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Conference Paper: Information acquisition in a war of attrition

TitleInformation acquisition in a war of attrition
Authors
KeywordsInformation acquisition
War of attrition
Information rent
Free riding
Issue Date2011
Citation
The 2011 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, St. Louis, MO., 9-12 June 2011. How to Cite?
AbstractWe consider a war of attrition in which the winner is determined according to the unobservable state of nature on a stochastic deadline and players can acquire information about the state at any time during the game. We study how the players' incentive to acquire information interacts with the verifiability of the acquired information. When the information is verifiable, players only have an incentive to free ride on the opponent's information acquisition and, thus, there is excessive delay. When the information is unverifiable, an informed player obtains information rents. This provides an incentive for players to acquire information more quickly, thereby reducing delay. However, an uninformed player catches up on information acquisition so as not to be exploited by the informed player, which creates redundant duplication in information acquisition. We show that in the most natural class of equilibria the two effects cancel each other out and, thus, the players' payoffs are identical, regardless of whether information is verifiable. We also show that, in our model, the faster the deadline arrives, the longer the conflict lasts.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/141185

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKim, Ken_US
dc.contributor.authorXu, Z-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23T06:27:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-23T06:27:41Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 2011 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, St. Louis, MO., 9-12 June 2011.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/141185-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a war of attrition in which the winner is determined according to the unobservable state of nature on a stochastic deadline and players can acquire information about the state at any time during the game. We study how the players' incentive to acquire information interacts with the verifiability of the acquired information. When the information is verifiable, players only have an incentive to free ride on the opponent's information acquisition and, thus, there is excessive delay. When the information is unverifiable, an informed player obtains information rents. This provides an incentive for players to acquire information more quickly, thereby reducing delay. However, an uninformed player catches up on information acquisition so as not to be exploited by the informed player, which creates redundant duplication in information acquisition. We show that in the most natural class of equilibria the two effects cancel each other out and, thus, the players' payoffs are identical, regardless of whether information is verifiable. We also show that, in our model, the faster the deadline arrives, the longer the conflict lasts.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartof2011 North America Summer Meetings of the Econometric Societyen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectInformation acquisition-
dc.subjectWar of attrition-
dc.subjectInformation rent-
dc.subjectFree riding-
dc.titleInformation acquisition in a war of attritionen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailKim, K: kyungmin-kim@uiowa.eduen_US
dc.identifier.emailXu, Z: zfxu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityXu, Z=rp01117en_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros192903en_US

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