File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00793.x
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-43149087815
- Find via
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Scopus: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Article: The council presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with power
Title | The council presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with power |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Citation | Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008, v. 46, n. 3, p. 593-617 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The extent of the Council presidency's political influence is the subject of disagreement among both practitioners and researchers. While some describe the presidency as responsibility without power, others suggest that it provides incumbent states with an opportunity to achieve decision outcomes close to their preferences. This article formulates and tests hypotheses on the conditions under which presidents influence the timing and content of decision outcomes in the legislative arena. Decision outcomes are shown to be significantly more favourable to presidents in the chair at the time of adoption than to other Member States, even after controlling for other factors that influence bargaining success. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345046 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.127 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Thomson, Robert | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-15T09:24:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-15T09:24:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008, v. 46, n. 3, p. 593-617 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0021-9886 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/345046 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The extent of the Council presidency's political influence is the subject of disagreement among both practitioners and researchers. While some describe the presidency as responsibility without power, others suggest that it provides incumbent states with an opportunity to achieve decision outcomes close to their preferences. This article formulates and tests hypotheses on the conditions under which presidents influence the timing and content of decision outcomes in the legislative arena. Decision outcomes are shown to be significantly more favourable to presidents in the chair at the time of adoption than to other Member States, even after controlling for other factors that influence bargaining success. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Common Market Studies | - |
dc.title | The council presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with power | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00793.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-43149087815 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 46 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 593 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 617 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1468-5965 | - |