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Article: Contract enforcement and family control of business: Evidence from China

TitleContract enforcement and family control of business: Evidence from China
Authors
Lu, YTao, Z
KeywordsChina's private enterprises
Contract enforcement
Family control of business
Issue Date2009
PublisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jce
Citation
Journal Of Comparative Economics, 2009, v. 37 n. 4, p. 597-609 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2009.06.002
AbstractFamily control of business is prevalent in developing economies, and one of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak contract enforcement in such economies. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business using a sample of China's private enterprises. It is found that weaker contract enforcement is associated with the higher degree of family control of business. Our results are robust to the control for omitted variables and reserve causality issues, to the adjustment for the sample attrition bias, to the use of a sub-sample, and to the inclusion of other explanations for the family control of business. © 2009 Association for Comparative Economic Studies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/145962
ISSN
0147-5967
2023 Impact Factor: 2.8
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.504
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000272580500006
References
References in Scopus
Errata
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2009.11.003

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLu, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-27T09:04:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-27T09:04:17Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Comparative Economics, 2009, v. 37 n. 4, p. 597-609en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/145962-
dc.description.abstractFamily control of business is prevalent in developing economies, and one of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak contract enforcement in such economies. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business using a sample of China's private enterprises. It is found that weaker contract enforcement is associated with the higher degree of family control of business. Our results are robust to the control for omitted variables and reserve causality issues, to the adjustment for the sample attrition bias, to the use of a sub-sample, and to the inclusion of other explanations for the family control of business. © 2009 Association for Comparative Economic Studies.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jceen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Comparative Economicsen_HK
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectChina's private enterprisesen_HK
dc.subjectContract enforcementen_HK
dc.subjectFamily control of businessen_HK
dc.titleContract enforcement and family control of business: Evidence from Chinaen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLu, Y: xzhongkanson@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLu, Y=rp01081en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturepreprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jce.2009.06.002en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-70350761687en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros198886en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-70350761687&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume37en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage597en_HK
dc.identifier.epage609en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000272580500006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.relation.erratumdoi:10.1016/j.jce.2009.11.003-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLu, Y=54901610300en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike5357506-
dc.identifier.issnl0147-5967-

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