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- Publisher Website: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2631
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0007107864
- WOS: WOS:000087756500003
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Article: Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency
Title | Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Bargaining; delegation; principal-agent; delay |
Issue Date | 2000 |
Citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 92, n. 2, p. 234-273 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf. A two-phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal-agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded. With a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium, we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties. We show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency (i.e., delay in reaching agreements). Extensions of the model and applications to union-firm bargaining are then discussed briefly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D82, J52. © 2000 Academic Press. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241882 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:55:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:55:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 92, n. 2, p. 234-273 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241882 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf. A two-phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal-agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded. With a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium, we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties. We show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency (i.e., delay in reaching agreements). Extensions of the model and applications to union-firm bargaining are then discussed briefly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D82, J52. © 2000 Academic Press. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | - |
dc.subject | Bargaining; delegation; principal-agent; delay | - |
dc.title | Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1006/jeth.1999.2631 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0007107864 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 92 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 234 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 273 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000087756500003 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |