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“CLOSER TO GOD”:
CHILD DEATH IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

In recent times the historiography of death has expanded considerably, but dead children have rarely been its central focus.¹ The same could be said of research in the history of children and youth. Though this field witnessed an early flourish of interest from demographic theorists and historians of the family in parental responses to early mortality, in the last few decades it has generally been haunted by the dead child’s absence.² After the controversy surrounding Philippe Ariès’s “parental indifference hypothesis” faded, historians of childhood prioritized efforts to uncover the values adult societies attached to “child life” or to recapture the agency of living children. This relative neglect of the dead child may owe something to the fact that death has been, statistically, in decline as an aspect of children’s experience in modern times. As John Gillis recently and pithily put it: “Two thirds of the longevity gains in the entire history of the human race have been attained in the last one hundred years.”³ Moreover, it is notable that those parts of the world that emerged in the late twentieth century as the heartlands of historical scholarship on childhood and youth were generally the same places in which this break with premodern patterns of child mortality had occurred earliest. Other more “intimate” considerations may also have stymied scholarly work in this area. As Magda Fahrni observes in this issue, extending research onto such a sensitive terrain leaves the historian of childhood exposed to allegations of a “ghoulish,” “unseemly,” or even “voyeuristic” fascination.

Though the stories of young people who failed to outlive childhood have largely been neglected in scholarly writing, child death certainly possessed vast social and cultural significance in modern times. As the contributors to this special issue show, even as death diminished as a central fact in children’s lives during the twentieth century it continued to haunt the worlds of the living.
Premodern mortality rates of 30 to 40 percent dropped precipitously to around 5 percent by the middle of the last century, in more affluent societies at least. But, even where mortality fell furthest and fastest, striking variations along fault lines of class, race, and space persisted in patterns of child death. And in many parts of the world, one in four children continued to die before age five well into the second half of the twentieth century. The generally observed shift away from the grim, centuries-old threat of an early demise was also accompanied by wars, genocides, and deliberate programs of extermination that visited death upon children in unprecedented numbers.

While meanings of, and responses to, child death varied widely over time and space, this fact, this reversal of nature, remained a jarring facet of human experience across cultures. In different contexts, the deaths of children proved capable of provoking an array of powerful responses. They triggered challenges to Gods’ sovereignty, debates over nation, law, labor, and culture, and contests over the meaning of public life, as well as of childhood itself. As the contributors to this volume show, the deaths of children lay at the heart of debates through which industrializing and urbanizing societies strove to understand and make meaningful the pressures of secularization, rapid technological advancement and the growth of state-led interventions into people’s everyday lives. While child death became less common and less publicly visible in the twentieth century, its meaning metamorphosed, informing broad and significant shifts in social and cultural practice right up to the present day.

The questions that surround the meanings and experiences of child death, mourning, grief, and bereavement are difficult ones to broach by their very nature. But historians have an important contribution to make by engaging with them. Studying death—examining the layers of raw and powerful emotion that often surrounded this aspect of human experience—can provide powerful new insights into the specific historical significance and meaning of child life. Changing images and interpretations of the dead child in the modern era influenced the ways in which children lived. Though such connections have been little studied, historians of childhood in particular are well placed to consider how social and cultural transformations structuring meanings of death impacted upon child life in particular. Many questions arise for those taking up this challenge. How were the sites and spaces of death reinvented as child death became less visible in public during the last hundred years? What literary, visual, and aesthetic consequences did the “removal” of death from public view have for children? What difference did age make to the histories of dying, death, grief, mourning, and bereavement, and the relationships between these discrete subjects of study? The contributors to this
issue grapple with such questions and more, across a variety of contexts, from North America to Britain, Canada, Australia, and Palestine, and a broad sweep of chronologically modern times.

The aim of this essay is to survey key themes, to introduce recent scholarship and to attempt to suggest some potentially valuable lines of inquiry that might yield histories that reveal much about societal transformation. It raises the question of what exactly might have been specific about child death in the modern era. While acknowledging the risk of over-generalization, this broad survey aims to identify areas where more work is needed in relation to childhood, death, and how the two relate to the broader questions of change and continuity. It draws together multiple strands beneath the umbrella rationale of the “ideological work” of child death to consider how demographic shifts and changing rates of infant mortality were linked to the shifts that defined cultural practices and meanings of child death. It considers the impact of religious change, technological improvements, and changing sentimental investments in childhood. In considering recent work setting out broad shifts in attitudes to dead children in the last two centuries from public to more private expressions of grief and mourning, this article also examines the changing forms through which child death was represented to children (or not)—e.g., necropedagogies and other literary and visual cultures produced for consumption by children.

SHOULD ANGELS DIE: CHILD DEATH, DEMOGRAPHY, AND THE DIVINE

In societies understood by contemporaries to be making a breathtakingly rapid transition to “modern-ness” in the 1800s, the persistence of child death often appeared as a brutal and worrisome fact. Where modern industrial capitalism developed earliest in the nineteenth century, death rates began to decline as technological innovations brought improvements in housing, vaccination, and other medico-sanitary technologies. With shorter working hours and better nutrition, overcrowded urban centers, widely seen as destructive of human life (and referred to in France, for example, as *villes mangeuses d’hommes*—literally man-eating cities), finally began to kill fewer inhabitants. In Britain death rates fell from twenty-two per thousand people in the 1870s to thirteen per thousand by 1910. Much earlier industrial capitalism had begun to transform attitudes to time. Those who claimed leading roles in industrializing societies, members of growing middle strata, reflected upon the capacity of these changes to bring about the extension of individual lifetimes. This achievement drove more intensive reflections upon the threshold of death, life’s final frontier, and raised the prospect that it might be further deferred.
As elites reflected upon this tantalizing prospect, they rebuilt cities in their own image and confronted the problem of redefining and delimiting death in their immediate proximity. From the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century it became clear that the challenge of fashioning urban centers into public showcases for “progress” would necessarily involve addressing the problem of overcrowded cemeteries. As cities grew, elites became exasperated by these unsightly and insanitary spaces, where the living mingled with the dead. In response, they organized new spaces accommodating human remains on the urban periphery. The vast garden-like cemetery of Père-Lachaise in Paris (1804) set an example that was taken up transnationally, from Mount Auburn in Boston (1831), to Kensal Green (1833) and Highgate in London (1839), to Greenwood in New York (1838), and the Cimitero di Staglieno in Genoa (1851). Within and around these great metropolitan cemeteries elites strove to project their earthly status into the afterlife through an array of new burial practices and material cultures of mourning.

These desires gave shape to an increasingly elaborate set of rituals, monumental funerary architecture and extravagant mourning practices. Through this “cult of death,” rising middle classes expressed aspirations for a kind of “temporary” immortality—achieved through memorialization. A consequence of this was the commercialization of death on a grand scale. For David Cannadine, the grave architecture proliferating in the stately new cemeteries across Europe and North America reflected a “bonanza of commercial exploitation.” What role did the dead child play in this process, which some historians have referred to as a “golden age” of grief? Certainly, they found a place of their own within the ostentatious new spaces of death, within landscaped cemeteries and dedicated family vaults. Sometimes they (and their mothers in cases of death in childbirth) even became the subjects of expensive and increasingly individualized grave sculpture. But as scholars have noted, class and status rather than age stood out as the dominant features of this increasingly commercialized nineteenth-century funerary culture. Rich children, like other members of their families, might be memorialized in grave architecture, personalized mourning jewelry, or other accoutrements, but poor children’s deaths were reflected in far more humble arrangements, if they were marked at all.

While class divided young and old in death, wealthy adults were only too well aware that their own children were as likely as those of the poor to fall victim to an untimely demise. The picture remained varied, but children residing in cities generally appeared vulnerable to infectious diseases throughout the late nineteenth century. Even in Britain, Europe’s wealthiest nation at midcentury, perceptions of “progress” jarred with evidence for the persistence
of stubbornly high mortality rates among the young. Death in early childhood remained common into the early years of the twentieth century.

In premodern times, responses to child death as a brute fact of life had often been defined evangelically, in terms of discipline and stoic sacrifice, but in post-Enlightenment Europe evangelical attitudes to childhood, and death, evolved in tension with newer ones marked by Romantic and other inflections. Significantly, the Victorian “cult of death” reached its high point during a period also marked by the romantic revival that historians have linked to changing attitudes to childhood. A key consequence of declining mortality and family size, as well as labor reform and growing access to elementary education, was that ideas about childhood as a distinct phase of life were reshaped. Childhood emerged as the subject of more intense speculative and philosophical debate.

Educated members of secularizing “Western” societies reimagined it not as a sinful time of life requiring constant correction (per older evangelical edicts), but as a separate, unspoiled, and innocent phase.¹² For some contemporaries, children—as possessors of innocence—could be seen as living exemplars of the divine, closer to God, and thus especially appropriate subjects for nostalgic remembrance. With this, the figure of the dead child acquired greater and more distinct social and symbolic power. Thus while death had been thoroughly commercialized, assumptions about children’s “natural” moral and social separate- ness from adults to some extent permitted the educated classes of secularizing societies to re-sacralize death. In this way, those who died young embodied the growing tensions and indeed the widening gulf between the religious and the secular in modern times.¹³ And in this respect dead children also became central to struggles over what it meant to be modern. The public mourning of dead children took on new symbolic significance in a period when developmentalist thinking—narratives of human evolution informed by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer—was spreading through educated circles in Europe, the United States, and beyond. From this perspective, displays of sentiment upon the death of a child could be understood as a “civilizational” achievement, and as evidence of a more highly evolved state. This belief, coupled with the notion that men were leaders of modern society (while women were the guardians of its traditions) ensured that public displays of grief at the death of children were not considered unmanly. The dead child could therefore become a focus of a shared public culture, and a middle-class–led consolatory œuvre in which fathers as well as mothers played an important role. Such ideas drew upon perceptions of childhood as a repository of innocence, as a higher, less sinful state than adulthood. From this viewpoint, in which the coming of age was conceived of as a “fall from grace,” child death could almost be seen in terms of
merciful release. In the mid- to late nineteenth century, such thinking allowed the aesthetic of the uncorrupted dead child, whose soul was already in heaven, to take on new moral authority. As rising middle classes asserted their status and authority in these urban milieus, dead children emerged at the epicenter of the family in the so-called golden age of grief.¹⁴

The suggestion that certain shared ideas expressed using the shorthand of “civilization” began to cohere around the meaning of dead children, and the “correct” way to manage death rituals resonates with recent research challenging notions of a strict class divide within funerary culture.¹⁵ Historians have critiqued the distinction between the “pauper” and the “respectable” burial as a rather too starkly drawn caricature and have pointed to the rise by the late nineteenth century of joint-stock cemeteries, insurance schemes, and burial club subscriptions to suggest that death rituals spread across class lines. In the late nineteenth-century United States, as Viviana Zelizer has shown, working-class families rushed to pay into insurance schemes intended to enable them to provide if not a “good” then at least a “better” death for their children, as an alternative to the dreaded pauper burial.¹⁶ In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century London, those traveling on the “necropolis” lines shared the same carriages, and newer cemeteries disguised class.¹⁷ Even in class-obsessed Britain, where experiences of social class sharpened distinctions between individuals’ lives, such facilities enabled poorer families, to some extent, to transcend them in death.

If middle-class mores were gradually and unevenly adopted further down the social spectrum, recent research has shown this was not through some straightforward process of “downward” cultural transfer. Such transformations were often defined by conflict. Sellers of child life insurance clashed with evangelical middle-class child-savers disturbed by the monetary valuation of children by the insurance industry (and inclined to dark assertions of its links to murder, malpractice and the defamation of the cult of mourning). Such complaints were in turn suggestive of the extent to which, by the turn of the century, children had come to be understood as “emotionally priceless,” if not yet entirely “economically valueless” further down the social spectrum.¹⁸ Meanwhile, cross-class and intra-class conflicts over deceased children challenge any notion of a discrete “Victorian culture of death.” In this issue, Lydia Murdoch exposes the contest surrounding the body of the dead child in a context of sharpening class antagonism. In the second half of the century, as British society was torn by pressures of secularization and the rise of social movements, the social fact of early death triggered a public debate over the appropriate treatment of dead children’s bodies. Middle classes inspired by lofty notions of uplift, betterment,
and the “civilizing mission” stereotyped and critiqued poorer urban dwellers’ mourning practices. In the process, the dead child became a point of contestation within and among working-class populations as a reform-minded middle class extended its sanitizing, civilizing projects into “Darkest England.” Middle-class commentators exposed evidence of poor, immigrant populations’ failure to observe death practices to public view, as a means of defining these groups as insufficiently sentimental, and thus less civilized.

Such commentary would later find an eerie echo in historical scholarship on child death, in particular Philippe Ariès’s highly influential work, *L’enfant et la vie familiale* (1960). In this seminal work Ariès put forward the controversial hypothesis that in premodern times parents responded to high rates of early mortality by displaying “indifference” to the deaths of their young children. This, he claimed, was because a heavier emotional investment was unjustified given the likelihood of children’s early demise. As Ariès put it, the dead child “was thought that the little thing which had disappeared so soon in life was not worthy of remembrance: there were far too many children whose survival was problematical,” and “the general feeling was, and for a long time remained, that one had several children in order to keep just a few.”19 Ariès also argued that, following the purported shift in attitudes toward childhood in the eighteenth century, children’s growing visibility in nineteenth-century death culture reflected the desire (as Robert Woods has put it) to “express intense grief and passionate desire to make them survive. To exalt their innocence, charm and beauty.”20 Demographic theorists and historians of the family (loosely referred to as the “sentiments school”), including Lawrence Stone, took their lead from Ariès’s stimulating arguments, referring to extravagant Victorian-era mourning practices in support of claims that parental love was a distinguishing feature of the modern family.21 From this perspective, premodern societies appeared to be places distinguished by abuse, suffering, and a comparative insensitivity to children’s death.22

Ariès’s “indifference hypothesis” did not go unchallenged. Focusing upon child life in Britain and America for example, Linda Pollock argued for the continuity of parental grief at child death.23 Scholars studying grave architecture and the styles of American tombstones for children since the mid-seventeenth century also emphasized continuity.24 Others, including Anthony Fletcher and Patricia Jalland, showed that the source base used in these earlier studies failed to convincingly underpin their arguments.25 And much recent work has presented a quite different picture of premodern attitudes to child death, emphasizing parents’ investment of sentimental value in their children’s lives and underlining the profundity of feeling that their loss elicited.26 This research has emphasized how in modern times poorer families continued to draw upon
an array of premodern folk practices and traditions in order to deal with the trauma of child death, adapted and reinvented in modern, urban contexts. The resonance of aspects of such practices across cultures is also suggestive of the need for scholars to confront child death using approaches that are not only sensitive to local and regional differences but which also locate practices within a global history of interconnections and transnational practices that sometimes changed remarkably slowly.

The revisionist turn in scholarship examining the meanings that adults ascribed to dead children has exposed earlier positions as reductive by casting doubt upon any simple or direct correlation between mortality rates and affect. More recently, however, scholars have again begun to question the precise mechanism through which the risk of premature death and death practices might have been connected. This shift has been productive in that it has prompted historians to examine the extravagant outpourings of emotion over dead children in the Victorian era in a quite different light.

Scholars following up on such lines of inquiry have also recently begun to give fuller consideration to the meanings that men of science ascribed to the dead child. Religious workers had long found projections of public grief over dead children a reassuring sign of parents’ willingness to submit to God’s will. However, such convictions began to fade in the late nineteenth century. By the 1880s, leaders of liberal evangelical reform movements in Britain were urging elites to adopt more downscale mourning rituals in public. Those who failed to observe these revised codes, as Lydia Murdoch shows in this issue, came in for sharp criticism. This was partly a result of repugnance at the fact that “death services” had become so thoroughly colonized by commercial and professional agencies. But it is significant that spectacular displays of grief and mourning began to fade from public view around the same time as men of science were striving to render death knowable.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, ideals of progress had come to be associated with mechanistic theories of science triumphing over death. Mourning culture fell back from its earlier peaks of ostentation as educated middle classes grappled with the implications of what scientists termed “degeneration.” From this perspective, child death began to be seen less as a test of individual piety and more as a problem for the social collective. As Paul White has argued, the “late Victorian denigration of sentimentality must be understood in relation to a broader shift in the nature and status of the emotions within scientific discourses, and as part of an assertion of scientific and social dominion over feeling.”
From the scientific perspective the dead child, a life cut short, represented the curtailment of growth and development. It sustained views of nature as merciless, relentless, and remorseless; as a confinement possibly to be unbound or overcome. Men of science (and most were men) were intrigued by the possibility of uncovering the secrets of death through rational inquiry, and they fashioned children’s bodies into affective spaces for scientific ritual. Among them were men confronting the loss of their own children, including the English naturalist Charles Darwin. Recent intellectual histories and biographies of Darwin have speculated over the possibility that the death of the scientist’s daughter Annie, at the age of ten, was a watershed moment on his path toward theorizing evolution. Annie was Darwin’s second child of ten, and one of three to die in childhood. The precise effect of his daughter’s death upon Darwin, his religious views, and subsequent work remains unclear. But for Patricia Jalland, the importance of Annie’s death lay more in the fact that her father viewed his own dead child, even at the very moment of her death, not merely as a focus for grief, but also as a subject for “serious scientific reflection.”

The scene is suggestive of the extent to which in post-Enlightenment Europe the child, in death and in life, served not only as a vehicle for sentimental reflection or as a source of consolation or fulfilment addressing the spiritual gulf that troubled modern minds, but also as a site for rational scientific inquiry and particularly for discussions of human interiority.

These ideas had their roots set deep in the earliest studies of child development. From the 1820s, medical literature and child care manuals had begun to direct attention toward the body’s interior (in contrast to eighteenth-century works). And in the late 1870s, Hippolyte Taine’s study of child language acquisition, published in Mind, inspired Charles Darwin to author his own “Biographical Sketch of an Infant,” the earliest Anglophone empirical study of child development. As Carolyn Steedman has pointed out, by the early years of the twentieth century, “any adult contemplating a small child was sharply aware of the immanence of death in growth,” and by this time, “death was no longer understood only as the immediate and very real threat to the child’s existence,” but also “as the inevitable outcome of the very process the child embodied, which was growth itself.” The question of growth led inexorably to the question of death, and amid fears that Western societies had reached their civilizational zenith and were now degenerating, raised the question of how this process could be slowed down or reversed. Steedman has argued that in the first decade of the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud drew upon the insights of physiology and evolutionary theory to make childhood central to the challenge
of confronting death—and the problem of stymied development. He theorized childhood in relation to the unconscious mind as a personal history, an immortal inner component of the adult self, using the concept of the “inner child.” Borne along within the mental inner space of every adult, the inner child was in one sense “dead” and in another “immortal” and transcendent.

Freud’s reversal of the link between childhood and death occurred at a moment in the early twentieth century when the dead child was being recast as a dangerous, unstable presence, a sign of moral failings and a threat to the nation. In more affluent societies the body of the dead child now came to elicit a jarring sense of departure from progress on a societal scale. While the observation of children had been an Enlightenment injunction, the monitoring of young people’s health in the interests of the nation had by the late nineteenth century become an essential duty of the state. And as concern for children became a more pressing concern of the state, child death was drawn from the domestic sphere, subjected to scientific scrutiny and relocated in curative enclaves and hygienic spaces. Historians have often emphasized the role played by “modern” spaces such as parks, playgrounds, gardens, clinics, and schoolrooms in histories of childhood, but other crucial but neglected institutions reshaped children’s lives by removing death from their midst. Municipal governments, for example, established mortuaries, as Lydia Murdoch shows in this issue.

Though the exact reasons for the decline in infant and early childhood mortality rates in the first decade of the twentieth century would long remain rather obscure, contemporaries marvelled at this astonishing new trend. In England and France, for example, childhood mortality had begun to decline from the 1880s, with infant mortality following in the early 1900s. As the likelihood that children might survive childhood began to appear greater, so the ability to protect them came to be understood as a barometer of the vigor of the nation. Children’s health emerged as a sign of parental competence and a marker of middle-class (and respectable working-class) identity. Child death by contrast emerged as a trauma against which children (and parents) were to be shielded at all costs. Consequently, memorial frameworks shifted. The earlier open and elaborate rituals of death that had served as a kind of social glue, binding adults and children together as active parts of family and community, had vanished. As child death became more knowable within the public spaces of scientific and media discourse, it also became more mysterious, in the sense of departing public life and becoming something considered properly the focus of private grief.

Sweeping death from living children’s experiences of life became a key deliverable, not only of the modern nation state, but also the modern parent. This new sensibility contributed to a process whereby child death was being
sequestered from public space and gradually (and, of course, incompletely) eliminated from public view. Scientific disciplines, not least the emergent field of psychiatry, provided evidence to support assumptions that it was especially important that child death be concealed from other children. Experts held that children were more vulnerable to emotion than adults owing to their supposedly inherent tendency toward imbalance. Proximity to death could be thus classed as the cause of a variety of pathologies from which children were “naturally” predisposed to suffer.

Beyond the realms of scientific discourse, literary cultures emerged to underpin new notions of interiority and serve the wider purpose of socializing children into new understandings of death. A key example was the modern fairy tale. Drawn upon traditional folk tales, these stories often recast children as associates of fairies. Children’s presumed proximity to, and ability to communicate with, diminutive “fallen angels” reflected and reinforced the notion that they were themselves closer to the dead. In times past older siblings, grandparents, and members of the extended family had disciplined children through tales of malevolent spirits, or the “bogey man,” as well as through didactic religious texts. The duty of inspiring fear of death in children to some extent produced the family as a social unit. However, the modern fairy tale was a sanitized version of older tales, and one generally divested of disciplining references to demonic agents abducting and exterminating the young. The new tales shifted mortal threats into a more euphemistic realm. But they also presented children with the responsibility to pore over questions of mortality quite independently, not through the Bible or other religious tracts, or adult intermediaries, but through “their own literature.” This shift fit within a wider trend in post-Enlightenment thinking that posited children as self-regulating subjects-to-be. But it also reflected the tendency, following the nineteenth-century separation of work and private life and the more general stripping away of children’s economic roles, to ascribe new responsibilities to young people within the home. Literary products emerging from the commercial culture saturating children’s lives presented readers with the expectation that they “master death” and the fear and feeling surrounding it.

This expectation endured across the twentieth century as growing access to cinema, radio, and television transformed popular culture and supplied a global audience of children with less heterogeneous sets of commercially generated texts. While day-to-day experiences of death for children continued to vary widely, in products such as cartoons and movies, death remained characteristically oblique. The millions of children who were able to access and participate in this burgeoning global culture—to join “Mickey Mouse Clubs,” for example,
and to visit cinemas—consumed cartoon characters who were in effect immortal. No matter how thoroughly belabored by their adversaries, these characters never died and went on to outlive multiple generations of young audiences. The somewhat paradoxical assumption that children should somehow still master death even as they were protected from it meanwhile found other new forms of expression, notably in the scaling up of Halloween—seen in traditional societies as the day upon which the spirit world overlapped with that of the living—by the 1930s into what many considered a “children’s holiday” in the United States and other Anglophone contexts.37

As the drive to preserve children against death gathered momentum in the first half of the twentieth century, it also served to bring different categories of dead children into sharper focus. Children who died at or before birth had often occupied a liminal position in modern societies. Not having been baptised, such dead infants commonly went unrecognized by the church. Catholic theologians had long deliberated the legacy of inherited sin and the implications of death before baptism. However, beyond the Augustinian theological assumption of “Original Sin,” popular belief had for centuries in Europe sustained the concept of “Limbo” as a separate space where such children spent all eternity. A variety of social solutions emerged in response to this theological predicament. In predominantly Catholic areas of Europe, shrines emerged (known in France as sanctuaires à répit), renowned as places where the miraculous revival of stillborn might occur long enough to permit baptism. Those children unable to receive the sacrament were buried on unconsecrated ground. Specific sites emerged for this informal purpose. Termed cillini in Ireland, these were marginal spaces classed as beyond the care of the Christian Church. However, as scholars have shown, they continued to serve as places of active remembrance as modern states began to show greater concern for the stillborn child in the early twentieth century.38

The same stillborn children who were denied entry into the afterlife had long been left unrecognized by modern states. In some places, civil registration had commenced in the early nineteenth century (for example in France in 1806 and in England and Wales in 1837), but even by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in many places, stillborn infants continued to be omitted from vital statistics altogether. This began to change as secularizing states strove to make their populations more legible. Registrars general created mortality rates. And having gone to the trouble of initiating these expensive exercises, officials soon condemned problems of criminal neglect and malpractice in registration, casting their value into doubt. This was a significant problem in societies that had embarked earliest upon the trajectory that would result in
demographically older populations. It was in “ageing” societies such as Britain and France in the early twentieth century that states began to take a closer interest in vital registration (and malpractice) and endowed stillborn children with a legal existence. As societal awareness of the infant as a separate medical and social entity grew in England, stillbirth registration was introduced. As Karen George explains in this special issue, a specific register recording information about the death of children in care in Australia, the Mortality Record Book, was also introduced from 1927. While Philippe Ariès and Geoffrey Gorer characterized the twentieth century as a period during which death was removed from public view, others have argued, to the contrary, that in this period it was recognized in places and ways that it had not been previously. As Tony Walter and Lindsay Prior have observed, it was discussed in a different kind of (legal and medical) language, notably in relation to children.

The surprising decline in infant mortality in the early twentieth century followed improvements in nutrition, the control of infectious disease, medical technologies, and reduced family size. And this remarkable trend had the consequence of driving educated observers to reassess the role of wealthy nation states in preserving child life beyond their borders, and in particular within their empires. European and American builders of empire had long seen bio-power as a key consideration in optimizing the managed extraction of resources from colonies and areas better described as “informal empire.” Medical missionaries, doctors, and hygienists had long disseminated specialist child-rearing knowledge through imperial networks. As census data revealed a striking disparity between infant mortality rates within metropolitan and colonial contexts, new international agencies such as the League of Nations (established at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919) used such figures to apply pressure to colonial governments. Colonial officials were generally reluctant to acknowledge responsibility for social reform, excusing their own inaction with reference to the preservation of indigenous “tradition” or the monumental scale of their “civilizing” task in the face of incorrigible backwardness. Much earlier, in the nineteenth century, evidence that peoples facing colonial domination used demographic strategies such as infanticide served imperial ambitions by denoting un-modernity and “incivility.” But in the interwar age of “trusteeship,” preserving the children of colonial subject peoples against early death increasingly came to be seen as a core deliverable of empire (especially as imperial governments faced a rising tide of indigenous nationalism). In places where high levels of infant mortality persisted, dead children posed a direct threat to colonial overlords’ pursuit of stability and their claims to represent civility and benevolence.
Scholarly arguments for the twentieth century as a period during which death was generally “invisible” or “tidied away” runs up against evidence to the contrary even beyond formal colonial possessions, in informal parts of empire. In “cosmopolitan” Shanghai for example, a large modern urban center on the east coast of nationalist-governed China, child death remained a highly visible public presence. As Christian Henriot has shown, notwithstanding its global connections and high concentrations of wealth, Shanghai remained a place where the poor left their dead in the streets in the thousands. From 1915 to 1947, an estimated 88 percent (some 659,871) were children. Though child death remained an obvious and highly public fact of urban life in Shanghai, Henriot suggests it also remained, in a sense, “invisible.” As he put it, this phenomenon “was so massive, so present in everyday life, and probably so unbearable that it became something they chose not to see or to care about, except when a dead body landed on their doorstep. Through a double process of social denial . . . these invisible deaths were pushed out of collective memory.”

A key consequence of the spread of new technologies across the globe in the early twentieth century was that the principal causes of child death began to change. Before 1900, infectious disease such as pneumonia, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and scarlet fever had killed around half of all infants in the United States, for example. But as improvements in urban sanitation reduced these figures, chronic and degenerative diseases took a much greater toll on children, especially those who were older. Soon, in more developed societies, child mortality was redefined in relation not to disease but to accidental death, the prime cause of which was motor traffic accidents.

The proliferation of motor vehicles in urban centers during the first half of the twentieth century led to automobiles being identified as the primary threat to child life. By the 1910s, accidents in which children were crushed beneath the wheels of motor vehicles had replaced disease as the leading cause of death in the United States for children in the five-to-fourteen age bracket. French provincial newspapers, already fretting over “de-population,” devoted substantial amounts of space to coverage of this growing threat. In a period marked more broadly by anxieties over the demographic impact of war, beyond streets and broadsheets the daily erasure of young lives by motor vehicles stimulated a critique of (auto)mobility. The main consequence of this, however, appears to have been a marked shift in understandings of children’s public mobility. Those in authority increasingly identified the public presence of young people as a “problem” to be solved. By the 1930s, acknowledgment of this led to the appointment of “safety councils” in wealthier nation-states. Children’s urban lives more generally were recast in terms of endangerment. By the second half
of the twentieth century, with reference to the case of Britain, the sociologist Gill Valentine has argued that the child in public had become a quite anomalous figure.  

While the growing threat of death by automobile cast a pall over children’s public lives, specific spaces, streets, and workspaces and places of commercial leisure continued to be construed as dangerous to children. Accidents in commercial places reinforced associations of children’s movement beyond the home with the lurking danger of death, and exposed conflicting views over questions of responsibility for them. As Magda Fahrni shows in this issue, the deaths of seventy-eight children in the Laurier Palace cinema fire, which convulsed the Francophone neighborhood of Hochelaga in Montreal, Canada, on January 9, 1927, illustrates how far consensus had spread over the emotional “pricelessness” of children. But acceptance of this view in turn helped to bring youth cultural practices perceived as “risky” under closer scrutiny. The Hochelaga fire killed dozens of children and triggered frantic demands for accountability, extensive deliberations over the assignation of blame, and indignant responses from grieving parents at the difficulties they encountered as they sought to secure legal redress. 

Quite similar concerns pervaded other contexts beyond the biological family where adults sought to articulate their power over children, notably reforming institutions and foster homes. The practice of divesting children had ancient roots, but from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dedicated spaces, such as foundling homes, became more numerous in Europe, as did the deaths of those they admitted. In this issue Karen George highlights the case of Australian foster homes as adjuncts of state-level intervention in children’s lives around the turn of the twentieth century. Her contribution explicitly honors the memories of the forgotten children who fell victim to accidents in these homes and highlights what she sees as state-level actors’ disinterest in their fate. Meanwhile, Kathleen Jones’s essay picks up on similar issues of neglect in the mid-twentieth century in relation to institutions where the state supposedly acted in loco parentis in the United States. Taking the case of suicides by children of Mexican descent at Whittier State School in California, Jones reveals how the failure of the state to prevent the deaths of children in care triggered bitterly divisive contests over how these incidents were to be interpreted in a cultural context where the meanings of childhood were reaching new heights of emotional significance. 

Both Fahrni’s and Jones’s articles return us to the question of children’s agency by illustrating how young people’s actions made them contributors to a societal dialog over death. In the case of the suicides at Whittier school, these
children’s apparently rational choice of death challenged assumptions that as children they were understood to be non-rational actors. As populist counter-narratives grew up in the wake of these shocking events, those determined to defend state-level interests struggled to find ways to shift the blame onto supposedly innocent victims. In fashioning a response to the suicides, experts therefore marshalled narratives highlighting the young victims’ supposedly unbalanced mental state. State authorities also ranged themselves behind demands for new and ever more specialized subdivisions of institutional space. These they deemed necessary to accommodating “defectives” and “delinquents” who were a danger both to themselves and to the larger communities of which they formed part.

These tragedies, like that of the Hochelaga fire, reveal how quickly children’s deaths could act as an emotional trigger, exceeding the meanings those in authority preferred to ascribe to them. And they also showed (in both cases) how the agency of children could have remarkable, posthumous consequences. In the hands of adults, children’s untimely deaths could powerfully symbolize inequality. Even in places where children had not yet become entirely economically worthless, they could represent the “failed promises” of industrial capitalism with considerable potency. The legacy of children’s actions, though far from undisputed, also provided communities with resources enabling them to challenge vested interests and social barriers. And, it was precisely because child death elicited a sense of “collective failure” and of a tragedy for society, as Fahrni puts it, that the sense of child life cut short could trigger such extraordinary debates over how to live.

As children’s lives in public spaces came to be construed as being in danger, this reinforced assumptions that the home—the site of the ideally happy childhood—might exist as a place of safety, a refuge from deadly encounters. However, on closer inspection, homes turned out to be spaces where, statistically, the emotionally priceless child was more and not less likely to be the victim of a fatal accident. As deaths at an early age became more rare, parents grappled with expectations that they take seriously the responsibility to “child proof” their homes. This process involved a minute subdivision of private space, or perhaps the further “islanding” of childhood within the family home. While parents finessed from the domestic picture the threats lurking at home in such mundane forms as stairs, electric sockets, and blind cords, they assigned a participatory role to older children in this process. Parents (and children’s storybooks) counselled young people on how to navigate the dangers of their own homes.
Even as dangers of death in the suitably “childproofed” home receded, the visualized threat of violent death, if not the physical experience of it, remained integral to the socialization of the child in private. As Tamara Myers shows in this issue, from the mid-twentieth century media technology exposed children to the imagery of death in new didactic forms. The dead child burst emphatically back into children’s lives, across cultures from the 1950s through the medium of public information films. These films ruptured the boundaries between public and private by delivering images of child death. The intention in doing so was to shock young audiences observing the films within the “safety” of their own homes into conforming to certain practices beyond it.

In some respects, these films revived a long tradition of cautionary tales. They reconnected children with what Ann Pellegrini has referred to as “necropedagogies”54: stories about death invested with pedagogical intent. Older stories of children’s deaths had provided families in Europe and America with models of religious piety and civic virtue, in effect ways of living. Their role was to teach children how to manage the powerful emotions associated with the possibility of their own death, and that of other children.55 However, as we have seen in the previous half century, experts in the inner workings of the human mind had undermined convictions that death should serve as a disciplinary tool in children’s lives, and knowledge of it had faded from the disciplinary narratives that defined community relations.

In the mid-twentieth century modern states revived necropedagogies, “judiciously” soliciting death with a view to enhancing the chances of children’s survival, in hopes of sustaining the “body politic.” Picking up on Pellegrini’s work, Maria Tumarkin has examined the example of the state-sponsored dissemination of necropedagogies on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, featuring child heroes of the Soviet Union who willingly gave their lives in the nation’s hour of need.56 In the North American context, public information films such as those discussed by Myers delivered grisly invocations of unintended, sudden death in public to didactically instill good behavior. These state-produced films associated danger and death with specific public places, notably roadways, railways, and substations—the architectures of high modernity. By informing children about the dangers of spaces associated with speed, transience, and mobility, state media undergirded older cultural assumptions about childhood as a site upon which tradition, nostalgia, and pastness were ideally to be inscribed. These assumptions had profound implications for the kinds of “childness” that authorities expected might be performed in public, and by extension attitudes toward citizenship.57 Though necropedagogies were intended to produce
public, self-governing, rational individuals by relying heavily upon their ability to shock, these mediatized visions of death threatened to undermine the very notion of a public space for children altogether.

The “didactic sudden death” films proliferated in a period described by David Cannadine as one of “total immersion in death of a new kind.” In the nuclear era, global death had become an ever-present possibility. The films created landscapes of childhood fear, threatened by transport and electricity networks, but appear to have hinted at deeper anxieties surrounding more powerful (weaponized) technologies and the complete inability of even the most powerful states to protect “priceless” children against them. Meanwhile, the willingness of governments to deliver unsentimental images of dead children to audiences, a significant number of whom were children, shattered the very dichotomy between “safe” private and “dangerous” public space that these interventions were intended to shore up. By the very fact of being screened within domestic environments, the films revealed the home not as a sanctuary but as a porous place, invaded and disrupted by the punitive or didactic tactics of police, educators, and experts. The “private” realm was a space invaded by the fear of death, if not death itself.

Nowhere was the porosity of the home clearer than in the midst of the social jeopardy of war. War in the twentieth century has often been discussed as strikingly different to the genres of conflict that preceded it, in terms of its scale and its tendency to expose civilian populations to combat. But what also distinguished modern warfare was that it revealed the gulf between ideals of a protected childhood and the grim reality “on the ground.” In her best-selling book of 1900 (translated into English in 1909), Ellen Key predicted that the twentieth century would be the “Century of the Child.” In the decades that followed, the recognition of childhood as an emotionally priceless condition reached unparalleled heights, global reach, and institutional backing, and modern states contributed to processes that saved more children than ever before in human history. However, the same period was also marked by wars and manmade catastrophes that brought millions of children face to face with the shocking fragility of their own supposedly “special” status.

War occasioned, or gave rise to, state-led campaigns calculated to deliver death on a scale that was unprecedented. Children’s deaths were often not merely the result of accidental exposure in the midst of conflict, but were pursued quite deliberately. From the Herero Uprising in Southwest Africa of 1904, to the Turkish massacre of Armenians, to the Nazis’ willful destruction of countless Jewish and other “defective” children on the grounds of racial efficiency, to Mao’s Great Famine in China, and other grim examples, state-led campaigns often targeted children.
Many children, especially boys, were also recruited or coerced into military service and lost their lives as a direct result. And recognition of this aspect of modern warfare eventually elicited ameliorative interventions in the form of international conventions. Articles 24 and 50 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, for example, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) quite explicitly spelled out rights intended to protect children in war. Even so, in its report on the State of the World’s Children of 1996, UNICEF estimated that two million children had been killed in warfare in the previous decade alone.61

Amid the wreckage of their homes and family life, some of those children caught up in conflict reached for the transnational norm of a happy childhood and defined their own experiences as aberrant in the light of it. They quickly grasped the sense that war in practice flattened out their distinctiveness as children. Wars increased rates of infant and childhood mortality, reversing the (new) natural order by making child death appear less exceptional and by lessening the protective effects of age. In the twentieth century, while the outcomes of conflicts remained in doubt, questions of responsibility also hung in the balance. This made child death a difficult subject for combatants to broach. Though representations of living children played a key role in soliciting adults to fight (or continue fighting) at times when the fabric of society was stretched and vulnerable, the dead child was often a difficult presence to admit. Certainly, it might usefully exemplify an opponent’s barbarism (as in the case of the British and French depictions of German atrocities during the Great War, which featured innocent child victims). But it also raised fundamental questions about the failure of societies at war to protect their most vulnerable members. In consequence, throughout the twentieth century, dead children tended to achieve greater prominence after peace returned, and even then as part of a carefully edited martyrology defining postwar norms of morality. From images of the anonymous, starving Austrian children at the end of the Great War to photographs of Anne Frank, images of child victims of war rank among the most memorable and controversial images of the century.62 After 1918 such imagery had begun to serve the interests of new international agencies determined to push ideals of childhood across borders. To these campaigners, children’s fragile bodies offered a valuable focal point enabling shared outpourings of collective grief to be rendered coherent and visible.63

In a late twentieth-century world transformed by the accelerated pace of globalization, the image of the child victim of war did not lose its capacity to shock. The spread of global media technology and the Internet instead brought a new, raw, and disruptive immediacy to images of child victims of wars. These victims, as children, retained the potential to destabilize narratives justifying
conflict, and could be called upon to symbolically represent what may be seen as an unjust or disproportionate use of force. In this issue, Heidi Morrison discusses the images and stories of children killed in the war-torn Gaza Strip in late 2000 and 2001 that were broadcast by media to global audiences. The conflict resulted in the death of nearly one thousand children and destroyed the lives of countless others. But beyond skirmishes on the ground and what television audiences saw on their screens, Palestinians and Israelis waged another battle, as Morrison shows, in the realm of media, disputing the meanings of, and responsibility for, the dead Palestinian child.

While Palestinians framed the dead child as evidence of a vengeful Israeli state, Morrison shows how Israeli journalists cast dead children as human shields or “baby suicide bombers.” Individual mothers, meanwhile, invested their children’s deaths with a sense of agency through claims that this trauma evidenced God’s will and that individual children had been chosen to become martyrs. The mothers’ strategies remind us that beyond the apparently stable and coherent international norm of childhood, families and societies projected powerful and often quite divergent meanings of their own onto the deaths of their children. These meanings may have intentionally challenged the gulf between modernity’s civilizing promise and its failure to protect the most vulnerable, not least by exposing the links between this norm and the international political order with which it remains so closely bound.  

CONCLUSION

We need new histories of children, childhood, and death. Historians of childhood in particular need to engage more deeply with the structures of feeling surrounding child death and how children engaged with didactic visions of it in ritual, literature, and symbolism. The question of how death shaped the experiences of living children also awaits much fuller examination. The significance of the work contained in this special issue lies in the authors’ willingness to consider the ideological work that child death performed in a variety of different modern contexts. In the articles that follow, the contributors take up this challenge in a variety of settings, from reformatories to foster homes and from war zones to living rooms. Together the articles collected here focus upon child death in specific institutions and spaces, and their authors explore its impact at the level of the individual and society. They shed light upon the shared and overlapping histories of meanings of age and mortality, and the close links between views of childhood and the social fact of death in the modern world. They reveal the extraordinary power that attached to the brief lives of children who failed to outlive their own childhoods. And they reveal how children’s
deaths can tell us not only something about loss, despair, and trauma, but also how past societies imagined new beginnings, redefined ways of living, and projected hopes of a better future.

NOTES


4. Jalland, *Death*, 120.


11. On children's efforts to elaborate their own rituals of mourning as expressions of class feeling, see Vincent DiGirolamo, “Newsboy Funerals: Tales of Sorrow and Solidarity in Urban America,” *Journal of Social History* 36, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 5-30.


17. Nash, “Pomp and Circumstance.”


27. Woods, Children Remembered.


31. Lorch and Hellal, “Darwin’s ‘Natural Science of Babies’”; Taine’s article was published in 1877, the same year as Darwin’s. ”M. Taine on the Acquisition of Language by Children”,


34. Steedman, *Strange Dislocations*, 76.


46. Henriot, “‘Invisible Deaths.’”


48. Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin, eds., *Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and Social Relations* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997); John Burnham, “Why did the Infants and Toddlers


64. Even today thousands of children are killed in civil wars, with millions of lives eliminated in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Peter N. Stearns, *Childhood in World History* (London: Routledge, 2006), 135-37.
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