on how often principals should rekey. As an additional benefit of our approach, the process of developing our theorem and proof lead us to identify and implement an improvement in our example protocol.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155062
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.630

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGray Iii, James Wen_US
dc.contributor.authorEpsilon Ip, Kin Faien_US
dc.contributor.authorLui, KingShanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T08:31:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-08T08:31:42Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Computer Security, 1998, v. 6 n. 1-2, p. 23-52en_US
dc.identifier.issn0926-227Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/155062-
dc.description.abstractWe develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from provable-security-style proofs of security. The approach is illustrated with a simple, yet useful protocol. Our main result provides the first published proof of an exact probabilistic relationship between a high-level protocol and multiple cryptographic primitives. This exact relationship enables us to rigorously derive concrete recommendations on the bitlengths of cryptographic keys and on how often principals should rekey. As an additional benefit of our approach, the process of developing our theorem and proof lead us to identify and implement an improvement in our example protocol.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherI O S Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.iospress.nl/html/09266801.phpen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Computer Securityen_US
dc.titleProvable security for cryptographic protocols - exact analysis and engineering applicationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLui, KingShan:kslui@eee.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLui, KingShan=rp00188en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0031620598en_US
dc.identifier.volume6en_US
dc.identifier.issue1-2en_US
dc.identifier.spage23en_US
dc.identifier.epage52en_US
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridGray III, James W=7404300433en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridEpsilon Ip, Kin Fai=6507892891en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLui, KingShan=7103390016en_US

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