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Article: Rawls and Realism
Title | Rawls and Realism |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Publisher | Florida State University, Department of Philosophy. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.fsu.edu/philo/STP |
Citation | Social Theory and Practice, 2012, v. 38 n. 1, p. 55-82 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/203344 |
ISSN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gledhill, JS | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-09-19T14:13:25Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-09-19T14:13:25Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Social Theory and Practice, 2012, v. 38 n. 1, p. 55-82 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0037-802X | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/203344 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Florida State University, Department of Philosophy. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.fsu.edu/philo/STP | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Social Theory and Practice | en_US |
dc.title | Rawls and Realism | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Gledhill, JS: gledhill@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Gledhill, JS=rp01783 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5840/soctheorpract20123813 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 235036 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 38 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 55 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 82 | en_US |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0037-802X | - |