Credit default swaps (CDS) and loan financing

Abstract

As evidenced by its market size, credit default swaps (CDSs) has been the cornerstone product of the credit derivatives market. The central question that I attempt to answer in this thesis is: why and how does the introduction of CDS market affect bank loan financing? Theoretical works predict some potential effects from CDS market, but empirical evidence is still rare. This dissertation empirically examines the effects of CDS trading on bank loan financing. In chapter one, I find that banks increase average loan amount and charge higher loan spread after the onset of CDS trading on the borrower’s debt. Also, credit quality of the borrower deteriorates for those with active CDS trading. These findings suggest that banks tend to take on more credit risk by issuing larger loans and by lending to riskier firms that could not obtain bank loan in the absence of CDS. The risk-taking by banks ultimately transmitted to higher bank-level risk profile. The second chapter is the first empirical study of CDS’ role in determining loan syndicate structure. I find larger lead bank share when CDS is in place. Moreover, participation of credit derivatives trading by lead banks is much larger than by the participants, suggesting that lead banks have better chance to use CDS to their own advantage. Further analysis shows that lead banks retain an even larger share when it is more experienced dealing with the borrower and when information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower is less severe. Different from conventional wisdom about moral hazard in syndicated lending, our findings suggest that the lead bank likely takes on more credit risk voluntarily due to its increased financing capacity. The third chapter focuses on the effects of CDS on debt contracting. Given that current evidence does not show CDS reduces average cost of debt, we conjecture that the diversification benefit is reflected by relaxation of restrictions imposed on borrowers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find the marginal effect from CDS trading on covenant strictness measure is 16.8% on average. One standard deviation increase in the number of outstanding CDS contracts loosens net worth covenants by approximately 8.9%. Using various endogeneity controls, we are able to show the loosening of covenants is due to the reduced level of debtholder-shareholder conflict. Furthermore, the loosening effect is stronger when the expected renegotiation cost is larger, consistent with the view that CDS mitigates contracting friction and improves contracting efficiency. Overall, this dissertation attempts to provide first empirical evidence on how CDS affects bank loan financing. We focus the analysis on loan issuance, syndicate structure and contracting. The findings suggest that banks lend to riskier borrowers in the presence of CDS. On a positive note, banks tend to impose less restrictive covenants on its borrower, which may mitigate frictions in lending market in terms of ex ante bargaining and ex post renegotiation cost.