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Article: The Chronicle of a Disease Foretold: Pandemic H1N1 and the Construction of a Global Health Security Threat

TitleThe Chronicle of a Disease Foretold: Pandemic H1N1 and the Construction of a Global Health Security Threat
Authors
KeywordsFraming
Global health security
Pandemic influenza
Securitisation
Issue Date2011
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PS
Citation
Political Studies, 2011, v. 59 n. 4, p. 797-812 How to Cite?
AbstractThe period beginning in 2004 saw an extraordinary spurt in attention paid to avian and pandemic influenza in the United States and at the global level. A disease that for decades had languished in the 'dull but worthy' category of infectious diseases was elevated to a risk to global health security. The securitisation of influenza was not unproblematic. The influenza pandemic of 2009 turned out to be far milder than anticipated, and much of the scientific basis on which planning had proceeded and resources had been mobilised turned out to be wrong. Developing countries with other disease priorities were urged to pour resources into pandemic planning exercises and change poultry-raising practices. The article argues that for an issue to be securitised as a global health threat, it is essential that the United States takes the lead role (or at the very least supports efforts by other leading powers). It uses the Copenhagen School's analysis to examine how avian and pandemic influenza was securitised in the United States, and then uses the concept of framing to examine why this disease was securitised by looking at the prior existence of an issue culture or discourse around emerging infectious diseases, which gained salience after the 2011 anthrax attacks. It finally looks at the impact of securitisation on countries with different priorities. © 2011 The Author. Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/144736
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.156
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.067
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAbraham, Ten_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T06:20:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T06:20:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationPolitical Studies, 2011, v. 59 n. 4, p. 797-812en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0032-3217en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/144736-
dc.description.abstractThe period beginning in 2004 saw an extraordinary spurt in attention paid to avian and pandemic influenza in the United States and at the global level. A disease that for decades had languished in the 'dull but worthy' category of infectious diseases was elevated to a risk to global health security. The securitisation of influenza was not unproblematic. The influenza pandemic of 2009 turned out to be far milder than anticipated, and much of the scientific basis on which planning had proceeded and resources had been mobilised turned out to be wrong. Developing countries with other disease priorities were urged to pour resources into pandemic planning exercises and change poultry-raising practices. The article argues that for an issue to be securitised as a global health threat, it is essential that the United States takes the lead role (or at the very least supports efforts by other leading powers). It uses the Copenhagen School's analysis to examine how avian and pandemic influenza was securitised in the United States, and then uses the concept of framing to examine why this disease was securitised by looking at the prior existence of an issue culture or discourse around emerging infectious diseases, which gained salience after the 2011 anthrax attacks. It finally looks at the impact of securitisation on countries with different priorities. © 2011 The Author. Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PSen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofPolitical Studiesen_HK
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.subjectFramingen_HK
dc.subjectGlobal health securityen_HK
dc.subjectPandemic influenzaen_HK
dc.subjectSecuritisationen_HK
dc.titleThe Chronicle of a Disease Foretold: Pandemic H1N1 and the Construction of a Global Health Security Threaten_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailAbraham, T: thomas@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityAbraham, T=rp00578en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00925.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-80755130374en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros198367en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-80755130374&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume59en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage797en_HK
dc.identifier.epage812en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9248-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000297581600003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridAbraham, T=15836927300en_HK

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