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Article: Estimating a parsimonious model of inequality aversion in stackelberg duopoly experiments

TitleEstimating a parsimonious model of inequality aversion in stackelberg duopoly experiments
Authors
Issue Date2010
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/OBES
Citation
Oxford Bulletin Of Economics And Statistics, 2010, v. 72 n. 5, p. 669-686 How to Cite?
AbstractIn the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001), nearly half of the followers' behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self-interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self-interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2010.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/139811
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.247
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.067
ISI Accession Number ID
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy at the University of Hong Kong
Funding Information:

The authors thank Vai-Lam Mui, Hans Normann, participants of the Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting (Pittsburgh) and the Econometric Society European Meeting (Milan), an anonymous referee and two editors for helpful comments, Steffen Huck for providing the data, Philip Ng for research assistance and Robert Canwell for editorial help. Financial support from the Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy at the University of Hong Kong is gratefully acknowledged.

References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, SHPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLeung, Fen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23T05:56:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-23T05:56:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_HK
dc.identifier.citationOxford Bulletin Of Economics And Statistics, 2010, v. 72 n. 5, p. 669-686en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0305-9049en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/139811-
dc.description.abstractIn the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001), nearly half of the followers' behaviours are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self-interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self-interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2010.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/OBESen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofOxford Bulletin of Economics and Statisticsen_HK
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleEstimating a parsimonious model of inequality aversion in stackelberg duopoly experimentsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLau, SHP: laushp@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLau, SHP=rp01073en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0084.2010.00592.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77955932753en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros194119en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-77955932753&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume72en_HK
dc.identifier.issue5en_HK
dc.identifier.spage669en_HK
dc.identifier.epage686en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0084-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000281216500005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, SHP=7401596159en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLeung, F=36442719400en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike7757860-

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