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Article: Governing stock markets in transition economies: Lessons from China

TitleGoverning stock markets in transition economies: Lessons from China
Authors
Issue Date2005
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
American Law And Economics Review, 2005, v. 7 n. 1, p. 184-210 How to Cite?
AbstractJump-starting stock markets in transition economies has proved difficult. These countries lack effective legal governance structures and face severe information problems. Yet not all financial markets failed because of adverse conditions. Using China's initial stock market development as a case study, this article suggests that administrative governance can substitute for formal legal governance. At the core of this governance structure was the quota system. It created incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection at the IPO stage. It was also used to punish regions and responsible officials when companies from their regions failed, as evidenced herein.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/138706
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.594
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.824
SSRN
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPistor, Ken_HK
dc.contributor.authorXu, Cen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-08T08:13:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-08T08:13:06Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Law And Economics Review, 2005, v. 7 n. 1, p. 184-210en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1465-7252en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/138706-
dc.description.abstractJump-starting stock markets in transition economies has proved difficult. These countries lack effective legal governance structures and face severe information problems. Yet not all financial markets failed because of adverse conditions. Using China's initial stock market development as a case study, this article suggests that administrative governance can substitute for formal legal governance. At the core of this governance structure was the quota system. It created incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection at the IPO stage. It was also used to punish regions and responsible officials when companies from their regions failed, as evidenced herein.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Law and Economics Reviewen_HK
dc.rightsThis is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in American Law and Economics Review following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version American Law and Economics Review, 2005, v. 7 n. 1, p. 184-210 is available online at: http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.titleGoverning stock markets in transition economies: Lessons from Chinaen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailXu, C: cgxu@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityXu, C=rp01118en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/aler/ahi008en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-24144493744en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-24144493744&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume7en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage184en_HK
dc.identifier.epage210en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.ssrn628065-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPistor, K=7003684465en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXu, C=23020300700en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike138210-

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