Corporate accountability and transparency in transition economy : examples from China's commercial banks

Abstract

This research is in the field of corporate governance and focuses on corporate accountability and transparency of China’s commercial banks, in particular SOCBs. Since 1979, the banking system of China has been undertaken reforms to transform from a mono banking system to a banking system in which banks should be profit-driven. The focus of the reforms has been changed from off-loading of NPLs to the improvement of corporate governance of commercial banks. However, China’s SOCBs still appear to be inefficient and poor in disclosure of information, though they are now more profitable. They are also required to make certain loans in line with the policies of the Chinese government. This research aims at finding out issues related to the governance and disclosure systems of China’s commercial banks from a legal perspective and suggesting possible direction to solve the issues. For the governance system, directors who are accountable to their stakeholders, not only the majority shareholders, play an important role in enhancing the operations of banks. For the disclosure system, auditors and CRAs, the gatekeepers of the financial sector, could help to reduce information asymmetry and enhance the transparency of banks, leading to a more effective use of market discipline in monitoring the operations of banks.

To improve the operations of banks, this research highlights the need to improve various institutions in addition to the reforms of banks, with the focus of reforms on the legal and regulatory systems relating to the governance mechanism, disclosure system, audit industry and credit rating industry. Though legal rules on the above areas are mostly stipulated in line with international standards or in line with regulations of other developed countries, they are usually scattered in various administrative regulations, departmental rules and normative documents and some of the provisions are still principles based in lack of implementation details. In lawmaking, there should be more revision, harmonization and consolidation of existing regulations and rules. In particular, the provisions associated with the liability risks of directors/ banks/ auditors/ audit firms/ CRAs/ responsible personnel of CRAs should be revisited and revised to enhance the enforceability of regulations and rules by regulators. Regulators of banks, auditors and CRAs should also take up more proactive roles in preventing possible risks in the financial sector rather than passively conducting box-ticking compliance. They should also increase supervisory intensity and effectiveness, with sufficient resources and clear mandate.

Though the Chinese government holds controlling shares of SOCBs and certain bank loans made are still policy-led, this research argues that a well-established and effective legal and regulatory system on governance mechanism and disclosure system, via the help of auditors and CRAs, could help withstand political influence and enhance a healthy and sustainable development of the financial sector. Without an effective legal and regulatory system, China’s banking system may still be subject to external and internal influence which will affect the progress of gradual transformation to a real market economy.