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Article: Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes
Title | Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1748-5983&site=1 |
Citation | Regulation & Governance, 2020, Epub 2020-04-01 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Democracies deliberately create “friction” in bureaucratic processes, using inefficiencies to mitigate the impact of government transitions and asymmetric information on leaders' ability to exert control. With far more centralized power, would authoritarians prefer less friction? We argue that they do not. In fact, excess friction is actively supplied to hinder bureaucratic coordination independent of or even in opposition to top‐down control, leaving the central leaders the only player powerful enough to organize complex actions. Our analysis of data on the Chinese government indicates that bureaucrats are systematically sent to unfamiliar work environment, and that agencies that are more exposed to the resultant inefficiencies are also more likely to come under direct control by senior Politburo members. The pattern of targeted intervention indicates that bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes is predicated not only on centralized power in general but also the deliberate supply of friction to obstruct independent actions from the bottom up. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/293595 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.381 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chan, KN | - |
dc.contributor.author | Fan, S | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-23T08:19:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-23T08:19:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Regulation & Governance, 2020, Epub 2020-04-01 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1748-5983 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/293595 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Democracies deliberately create “friction” in bureaucratic processes, using inefficiencies to mitigate the impact of government transitions and asymmetric information on leaders' ability to exert control. With far more centralized power, would authoritarians prefer less friction? We argue that they do not. In fact, excess friction is actively supplied to hinder bureaucratic coordination independent of or even in opposition to top‐down control, leaving the central leaders the only player powerful enough to organize complex actions. Our analysis of data on the Chinese government indicates that bureaucrats are systematically sent to unfamiliar work environment, and that agencies that are more exposed to the resultant inefficiencies are also more likely to come under direct control by senior Politburo members. The pattern of targeted intervention indicates that bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes is predicated not only on centralized power in general but also the deliberate supply of friction to obstruct independent actions from the bottom up. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1748-5983&site=1 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Regulation & Governance | - |
dc.rights | Submitted (preprint) Version This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. Accepted (peer-reviewed) Version This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: [FULL CITE], which has been published in final form at [Link to final article using the DOI]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. | - |
dc.title | Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chan, KN: kwachan@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chan, KN=rp02084 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/rego.12310 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85082958062 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 318928 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | Epub 2020-04-01 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000558757700001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Australia | - |