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Conference Paper: An axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle

TitleAn axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle
Authors
KeywordsStrategy-proofness
Single-peakedness
Uniform rule
Issue Date2011
Citation
The 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory, Tokyo, Japan, 28 February-2 March 2011. How to Cite?
AbstractOur objective is to identify strategy-proof rules in the allocation problem µa la Benassy (1982). Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and anonymity (or no-envy). While either anonymity or no-envy (both are fairness condition) in his characterizations can be relaxed to weak symmetry (Ching 1994), whether the characterizations can be strengthened along the Pareto dimension has remained open. This question is taken up by this paper. We show that efficiency in Ching's (1994) characterization can be relaxed to continuity and a null-player axiom (irrelevant' agents are not allocated with any amount). The null-player axiom is implied by efficiency.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/141190

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChing, Sen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23T06:27:43Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-23T06:27:43Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory, Tokyo, Japan, 28 February-2 March 2011.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/141190-
dc.description.abstractOur objective is to identify strategy-proof rules in the allocation problem µa la Benassy (1982). Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and anonymity (or no-envy). While either anonymity or no-envy (both are fairness condition) in his characterizations can be relaxed to weak symmetry (Ching 1994), whether the characterizations can be strengthened along the Pareto dimension has remained open. This question is taken up by this paper. We show that efficiency in Ching's (1994) characterization can be relaxed to continuity and a null-player axiom (irrelevant' agents are not allocated with any amount). The null-player axiom is implied by efficiency.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartof6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory 2011en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectStrategy-proofness-
dc.subjectSingle-peakedness-
dc.subjectUniform rule-
dc.titleAn axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principleen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailChing, S: steve.ching@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChing, S=rp01056en_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros194894en_US

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