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Conference Paper: Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets

TitleStrategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets
Authors
KeywordsApproximate solution
Auction design
Channel allocation
Dominant strategy
Fairness criteria
Issue Date2011
PublisherI E E E, Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.ieee-infocom.org/
Citation
The IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In Conference Proceedings, 2011, p. 3020-3028 How to Cite?
AbstractSecondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a trade-off between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interference-free spectrum allocation is NP-Hard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and max-min fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. © 2011 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/135703
ISSN
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGopinathan, Aen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLi, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, Cen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-27T01:46:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-27T01:46:58Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationThe IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In Conference Proceedings, 2011, p. 3020-3028en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0743-166Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/135703-
dc.description.abstractSecondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a trade-off between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interference-free spectrum allocation is NP-Hard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and max-min fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. © 2011 IEEE.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherI E E E, Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.ieee-infocom.org/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the IEEE INFOCOMen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsIEEE Infocom Proceedings. Copyright © IEEE, Computer Society.-
dc.rights©2011 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.subjectApproximate solution-
dc.subjectAuction design-
dc.subjectChannel allocation-
dc.subjectDominant strategy-
dc.subjectFairness criteria-
dc.titleStrategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum marketsen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0743-166X&volume=&spage=3020&epage=3028&date=2011&atitle=Strategyproof+auctions+for+balancing+social+welfare+and+fairness+in+secondary+spectrum+markets-
dc.identifier.emailWu, C:cwu@cs.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935145en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79960884325en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros187766en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-79960884325&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.spage3020en_HK
dc.identifier.epage3028en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.description.otherThe IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In Conference Proceedings, 2011, p. 3020-3028-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridGopinathan, A=6602302196en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, Z=35316050800en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWu, C=15836048100en_HK

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