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Conference Paper: An axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle
| Title | An axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | Strategy-proofness Single-peakedness Uniform rule |
| Issue Date | 2011 |
| Citation | The 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory, Tokyo, Japan, 28 February-2 March 2011. How to Cite? |
| Abstract | Our objective is to identify strategy-proof rules in the allocation problem µa la Benassy (1982). Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and anonymity (or no-envy). While either anonymity or no-envy (both are fairness condition) in his characterizations can be relaxed to weak symmetry (Ching 1994), whether the characterizations can be strengthened along the Pareto dimension has remained open. This question is taken up by this paper. We show that efficiency in Ching's (1994) characterization can be relaxed to continuity and a null-player axiom (irrelevant' agents are not allocated with any amount). The null-player axiom is implied by efficiency. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/141190 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Ching, S | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-23T06:27:43Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2011-09-23T06:27:43Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | The 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory, Tokyo, Japan, 28 February-2 March 2011. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/141190 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Our objective is to identify strategy-proof rules in the allocation problem µa la Benassy (1982). Sprumont (1991) showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and anonymity (or no-envy). While either anonymity or no-envy (both are fairness condition) in his characterizations can be relaxed to weak symmetry (Ching 1994), whether the characterizations can be strengthened along the Pareto dimension has remained open. This question is taken up by this paper. We show that efficiency in Ching's (1994) characterization can be relaxed to continuity and a null-player axiom (irrelevant' agents are not allocated with any amount). The null-player axiom is implied by efficiency. | - |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | 6th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory 2011 | en_US |
| dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | - |
| dc.subject | Single-peakedness | - |
| dc.subject | Uniform rule | - |
| dc.title | An axiomatization of the Uniform Rule without the Pareto Principle | en_US |
| dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
| dc.identifier.email | Ching, S: steve.ching@hku.hk | en_US |
| dc.identifier.authority | Ching, S=rp01056 | en_US |
| dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
| dc.identifier.hkuros | 194894 | en_US |