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Conference Paper: Investing in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Building

TitleInvesting in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Building
Authors
Issue Date2003
PublisherWestern Economic Association International
Citation
Western Economic Association International 5th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 9-12 January 2003 How to Cite?
AbstractIn many occupations, reputation or past performance affects the demand for a worker’s output, creating an incentive to invest in reputation early in a career. This results in a tendency for superior workers to start their career in the mainstream market. The intuition is that, for high ability workers, the returns to investing in reputation is larger in the mass market, while less able ones would avoid the more competitive mainstream by developing their specializations in the fringe market. Some mainstream workers may enter the fringe market once the motive to invest in reputation diminishes later in their careers, but less able workers who start in the fringe are seldom able to return to the mainstream. These results are empirically testable and have potential implications for product markets as well.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/114948

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSuen, WCen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-26T05:23:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-26T05:23:14Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_HK
dc.identifier.citationWestern Economic Association International 5th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 9-12 January 2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/114948-
dc.description.abstractIn many occupations, reputation or past performance affects the demand for a worker’s output, creating an incentive to invest in reputation early in a career. This results in a tendency for superior workers to start their career in the mainstream market. The intuition is that, for high ability workers, the returns to investing in reputation is larger in the mass market, while less able ones would avoid the more competitive mainstream by developing their specializations in the fringe market. Some mainstream workers may enter the fringe market once the motive to invest in reputation diminishes later in their careers, but less able workers who start in the fringe are seldom able to return to the mainstream. These results are empirically testable and have potential implications for product markets as well.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWestern Economic Association International-
dc.relation.ispartofWestern Economic Association International Biennial Pacific Rim Conferenceen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleInvesting in Reputation: Strategic Choices in Career Buildingen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChan, W: wchan@econ.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailSuen, WC: wsuen@econ.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChan, W=rp01049en_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, WC=rp00066en_HK
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros131126en_HK

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