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Article: Competitive bidding with a bid floor

TitleCompetitive bidding with a bid floor
Authors
KeywordsBid floor
Competitive bidding
Minimum wage
Revenue
Issue Date2011
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/IJET
Citation
International Journal Of Economic Theory, 2011, v. 7 n. 4, p. 351-371 How to Cite?
AbstractWe study competitive bidding with an explicit bid floor, motivated by minimum wage legislation and minimum labor standards. We derive the equilibrium strategies in, and compare the expected procurement costs among, the first-price, second-price, English, and Dutch auctions in a private-cost model. For the English auction, we also consider a variant in which each seller can terminate the auction by jumping down to sell at the price floor. We find that the first-price auction and the aforementioned jump-down English auction lead to a lower expected procurement cost than under the second-price auction and the standard English auction. © IAET.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/137598
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.229
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.499
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, BRen_HK
dc.contributor.authorChiu, YSen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-26T14:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-26T14:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal Of Economic Theory, 2011, v. 7 n. 4, p. 351-371en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1742-7355en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/137598-
dc.description.abstractWe study competitive bidding with an explicit bid floor, motivated by minimum wage legislation and minimum labor standards. We derive the equilibrium strategies in, and compare the expected procurement costs among, the first-price, second-price, English, and Dutch auctions in a private-cost model. For the English auction, we also consider a variant in which each seller can terminate the auction by jumping down to sell at the price floor. We find that the first-price auction and the aforementioned jump-down English auction lead to a lower expected procurement cost than under the second-price auction and the standard English auction. © IAET.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/IJETen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Economic Theoryen_HK
dc.subjectBid flooren_HK
dc.subjectCompetitive biddingen_HK
dc.subjectMinimum wageen_HK
dc.subjectRevenueen_HK
dc.titleCompetitive bidding with a bid flooren_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1742-7363&volume=&spage=&epage=&date=2012&atitle=Competitive+Bidding+with+a+Bid+Flooren_US
dc.identifier.emailChiu, YS: sywchiu@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, YS=rp01057en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00169.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-81255205432en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros191594en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-81255205432&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume7en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage351en_HK
dc.identifier.epage371en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1742-7363-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000297256800004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChen, BR=35728175500en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChiu, YS=7202775090en_HK

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