Does CFO Incentives Cause Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment


Grant Data
Project Title
Does CFO Incentives Cause Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Principal Investigator
Dr Na, Ke   (Principal investigator)
Duration
24
Start Date
2015-09-01
Completion Date
2017-08-31
Amount
228614
Conference Title
Presentation Title
Keywords
Executive Compensation, CFO Incentives, Accounting Manipulation
Discipline
Accounting
Panel
Business Studies (B) (under H Panel before 2011/12)
Sponsor
RGC Early Career Scheme (ECS)
HKU Project Code
27503915
Grant Type
Early Career Scheme (ECS)
Funding Year
2015/2016
Status
On-going
Objectives
2) Provides evidence on the real effects of vesting terms and duration of executive compensation. 3) Investigates the effect of requiring executives to defer compensation on firm risk and short-termism.