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Article: Deference, expertise and information-gathering powers

TitleDeference, expertise and information-gathering powers
Authors
KeywordsHuman Rights Act 1998
Deference
Judicial restraint
Separation of powers
National security
Institutional competence
Issue Date2012
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd.
Citation
Legal Studies, 2012, p. 1-28 How to Cite?
AbstractThis article explores two questions. First, in adjudicating claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, should the court defer to the executive or legislature on the ground that the latter two institutions possess superior expertise or information-gathering powers, when such expertise or powers fail to generate persuasive first-order reasons for the court? This article argues that rationality requires courts to defer on these second-order grounds of institutional capacity in situations of judicial uncertainty. Secondly, this article examines an underexplored question in the current literature: when is it justified for courts to consider the government as possessing second-order grounds of institutional capacity that warrant deference? It is argued that rational, impartial and open adjudication in the post-HRA era requires the government to prove its claims of superior institutional capacity, and courts to openly scrutinise such claims by considering a number of factors, including, crucially, the government institution’s track record of expertise and credibility.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/148851
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.328
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, C-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-14T06:47:56Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-14T06:47:56Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.citationLegal Studies, 2012, p. 1-28-
dc.identifier.issn0261-3875-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/148851-
dc.description.abstractThis article explores two questions. First, in adjudicating claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, should the court defer to the executive or legislature on the ground that the latter two institutions possess superior expertise or information-gathering powers, when such expertise or powers fail to generate persuasive first-order reasons for the court? This article argues that rationality requires courts to defer on these second-order grounds of institutional capacity in situations of judicial uncertainty. Secondly, this article examines an underexplored question in the current literature: when is it justified for courts to consider the government as possessing second-order grounds of institutional capacity that warrant deference? It is argued that rational, impartial and open adjudication in the post-HRA era requires the government to prove its claims of superior institutional capacity, and courts to openly scrutinise such claims by considering a number of factors, including, crucially, the government institution’s track record of expertise and credibility.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd.-
dc.relation.ispartofLegal Studies-
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectHuman Rights Act 1998-
dc.subjectDeference-
dc.subjectJudicial restraint-
dc.subjectSeparation of powers-
dc.subjectNational security-
dc.subjectInstitutional competence-
dc.titleDeference, expertise and information-gathering powersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChan, C: corachan@hku.hk-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1748-121X.2012.00259.x-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84886291072-
dc.identifier.hkuros202840-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage28-
dc.identifier.eissn1748-121X-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.ssrn2066022-
dc.identifier.hkulrp2012/028-

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