File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Game-theory approach for resident coalitions to allocate green-roof benefits

TitleGame-theory approach for resident coalitions to allocate green-roof benefits
Authors
KeywordsBuilding
Game theory
Public spending
Public-private partnership
Stakeholder
Issue Date2011
PublisherPion Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.envplan.com
Citation
Environment And Planning A, 2011, v. 43 n. 2, p. 363-377 How to Cite?
AbstractRoof greening in cities provides a range of environmental, economic, and social benefits. However, the lack of motivation among property owners in high-rise buildings poses an intractable obstacle to its wide implementation in compact cities. Cooperation amongst stakeholders, from individual-building to city-block scales, could facilitate adoption of green roofing, with implications for urban sustainability. This study is an attempt to evaluate the net gain from roof greening in terms of apportioned collective costs and benefits to a group of property owners. With government tax exemption to encourage green-roof installation, a fair allocation scheme, based on the Shapley value, is adopted to distribute the net gain in a partnership structure. A case study in Hong Kong serves to illustrate the application of the method to allocate theoretically the sharable gain of roof greening translated into monetary terms. The results verify the importance of individual owners in different coalition configurations in moulding the benefit profile. The crux of the financial incentive scheme is the enhanced rewards to optimized cooperation, and the pump-priming triggering of cooperation and action. The benefits of green roofs could be maximized by their widespread and contiguous, rather than piecemeal, installation. Green roofs could reduce both capital and recurrent public expenditures in stormwater management, healthcare, and green-space provision, the savings from which would be more than enough to fund the tax-exemption scheme. The findings yield convincing justifications for government financial incentives to promote public - private partnerships and cooperative coalitions of stakeholders in roof greening in compact urban areas. © 2011 Pion Ltd and its Licensors.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/139846
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.46
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.460
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTsang, SWen_HK
dc.contributor.authorJim, CYen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23T05:58:02Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-23T05:58:02Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationEnvironment And Planning A, 2011, v. 43 n. 2, p. 363-377en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0308-518Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/139846-
dc.description.abstractRoof greening in cities provides a range of environmental, economic, and social benefits. However, the lack of motivation among property owners in high-rise buildings poses an intractable obstacle to its wide implementation in compact cities. Cooperation amongst stakeholders, from individual-building to city-block scales, could facilitate adoption of green roofing, with implications for urban sustainability. This study is an attempt to evaluate the net gain from roof greening in terms of apportioned collective costs and benefits to a group of property owners. With government tax exemption to encourage green-roof installation, a fair allocation scheme, based on the Shapley value, is adopted to distribute the net gain in a partnership structure. A case study in Hong Kong serves to illustrate the application of the method to allocate theoretically the sharable gain of roof greening translated into monetary terms. The results verify the importance of individual owners in different coalition configurations in moulding the benefit profile. The crux of the financial incentive scheme is the enhanced rewards to optimized cooperation, and the pump-priming triggering of cooperation and action. The benefits of green roofs could be maximized by their widespread and contiguous, rather than piecemeal, installation. Green roofs could reduce both capital and recurrent public expenditures in stormwater management, healthcare, and green-space provision, the savings from which would be more than enough to fund the tax-exemption scheme. The findings yield convincing justifications for government financial incentives to promote public - private partnerships and cooperative coalitions of stakeholders in roof greening in compact urban areas. © 2011 Pion Ltd and its Licensors.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPion Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.envplan.comen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofEnvironment and Planning Aen_HK
dc.rights[Tsang, SW and Jim, CY, 2011]. The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published in [Environment and Planning A: international journal of urban and regional research], volume 43, issue 2, pages 363-377, 2011, [DOI 10.1068/a43230]-
dc.subjectBuilding-
dc.subjectGame theory-
dc.subjectPublic spending-
dc.subjectPublic-private partnership-
dc.subjectStakeholder-
dc.titleGame-theory approach for resident coalitions to allocate green-roof benefitsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0308-518X&volume=43&issue=2&spage=363&epage=377&date=2011&atitle=Game-theory+approach+for+resident+coalitions+to+allocate+green-roof+benefits-
dc.identifier.emailTsang, SW: victsang@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailJim, CY: hragjcy@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTsang, SW=rp00875en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityJim, CY=rp00549en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1068/a43230en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79952331871en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros195112en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-79952331871&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume43en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage363en_HK
dc.identifier.epage377en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000289178200009-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTsang, SW=36926417600en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridJim, CY=7006143750en_HK

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats