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Conference Paper: Inherent Motivation for a Retailer not to Share Cost and Market Information Before a Supply Contract is Committed
Title | Inherent Motivation for a Retailer not to Share Cost and Market Information Before a Supply Contract is Committed |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Publisher | Czech Society for Operational Research & University of Economics, Prague |
Citation | The 22nd European Conference on Operational Research (EURO XXII), Prague, Czech Republic, 8-11 July 2007 How to Cite? |
Abstract | A dominant manufacturer (”Manu”) supplies a product to a retailer
(”Reta”). Reta incurs a unit processing cost c and sets the unit retail price
p. The retail volume (q) is then q = a - bp. Should Reta help to improve
Manu’s (a,b,c) knowledge? Can Manu use well-designed and sophisticated
supply contracts such as a ”menu of contracts” to induce Reta to
share her superior (a,b,c) knowledge? We show that ”yes” is the correct
answer for only a specific range of conditions; for a wide range of other
likely conditions the correct answer is ”no.” |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112168 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lau, AHL | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Lau, H | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Wang, J | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-26T03:20:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-26T03:20:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | The 22nd European Conference on Operational Research (EURO XXII), Prague, Czech Republic, 8-11 July 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/112168 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A dominant manufacturer (”Manu”) supplies a product to a retailer (”Reta”). Reta incurs a unit processing cost c and sets the unit retail price p. The retail volume (q) is then q = a - bp. Should Reta help to improve Manu’s (a,b,c) knowledge? Can Manu use well-designed and sophisticated supply contracts such as a ”menu of contracts” to induce Reta to share her superior (a,b,c) knowledge? We show that ”yes” is the correct answer for only a specific range of conditions; for a wide range of other likely conditions the correct answer is ”no.” | - |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.publisher | Czech Society for Operational Research & University of Economics, Prague | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The European Conference on Operational Research, EURO XXII | en_HK |
dc.title | Inherent Motivation for a Retailer not to Share Cost and Market Information Before a Supply Contract is Committed | en_HK |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Lau, AHL: ahlau@business.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, J: wangjc@business.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Lau, AHL=rp01072 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Wang, J=rp01107 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 137948 | en_HK |