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Article: First in village or second in rome?

TitleFirst in village or second in rome?
Authors
Issue Date2010
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598
Citation
International Economic Review, 2010, v. 51 n. 1, p. 263-288 How to Cite?
AbstractThough individuals prefer high-quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high-quality and low-quality organizations. © (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/129427
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.29
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.153
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDamiano, Een_HK
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSuen, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-23T08:37:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-23T08:37:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Economic Review, 2010, v. 51 n. 1, p. 263-288en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/129427-
dc.description.abstractThough individuals prefer high-quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group. In this environment, sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. With transfers, this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation. More egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations, but can improve the allocation efficiency. Since competition is most intense for intermediate talent, effective personnel policies differ systematically between high-quality and low-quality organizations. © (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Economic Reviewen_HK
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com-
dc.titleFirst in village or second in rome?en_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0020-6598&volume=51&issue=1&spage=263&epage=288&date=2010&atitle=First+in+village+or+second+in+Rome?-
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00579.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77950227893en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros178078en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-77950227893&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume51en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage263en_HK
dc.identifier.epage288en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2354-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDamiano, E=9239291100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, H=25960883900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike6802306-

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