Does CFO Incentives Cause Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Grant Data
Project Title
Does CFO Incentives Cause Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Principal Investigator
Dr Na, Ke   (Principal Investigator (PI))
Duration
36
Start Date
2015-09-01
Amount
228614
Conference Title
Does CFO Incentives Cause Accounting Manipulation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Presentation Title
Keywords
Accounting Manipulation, CFO Incentives, Executive Compensation
Discipline
Accounting
Panel
Business Studies (B)
HKU Project Code
27503915
Grant Type
Early Career Scheme (ECS)
Funding Year
2015
Status
Completed
Objectives
1) Examines the causal relation between CFO incentives and accounting manipulation. 2) Provides evidence on the real effects of vesting terms and duration of executive compensation. 3) Investigates the effect of requiring executives to defer compensation on firm risk and short-termism.