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Book Chapter: The upward and downward spirals in China's anti-corruption enforcement

TitleThe upward and downward spirals in China's anti-corruption enforcement
Authors
KeywordsCorruption
China
Committee for Disciplinary Inspection
Syndicated corruption
Anti-corruption enforcement
Chinese Communist Party
Procuracy
Issue Date2013
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing
Citation
The upward and downward spirals in China's anti-corruption enforcement. In McConville, M & Pils, E (Eds), Comparative Perspectives On Criminal Justice In China, p. 390-410. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013 How to Cite?
AbstractChina's fight against corruption appears to have reached a stalemate. The fluctuation in the number of corruption prosecution, which was a characteristic of the official statistics until the early 1990s, has virtually vanished. Instead, one sees flat lines. The stalemate is surprising given the ideological and organizational adaptation in the fight of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against corruption. Ideologically, the CCP has enhanced its anti-corruption rhetoric and appears more determined than ever to control the spread of corruption. Organizationally, the CCP has increased investment in the anti-corruption establishment and provided additional financial and human resources to anti-corruption institutions. The high profile prosecution of high ranking officials in recent years and the imposition of harsh sentencing, including execution, contrast sharply with the larger institutional inertia. This paper examines anti-corruption enforcement in China. The CCP is taking a hands-on approach in tackling corruption and appears determined to clamp down hard on corruption, as demonstrated by the increase in prosecution of large-scaled corruption cases involving top CCP officials and the institutional renovation, though limited and piecemeal. However, it is clear that the anti-corruption action is taken largely by the CCP's anti-corruption central authority, the Central Committee of Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI). The CCDI takes direct action because local anti-corruption authorities are unable and unwilling to play an effective role.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/142035
ISBN
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFu, H-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-10T01:46:56Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-10T01:46:56Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationThe upward and downward spirals in China's anti-corruption enforcement. In McConville, M & Pils, E (Eds), Comparative Perspectives On Criminal Justice In China, p. 390-410. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013-
dc.identifier.isbn9781781955857-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/142035-
dc.description.abstractChina's fight against corruption appears to have reached a stalemate. The fluctuation in the number of corruption prosecution, which was a characteristic of the official statistics until the early 1990s, has virtually vanished. Instead, one sees flat lines. The stalemate is surprising given the ideological and organizational adaptation in the fight of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against corruption. Ideologically, the CCP has enhanced its anti-corruption rhetoric and appears more determined than ever to control the spread of corruption. Organizationally, the CCP has increased investment in the anti-corruption establishment and provided additional financial and human resources to anti-corruption institutions. The high profile prosecution of high ranking officials in recent years and the imposition of harsh sentencing, including execution, contrast sharply with the larger institutional inertia. This paper examines anti-corruption enforcement in China. The CCP is taking a hands-on approach in tackling corruption and appears determined to clamp down hard on corruption, as demonstrated by the increase in prosecution of large-scaled corruption cases involving top CCP officials and the institutional renovation, though limited and piecemeal. However, it is clear that the anti-corruption action is taken largely by the CCP's anti-corruption central authority, the Central Committee of Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI). The CCDI takes direct action because local anti-corruption authorities are unable and unwilling to play an effective role.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherEdward Elgar Publishing-
dc.relation.ispartofComparative Perspectives On Criminal Justice In China-
dc.subjectCorruption-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.subjectCommittee for Disciplinary Inspection-
dc.subjectSyndicated corruption-
dc.subjectAnti-corruption enforcement-
dc.subjectChinese Communist Party-
dc.subjectProcuracy-
dc.titleThe upward and downward spirals in China's anti-corruption enforcementen_US
dc.typeBook_Chapteren_US
dc.identifier.emailFu, H: hlfu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.hkuros224741-
dc.identifier.spage390-
dc.identifier.epage410-
dc.publisher.placeCheltenham, UK-
dc.identifier.ssrn1883348-
dc.identifier.hkulrp2011/014-

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