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Conference Paper: Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures

TitleRevenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures
Authors
KeywordsJoint Ventures
Control Right
Revenue-sharing Contracts
Expropriation
Theory of the Firm
Issue Date2003
Citation
Bai, Chong-En and Tao, Zhigang and Wu, Changqi, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures (January 2003). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 563. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=404001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.404001 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract frameworks of Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory of the firm, and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our Property-Rights-Theory motivated model with self investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The Transaction-Cost-Theory motivated model leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings also reject some of the existing theories of joint ownership.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/112301
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBai, CEen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, CQen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-26T03:26:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-26T03:26:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_HK
dc.identifier.citationBai, Chong-En and Tao, Zhigang and Wu, Changqi, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures (January 2003). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 563. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=404001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.404001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/112301-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract frameworks of Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory of the firm, and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our Property-Rights-Theory motivated model with self investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The Transaction-Cost-Theory motivated model leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings also reject some of the existing theories of joint ownership.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 563en_HK
dc.subjectJoint Ventures-
dc.subjectControl Right-
dc.subjectRevenue-sharing Contracts-
dc.subjectExpropriation-
dc.subjectTheory of the Firm-
dc.titleRevenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Venturesen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.404001-
dc.identifier.hkuros83958en_HK
dc.identifier.ssrn404001-

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