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Article: Risk-free approaches to the priority view

TitleRisk-free approaches to the priority view
Authors
KeywordsPhilosophy
Epistemology
Ontology
Ethics
Logic
Issue Date2013
PublisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0165-0106
Citation
Erkenntnis, 2013, v. 78 n. 2, p. 421-449 How to Cite?
AbstractParfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But it argues that neither argument succeeds, and more generally, that it is not possible to make sense of the priority view in a risk-free framework. As a diagnosis, the article suggests that the literature on the priority view has paid insufficient attention to axiomatization and has most likely mistaken the proper role of the use of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics of distribution. Reasons are eventually offered for thinking that despite appearances, approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is quite natural. © 2012 The Author(s).
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/147132
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.699
ISI Accession Number ID
References

Brown, C. (2007). Prioritarianism for variable populations, Philosophical Studies 134, 325–361. doi: 10.1007/s11098-005-0897-5

Gibbard, A. (2008). Reconciling our aims. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.001.0001

Harsanyi, J. (1955). Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility, Journal of Political Economy 63, 309–21. doi: 10.1086/257678

Jackson, F. (2000). From metaphysics to ethics: A defense of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0198250614.001.0001

Jensen, K.K. (2003) What is the difference between (moderate) egalitarianism and prioritarianism?, Economics and Philosophy 19, 89–109. doi: 10.1017/S0266267103001032

McCarthy, D. (2008). Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II, Economics and Philosophy 24, 1–33. doi: 10.1017/S026626710800165X

McKerlie, D. (2001). Dimensions of equality, Utilitas 13, 263–288. doi: 10.1017/S0953820800003186

Myerson, R. (1981). Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and the timing effect in social choice problems Econometrica 49, 883-897. doi: 10.2307/1912508

Rabinowicz, W. (2002). Prioritarianism for prospects, Utilitas 14, 2–21. doi: 10.1017/S0953820800003368

Segal, U. (2006). Fair bias, Economics and Philosophy 22, 213–29. doi: 10.1017/S0266267106000873

Sen, A. (1973) On economic inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi: 10.1093/0198281935.001.0001

Tungodden, B. (2003). The value of equality, Economics and Philosophy 19, 1–44. doi: 10.1017/S0266267103001007

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMcCarthy, Den_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-28T08:20:11Z-
dc.date.available2012-05-28T08:20:11Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_HK
dc.identifier.citationErkenntnis, 2013, v. 78 n. 2, p. 421-449en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/147132-
dc.description.abstractParfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But it argues that neither argument succeeds, and more generally, that it is not possible to make sense of the priority view in a risk-free framework. As a diagnosis, the article suggests that the literature on the priority view has paid insufficient attention to axiomatization and has most likely mistaken the proper role of the use of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics of distribution. Reasons are eventually offered for thinking that despite appearances, approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is quite natural. © 2012 The Author(s).en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0165-0106en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofErkenntnisen_HK
dc.rightsThe Author(s)en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong Licenseen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectLogicen_US
dc.titleRisk-free approaches to the priority viewen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://www.springerlink.com/link-out/?id=2104&code=T6T5628360032H17&MUD=MPen_US
dc.identifier.emailMcCarthy, D: mccarthy@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityMcCarthy, D=rp01447en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10670-012-9377-4en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84876677583en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros206539-
dc.relation.referencesBrown, C. (2007). Prioritarianism for variable populations, Philosophical Studies 134, 325–361.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1007/s11098-005-0897-5en_US
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dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.001.0001en_US
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dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1086/257678en_US
dc.relation.referencesJackson, F. (2000). From metaphysics to ethics: A defense of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1093/0198250614.001.0001en_US
dc.relation.referencesJensen, K.K. (2003) What is the difference between (moderate) egalitarianism and prioritarianism?, Economics and Philosophy 19, 89–109.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S0266267103001032en_US
dc.relation.referencesMcCarthy, D. (2008). Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II, Economics and Philosophy 24, 1–33.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S026626710800165Xen_US
dc.relation.referencesMcKerlie, D. (2001). Dimensions of equality, Utilitas 13, 263–288.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S0953820800003186en_US
dc.relation.referencesMyerson, R. (1981). Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and the timing effect in social choice problems Econometrica 49, 883-897.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.2307/1912508en_US
dc.relation.referencesRabinowicz, W. (2002). Prioritarianism for prospects, Utilitas 14, 2–21.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S0953820800003368en_US
dc.relation.referencesSegal, U. (2006). Fair bias, Economics and Philosophy 22, 213–29.en_US
dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S0266267106000873en_US
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dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1093/0198281935.001.0001en_US
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dc.relation.referencesdoi: 10.1017/S0266267103001007en_US
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dc.identifier.spage421en_HK
dc.identifier.epage449en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8420en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000317928000011-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.description.otherSpringer Open Choice, 28 May 2012en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridMcCarthy, D=15019816900en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike10690970-

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