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Article: Incentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspective

TitleIncentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspective
Authors
KeywordsCapacity allocation
Competition
Incentive theory
Issue Date2011
PublisherGlobal Science Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.global-sci.org/eajam/
Citation
East Asian Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2011, v. 1 n. 4, p. 379-402 How to Cite?
AbstractA two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible allocation schemes were compared --- viz. the common queue and separate queue schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity. In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular, if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is sufficiently high.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/142368
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.489
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.424
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChoi, SMen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Xen_US
dc.contributor.authorChing, WKen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Men_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-28T02:44:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-28T02:44:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationEast Asian Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2011, v. 1 n. 4, p. 379-402en_US
dc.identifier.issn2079-7362-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/142368-
dc.description.abstractA two-server service network has been studied from the principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by two independent facilities coordinated by an agency, which seeks to devise a strategy to suitably allocate customers to the facilities and to simultaneously determine compensation levels. Two possible allocation schemes were compared --- viz. the common queue and separate queue schemes. The separate queue allocation scheme was shown to give more competition incentives to the independent facilities and to also induce higher service capacity. In this paper, we investigate the general case of a multiple-server queueing model, and again find that the separate queue allocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers and induces higher service capacities. In particular, if there are no severe diseconomies associated with increasing service capacity, it gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when the compensation level is sufficiently high.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherGlobal Science Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.global-sci.org/eajam/-
dc.relation.ispartofEast Asian Journal of Applied Mathematicsen_US
dc.subjectCapacity allocation-
dc.subjectCompetition-
dc.subjectIncentive theory-
dc.titleIncentive effects of multiple-server queueing networks: the principal-agent perspectiveen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChing, WK: wching@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChing, WK=rp00679en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a-
dc.identifier.hkuros197181en_US
dc.identifier.volume1en_US
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage379en_US
dc.identifier.epage402en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000208793300003-
dc.publisher.placeHong Kong-

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