File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Emotion and agency in Zhuangzi

TitleEmotion and agency in Zhuangzi
Authors
Issue Date2011
PublisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/09552367.asp
Citation
Asian Philosophy, 2011, v. 21 n. 1, p. 97-121 How to Cite?
AbstractAmong the many striking features of the philosophy of the Zhuangzi is that it advocates a life unperturbed by emotions, including even pleasurable, positive emotions such as joy or delight. Many of us see emotions as an ineluctable part of life, and some would argue they are a crucial component of a well-developed moral sensitivity and a good life. The Zhuangist approach to emotion challenges such commonsense views so radically that it amounts to a test case for the fundamental plausibility of the Daoist ethical orientation: If the Zhuangist stance on emotion is untenable, then other aspects of Daoist ethics may founder as well. In this essay, I explore what I call a Zhuangist 'Virtuoso View' of emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version of a Zhuangist approach to emotion passes the 'basic plausibility' test. I begin by describing the Virtuoso View and sketching its theoretical foundation, which involves claims about human agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. Next, I defend the Virtuoso View against three objections, namely that it abandons intentionality, that it interferes with a good life, and that it yields a schizophrenic conception of agency. I argue for three major theses. First, the Virtuoso View is easily intelligible and largely defensible. Second, it reflects a crucial insight into a fundamental dichotomy at the core of human agency: the unavoidable conflict within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, detached one. Third, I suggest that certain problems or conflicts arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament and thus are not mere conceptual defects. Hence even if we do not find the Virtuoso View wholly convincing, we can nevertheless gain much insight from it. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/136329
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.201
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFraser, Cen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-27T02:13:29Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-27T02:13:29Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationAsian Philosophy, 2011, v. 21 n. 1, p. 97-121en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0955-2367en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/136329-
dc.description.abstractAmong the many striking features of the philosophy of the Zhuangzi is that it advocates a life unperturbed by emotions, including even pleasurable, positive emotions such as joy or delight. Many of us see emotions as an ineluctable part of life, and some would argue they are a crucial component of a well-developed moral sensitivity and a good life. The Zhuangist approach to emotion challenges such commonsense views so radically that it amounts to a test case for the fundamental plausibility of the Daoist ethical orientation: If the Zhuangist stance on emotion is untenable, then other aspects of Daoist ethics may founder as well. In this essay, I explore what I call a Zhuangist 'Virtuoso View' of emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version of a Zhuangist approach to emotion passes the 'basic plausibility' test. I begin by describing the Virtuoso View and sketching its theoretical foundation, which involves claims about human agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. Next, I defend the Virtuoso View against three objections, namely that it abandons intentionality, that it interferes with a good life, and that it yields a schizophrenic conception of agency. I argue for three major theses. First, the Virtuoso View is easily intelligible and largely defensible. Second, it reflects a crucial insight into a fundamental dichotomy at the core of human agency: the unavoidable conflict within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, detached one. Third, I suggest that certain problems or conflicts arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament and thus are not mere conceptual defects. Hence even if we do not find the Virtuoso View wholly convincing, we can nevertheless gain much insight from it. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/09552367.aspen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofAsian Philosophyen_HK
dc.rightsThis is an electronic version of an article published in Asian Philosophy, 2011, v. 21 n. 1, p. 97-121. The article is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552367.2011.542306-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleEmotion and agency in Zhuangzien_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailFraser, C: fraser@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityFraser, C=rp01221en_HK
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09552367.2011.542306en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79951972314en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros186982en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-79951972314&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume21en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage97en_HK
dc.identifier.epage121en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000287497400007-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridFraser, C=7401516122en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike8856156-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats