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Conference Paper: Identity-based encryption resilient to continual auxiliary leakage

TitleIdentity-based encryption resilient to continual auxiliary leakage
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/
Citation
The 31st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT 2012), Cambridge, UK., 15-19 April 2012. In Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 2012, v. 7237, p. 117-134 How to Cite?
AbstractWe devise the first identity-based encryption (IBE) that remains secure even when the adversary is equipped with auxiliary input (STOC '09)-any computationally uninvertible function of the master secret key and the identity-based secret key. In particular, this is more general than the tolerance of Chow et al.'s IBE schemes (CCS '10) and Lewko et al.'s IBE schemes (TCC '11), in which the leakage is bounded by a pre-defined number of bits; yet our construction is also fully secure in the standard model based on only static assumptions, and can be easily extended to give the first hierarchical IBE with auxiliary input. Furthermore, we propose the model of continual auxiliary leakage (CAL) that can capture both memory leakage and continual leakage. The CAL model is particularly appealing since it not only gives a clean definition when there are multiple secret keys (the master secret key, the identity-based secret keys, and their refreshed versions), but also gives a generalized definition that does not assume secure erasure of secret keys after each key update. This is different from previous definitions of continual leakage (FOCS '10, TCC '11) in which the length-bounded leakage is only the secret key in the current time period. Finally, we devise an IBE scheme which is secure in this model. A major tool we use is the modified Goldreich-Levin theorem (TCC '10), which until now has only been applied in traditional public-key encryption with a single private key. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.
DescriptionConference Theme: Advances in Cryptology
LNCS v. 7237 entitled: Advances in cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2012 : 31st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques ... proceedings
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/152039
ISSN
2005 Impact Factor: 0.402
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.252
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYuen, THen_US
dc.contributor.authorChow, SSMen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Yen_US
dc.contributor.authorYiu, SMen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-26T06:32:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-26T06:32:46Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 31st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT 2012), Cambridge, UK., 15-19 April 2012. In Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 2012, v. 7237, p. 117-134en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/152039-
dc.descriptionConference Theme: Advances in Cryptology-
dc.descriptionLNCS v. 7237 entitled: Advances in cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2012 : 31st Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques ... proceedings-
dc.description.abstractWe devise the first identity-based encryption (IBE) that remains secure even when the adversary is equipped with auxiliary input (STOC '09)-any computationally uninvertible function of the master secret key and the identity-based secret key. In particular, this is more general than the tolerance of Chow et al.'s IBE schemes (CCS '10) and Lewko et al.'s IBE schemes (TCC '11), in which the leakage is bounded by a pre-defined number of bits; yet our construction is also fully secure in the standard model based on only static assumptions, and can be easily extended to give the first hierarchical IBE with auxiliary input. Furthermore, we propose the model of continual auxiliary leakage (CAL) that can capture both memory leakage and continual leakage. The CAL model is particularly appealing since it not only gives a clean definition when there are multiple secret keys (the master secret key, the identity-based secret keys, and their refreshed versions), but also gives a generalized definition that does not assume secure erasure of secret keys after each key update. This is different from previous definitions of continual leakage (FOCS '10, TCC '11) in which the length-bounded leakage is only the secret key in the current time period. Finally, we devise an IBE scheme which is secure in this model. A major tool we use is the modified Goldreich-Levin theorem (TCC '10), which until now has only been applied in traditional public-key encryption with a single private key. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Scienceen_US
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com-
dc.titleIdentity-based encryption resilient to continual auxiliary leakageen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailYiu, SM: smyiu@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityYiu, SM=rp00207en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_9en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84859970436en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros205216-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84859970436&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume7237en_US
dc.identifier.spage117en_US
dc.identifier.epage134en_US
dc.publisher.placeGermanyen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYuen, TH=8902468800en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChow, SSM=8980575500en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, Y=36681041300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYiu, SM=7003282240en_US
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 140117-

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