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Conference Paper: Food safety policy coordination in three Chinese cities

TitleFood safety policy coordination in three Chinese cities
Other TitlesFood safety policy coordination in three Chinese cities: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong
Authors
Issue Date2010
Citation
The 3rd Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulatory Governance of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and the Regulation Network, Dublin, Ireland, 17-19 June 2010. How to Cite?
AbstractPoliticians make institutional choices for the delivery of public services, including the regulation of food safety, based on the incentive systems in which they operate. The incentives to manage agency problems (a manifestation of which may be poor coordination) vary from regime to regime. In mainland China the dilemma of serving multiple principals is almost entirely an internal (bureaucratic) affair. In Taiwan the problem of multiple principals is arguably more complex because politicians must win elections to stay in office. Both arrangements provide powerful but different sorts of incentives to manage food safety agency problems. In Hong Kong although the political executive is not elected, public opinion is also significant. Regime change in Hong Kong also impacted institutional choices. Based on the melamine tainted milk powder case exposed in 2008 the paper shows how regime differences impact the incentive system for politicians and thus their institutional choices for the coordination of food safety policy.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/128043

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBurns, JPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorPeters, BGen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWang, X-
dc.contributor.authorLi, J-
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-31T14:01:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-10-31T14:01:40Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_HK
dc.identifier.citationThe 3rd Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulatory Governance of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and the Regulation Network, Dublin, Ireland, 17-19 June 2010.en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/128043-
dc.description.abstractPoliticians make institutional choices for the delivery of public services, including the regulation of food safety, based on the incentive systems in which they operate. The incentives to manage agency problems (a manifestation of which may be poor coordination) vary from regime to regime. In mainland China the dilemma of serving multiple principals is almost entirely an internal (bureaucratic) affair. In Taiwan the problem of multiple principals is arguably more complex because politicians must win elections to stay in office. Both arrangements provide powerful but different sorts of incentives to manage food safety agency problems. In Hong Kong although the political executive is not elected, public opinion is also significant. Regime change in Hong Kong also impacted institutional choices. Based on the melamine tainted milk powder case exposed in 2008 the paper shows how regime differences impact the incentive system for politicians and thus their institutional choices for the coordination of food safety policy.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofBiennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulatory Governance of the European Consortium for Political Research and the Regulation Network-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleFood safety policy coordination in three Chinese citiesen_HK
dc.title.alternativeFood safety policy coordination in three Chinese cities: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong-
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailBurns, JP: jpburns@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailPeters, BG: bgpeters@pitt.eduen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWang, X: xbwang@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailLi, J: jingscorpio@gmail.com-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros175288en_HK
dc.description.otherThe 3rd Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulatory Governance of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and the Regulation Network, Dublin, Ireland, 17-19 June 2010.-

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