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Conference Paper: A unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency

TitleA unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency
Authors
Ching, S
Issue Date2009
Citation
The 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory, Taipei, Taiwan, 17-19 August 2009. How to Cite?
AbstractChing and Serizawa (1998) showed that the single-plateaued domain is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry,and efficiency, but pointed out that strategy-proofness becomes redundant when symmetry is strengthened to strong symmetry (which is weaker than anonymity), i.e. the single-plateaued domain remains the unique maximal domain for strong symmetry and efficiency. In this paper, efficiency is relaxed to unanimity and continuity. The weakly monotonic single-peaked domain is identified as the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, strong symmetry, unanimity, and continuity. Strategy-proofness can no longer be dropped in this result. The tie between strategy-proofness and single-peakedness is restored.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/114939

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChing, Sen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-26T05:22:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-26T05:22:50Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationThe 2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory, Taipei, Taiwan, 17-19 August 2009.-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/114939-
dc.description.abstractChing and Serizawa (1998) showed that the single-plateaued domain is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry,and efficiency, but pointed out that strategy-proofness becomes redundant when symmetry is strengthened to strong symmetry (which is weaker than anonymity), i.e. the single-plateaued domain remains the unique maximal domain for strong symmetry and efficiency. In this paper, efficiency is relaxed to unanimity and continuity. The weakly monotonic single-peaked domain is identified as the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, strong symmetry, unanimity, and continuity. Strategy-proofness can no longer be dropped in this result. The tie between strategy-proofness and single-peakedness is restored.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartof2nd Taiwan-Dutch and International Conference on Game Theory 2009en_HK
dc.titleA unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiencyen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChing, S: steve.ching@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChing, S=rp01056en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros164280en_HK

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