File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Conference Paper: Incentive effects of common and separate queues with multiple servers: The principal-agent perspective

TitleIncentive effects of common and separate queues with multiple servers: The principal-agent perspective
Authors
KeywordsCapacity allocation
Competition
Incentive theory
Markovian queueingsystems
Nash equilibrium
Principal agent
Issue Date2009
PublisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1800022
Citation
Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering (CIE39), Troyes, France, 6-8 July 2009, p. 1249-1254 How to Cite?
AbstractA two-server service network has been studied by Gilbert and Weng [13] fromthe principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by twoindependent facilities coordinated by an agency. The agency must devise astrategy to allocate customers to the facilities and determine the compensation.A common queue allocation scheme and separate queue allocation scheme are thencompared. It has been shown that the separate queue system gives morecompetition incentives to the independent facilities and induces a higherservice capacity. The main aim of this paper is to extend the results of thetwo-server queueing model to the case of multiple-server queueing model. Ouranalysis shows that in the case of multiple servers the separate queueallocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers to increasetheir service capacities. In particular, when there are not severe diseconomiesassociated with increasing service capacity, the separate queue allocationscheme gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium. © 2009 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/100314
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChoi, SMen_HK
dc.contributor.authorChing, WKen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Men_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-25T19:05:08Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-25T19:05:08Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the 39th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering (CIE39), Troyes, France, 6-8 July 2009, p. 1249-1254-
dc.identifier.isbn9781424441365-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/100314-
dc.description.abstractA two-server service network has been studied by Gilbert and Weng [13] fromthe principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by twoindependent facilities coordinated by an agency. The agency must devise astrategy to allocate customers to the facilities and determine the compensation.A common queue allocation scheme and separate queue allocation scheme are thencompared. It has been shown that the separate queue system gives morecompetition incentives to the independent facilities and induces a higherservice capacity. The main aim of this paper is to extend the results of thetwo-server queueing model to the case of multiple-server queueing model. Ouranalysis shows that in the case of multiple servers the separate queueallocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers to increasetheir service capacities. In particular, when there are not severe diseconomiesassociated with increasing service capacity, the separate queue allocationscheme gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium. © 2009 IEEE.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1800022-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the International Conference on Computers & Industrial Engineeringen_HK
dc.rightsProceedings of the International Conference on Computers & Industrial Engineering. Copyright © IEEE.-
dc.rights©2009 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectCapacity allocation-
dc.subjectCompetition-
dc.subjectIncentive theory-
dc.subjectMarkovian queueingsystems-
dc.subjectNash equilibrium-
dc.subjectPrincipal agent-
dc.titleIncentive effects of common and separate queues with multiple servers: The principal-agent perspectiveen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChoi, SM: kellyci@hkusua.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailChing, WK: wching@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChing, WK=rp00679en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICCIE.2009.5223917-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77956096835-
dc.identifier.hkuros160417en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1249-
dc.identifier.epage1254-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.description.otherProceedings of the 39th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering (CIE39), Troyes, France, 6-8 July 2009, p. 1249-1254-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChoi, SM=26435077400-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChing, WK=13310265500-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, M=26643214600-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats