Constitutional Protection of the Right to be Presumed Innocent and the Right against Self-Incrimination: The Hong Kong Experience

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WHILE civil libertarians embrace the introduction of a bill of rights as a hallmark in human right protection, the skeptics have labeled a bill of right as a "bill of wrongs" or even a "criminal charter". Such skeptical sentiment is understandable, as in many jurisdictions those who face criminal charges are usually among the first group to invoke human rights protection, and not surprisingly, some people consider that constitutional protection may have gone too far in protecting the dubious members of the community. This tension between protection of fundamental rights and the protection of public interest is best seen in the context of the presumption of innocence, which lies at the heart of our criminal justice system. This presumption shapes our approach towards burden of proof, the right against self-incrimination, and the remedies towards a violation of this fundamental presumption. Yet ironically, this golden thread of our criminal justice system has only a recent origin, and is entirely judge-made, which means that it is at the mercy of Parliamentary acceptance. In a traditional common law system without a bill of rights, the presumption of innocence is hamstrung by Parliament through the introduction of reversed onus provisions and statutory abrogation of the right against self-incrimination. When the presumption of innocence acquires a constitutional status in a bill of rights, the power is re-balanced as it is now in the hands of the judiciary to determine whether statutory encroachment into this judge-made presumption has gone too far. This chapter will examine how the Hong Kong judiciary responds to this new challenge by focusing on two main issues: reversed onus provisions and statutory inroads into the right against self-incrimination. At the end of the day, whether a bill of right turns out to be a criminal charter or whether it is nothing more than a set of rhetorical promises depends largely on how the judiciary is going to interpret the constitutional provisions, and the approach of the judiciary is from time to time shaped by prevailing social, political and legal environment, and in Hong Kong, the unique constitutional framework of “one country, two systems” when the sovereign country has a different criminal justice system and does not accept the presumption of innocence. The challenge of the Hong Kong judiciary is best captured by Justice Kennedy of the US Supreme Court in his
inspiring speech to the Hong Kong judiciary shortly after the change of
sovereignty over Hong Kong:¹

“It is our human condition, it is our common fate that we may never know
the verdict that history returns on our efforts, our attempts to shape our
own times. We do not know whether you in Hong Kong are writing a
quiet epilogue, or are instead writing a prologue for what will become a
new and noble chapter in the history of the law. I hope and pray it is the
latter.”

It is against such background that this chapter examines the development
of the presumption of innocence under the constitutional system of Hong Kong
in the last decade.

The Constitutional Framework

Hong Kong became a British colony in the mid-19th century. Despite all
the shortcomings associated with colonialism, the British Government has
brought to Hong Kong the common law system, a benign government that ruled
on consensus, and an efficient and a relatively liberal regime. Within a century
Hong Kong has been transformed from a remote fishing village into a major
international financial centre. By virtue of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
1984, the British Government agreed to return Hong Kong to the People's
Republic of China in 1997, and in return, China agreed to make Hong Kong a
Special Administrative Region governed by the so-called “one country, two
systems” model. In essence, Hong Kong will retain its legal, social and economic
system. The common law is preserved. The previous judicial system is retained,
save that a Court of Final Appeal is established in Hong Kong. Independence of
the judiciary, fundamental human rights, and prosecutorial independence are
guaranteed. Chinese socialist policies or criminal law do not apply to Hong Kong.
These guarantees are written into the Basic Law, the constitution of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, which was promulgated by the National
People's Congress in April 1990.

In 1991, despite China’s objection, the Hong Kong Legislative Council
enacted the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, which incorporated into
domestic law the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)

¹ Speech delivered to the Judiciary on 5 February 1999; quote in Kemal
Bokhary, Recollections (Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), pp 213-214.
as applied to Hong Kong. On 1 July 1997, the Basic Law came into effect. Chapter 3 of the Basic Law sets out the protection for fundamental rights. Article 39 provides that the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the HKSAR. The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law, and such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. Soon after the establishment of the HKSAR, the Court of Final Appeal has confirmed the constitutional status of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, and the supreme authority of the Basic Law such that any law in contravention of the Basic Law shall be of no legal effect. In short, the courts assume without question the power of constitutional review.

Reversed Onus Provisions

The presumption of innocence has rightly been described as “the golden thread of criminal law”. It lies at the heart of our criminal justice system, which will become a very different system without such presumption. Among other things, the presumption means that the burden of proof of an offence falls on the prosecution. However, over the years, it has been found convenient to place the burden of proof of some elements of an offence to the defendant, invariably on the ground that it is difficult or impossible for the prosecution to prove these elements or that the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. Thus, it is not surprising that the first case that reached the Court of Appeal on the Bill of Rights was a case challenging the constitutionality of a number of reversed onus provisions in the Dangerous Drug Ordinance. In a colourful judgment, Silke VP held that:

“In my judgment, the glass through which we view the interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill is a glass provided by the Covenant. We are no longer guided by the ordinary cannons of construction of statues nor with the dicta of the common law inherent in our training. We must look, in our interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill, at the aims of the Covenant and give ‘full recognition and effect’ to the statement which commences that Covenant. From this stems the entirely new jurisprudential approach to which I have already referred.”

2 For more details, see J Chan & C L Lim (eds), The Law of Hong Kong Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), chs 1 and 15.
3 Ng Ka Ling v HKSAR (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4; A v Commissioner of ICAC (2012) 15 HKCFAR 360 at 381, paras 34-36.
4 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481-482, per Lord Sankey LC.
Under this new jurisprudential approach, in balancing individual rights against societal interests, the courts proceed with a presumption in favour of individual rights, and the Government has to tilt the balance by presenting cogent and persuasive evidence. Silke VP laid down the following guidelines:6

“The onus is on the Crown to justify. It is to be discharged on the preponderance of probability. The evidence of the Crown needs to be cogent and persuasive. The interests of the individual must be balanced against the interests of society generally but, in the light of the contents of the Covenant and its aim and objects, with a bias towards the interests of the individual.”

After reviewing comparative jurisprudence from international and foreign domestic jurisdictions with a constitutional bill of rights, the court concluded that a mandatory presumption of fact may be compatible with the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence only if the Crown could show, taking into account the legislative intention, that “the fact to be presumed rationally and realistically follows from that proved and also if the presumption is no more than proportionate to what is warranted by the nature of the evil against which society requires protection.”7 Under the then legislation, a defendant was presumed to be in possession of dangerous drug for the purpose of trafficking if he was found to be in possession of a certain quantity of dangerous drug (0.5 gram or more than 5 packets whatever be the quantity of the drug). He was further presumed to be in possession of dangerous drug and to know the nature of the drug if he was found to be in possession of a key to anything where the drug was found, which involved building a presumption upon another presumption. The Court held that these reversed onus provisions were too broad and, on the evidence before it, failed to satisfy the rationality test and were hence unconstitutional.

Encouraged by this judgment, the courts were soon flooded with constitutional challenges against many reversed onus provisions. As these provisions could take many different forms, the courts have held that it should consider the substance rather than the form in approaching reverse onus provisions. Some provisions may appear as classic reverse onus provisions; some may impose an evidential rather than a legal burden on the defendant. Sometimes it could be a presumption of law rather than a presumption of fact. Sometimes the essential element of an offence may be drafted as a defence.8

6 Ibid, 113.
7 Ibid, 134.
8 See Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 at 710B-D where Lord Steyn addressed the possibility of a redrafting a provision requiring the registered owner to supply
presumption of innocence was also held to apply to both the pre-trial and the post-trial stage. It has been invoked to challenge interdiction and suspension of part of the salary of a civil servant who has faced criminal charges,\(^9\) extensive pre-trial adverse publicity,\(^10\) refusal to award cost upon successful appeal against conviction with an order for a re-trial,\(^11\) and a presumption, at the stage of sentencing, of having committed repeated offences of managing an unlicensed massage establishment if another person has previously been convicted of the same offence at the same address.\(^12\)

Judicial enthusiasm on constitutional presumption of innocence was halted by the decision of the Privy Council in *Attorney General v Lee Kwong-kut*.\(^13\) Lord Woolf set down a more cautious approach to constitutional interpretation:

> "While the Hong Kong judiciary should be zealous in upholding an individual’s rights under the Hong Kong Bill, it is also necessary to ensure that disputes as to the effect of the Bill are not allowed to get out of hand. The issues involving the Hong Kong Bill should be approached with realism and good sense, and kept in proportion. If this is not done, the Bill will become a source of injustice rather than justice and it will be debased in the eyes of the public. In order to maintain the balance between the individual and the society as a whole, rigid and inflexible standards should not be imposed on the Legislature’s attempts to resolve the difficult and intransigent problems with which society is faced when seeking to deal with serious crime. It must be remembered that questions of policy remain primarily the responsibility of the Legislature."

That case involved two appeals that were heard together. In the first appeal, the subject of the challenge was section 30 of the Summary Offences Ordinance, under which a person committed an offence if he was found to be in possession of anything that was reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained, unless he could provide a satisfactory account of how he came by the same. The second appeal was concerned with the constitutionality of section 25 of the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance, which provided for an offence of being involved in any arrangement to facilitate the retention or control

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10 R v Lo Chak Man (No 2) (1994) 4 HKPLR 466.
11 R v Man Wai Keung (No 2) [1992] 2 HKCLR 207.
of the proceeds of drug trafficking, with a defence of an absence of knowledge or reasonable suspicion that the relevant arrangement was related to the proceeds of drug trafficking. The Privy Council rejected the rationality and proportionality tests, describing them as an unnecessarily complex process. Instead, it proposed a reasonableness test:

“Some exceptions will be justifiable, others will not. Whether they are justifiable will in the end depend upon whether it remains primarily the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused to the required standard and whether the exception is reasonably imposed, notwithstanding the importance of maintaining the principle which article 11(1) enshrines. The less significant the departure from the normal principle, the simpler it will be to justify an exception. If the prosecution retains responsibility for proving the essential ingredients of the offence, the less likely it is that an exception will be regarded as unacceptable. In deciding what are the essential ingredients, the language of the relevant statutory provision will be important. However what will be decisive will be the substance and reality of the language creating the offence rather than its form.”

Applying these tests, the Privy Council found the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant to provide an explanation of innocent possession, which was the most significant element of the summary offence of unlawful possession, violated the right to be presumed innocent, whereas the defence of an absence of knowledge or reasonable suspicion in the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance, which was something the defendant could easily substantiate but extremely difficult if not impossible for the prosecution to prove, was justifiable. Indeed, the two reversed onus provisions were said to be “examples of situations close to the opposite ends of the spectrum of what does and does not contravene article 11(1).”

Lord Woolf further added that in the majority of cases, the court would be able to come to a conclusion whether the reverse onus provisions were inconsistent with the presumption of innocence by examining the provisions themselves, without the need to go through the complex tests of rationality and proportionality. Even when it is necessary to resort to these tests in the exceptional circumstances, these tests should be applied with caution and flexibility.

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14 At 198.
15 Ibid, at 200.
16 Ibid, at 200.
It is not easy to understand the judicial skepticism of the Privy Council towards the tests of rationality and proportionality. The Privy Council is probably right that, in the majority of cases, the outcome would be the same whichever approach is adopted. On the other hand, the approach of the Privy Council lends itself to a subjective assessment of the effect of the reverse onus provisions. By treating the matter as purely one of statutory interpretation, the Privy Council’s approach may not allow the court to consider the evidence on the practical operation of a reverse onus provision or the alternative measures, which is what proportionality would require. Take the Sin Yau Ming case as an example. It would be difficult to assess whether it is constitutional to require a defendant to rebut a presumption of possession of dangerous drug for the purpose of trafficking when he is in possession of 0.5 gm or more of dangerous drug, without considering evidence on the average consumption of dangerous drug by an average drug addict, or the pattern of acquisition of dangerous drug.17 Likewise, in considering the proportionality of a presumption of repeated offences, in the case of a conviction of operating an unlawful gambling establishment or an unlicensed massage parlour, by reason of a similar previous conviction of another person at the same address, it is difficult to confine oneself to an examination of the statutory provision without looking at the evidence, and sometimes the alternative measures available to the prosecution. The intuitive approach is particularly dangerous when a popular but draconian provision is involved, such as a presumption that a civil servant is corrupted if he maintains a standard of living that is incommensurate with his official emolument. There is of course nothing to prevent a judge who has adopted the approach advocated by the Privy Council from asking for evidence of justification, but this will largely be a matter for individual judges, whereas the Sin Yau Ming approach allows all parties concerned to know from the very beginning where they stand, what they have to prove and what evidence would be necessary. It does not mean that a mechanical approach should be adopted or that the rationality and proportionality tests will always produce the right answer, but a systematic approach is likely to produce a more convincing and objective solution that is capable of being objectively and rationally tested. More importantly, a statutory interpretation approach is likely to result in the triumph of societal interests over individual rights, whereas the rationality and proportionality tests are more likely to lead to a more rigorous scrutiny of any restriction of fundamental rights.

17 In that case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution showed that the average drug consumption of an average drug addict is about 0.9 gm per day, thus casting doubt on the appropriateness of adopting 0.5 gm as a criterion to trigger the presumption. It was further shown that most drug addicts tend to acquire sufficient drug for a few days’ consumption, and hence the amount would easily be above the statutory triggering point even though the drug was acquired for personal consumption.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court of Final Appeal has no hesitation in preferring the Sin Yau Ming’s approach when this issue was raised under the Basic Law after the change of sovereignty. In Lam Kwong Wai, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 20(3) of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, which created an offence of possession of an imitation firearm for a purpose dangerous to the public peace or for the commission of an offence.\footnote{(2006) 9 HKCFAR 574, 593, para 21 and 595, para 29, per Sir Anthony Mason NP].} It then provided for a defence if a defendant could satisfy the court that he was in possession of the firearm for an innocent purpose. The Court of Final Appeal readily accepted that, to pass muster the Basic Law, the relevant presumption could only be justified if it had a rational connection with the pursuit of a legitimate aim and if it was no more than necessary for the achievement of that legitimate aim, and the justification had to be compelling.\footnote{Paras 42- 43. See also R v Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 at 1749H-1750A, per Lord Nicholls; S v Mbatha (1996) (3) BCLR 293 (SACC).} Although the reverse onus provision was formulated as a defence, it had the effect of placing the burden of proof of an essential element of the offence on the defendant, and hence it had to be justified by the rationality and proportionality tests.\footnote{See paras 32-34. It is a fine line between imposing the burden of proof of an essential element on the defendant and completing the criminal offence without that essential element, which is left as a matter of defence. See also Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 150C (per Lord Reid).} While it satisfied the rationality test, it failed the proportionality test by imposing a legal burden of proof on the defendant. In upholding the reverse onus provision, the Court of Final Appeal was prepared to adopt a remedial interpretation by reading down the provision to impose an evidential, rather than legal, burden of proof. It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Legislature has considered appropriate to impose a persuasive burden, holding that in the area of matters of proof, onus and evidence, the Court was the master of its own house and was able to form its own judgment after giving appropriate respect to the judgment of the Legislature.\footnote{Para 45.}

This case raises the vexed question whether imposing a legal burden of proof of an essential element of an offence on the defendant could ever be justified. The argument against such a provision is that a defendant would be exposed to a risk of conviction notwithstanding that he is able to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, but is unable to discharge his legal burden of proof. This is a powerful argument, which has by and large been accepted by the court,\footnote{Paras 23-28 & 41. See also R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 at 572D (per Lord Steyn); R v Whyte (1985) 51 DLR (4th) 481 at 493 (per Dickson CJC). See also the} but the court was nonetheless reluctant to lay down a
general principle that imposing a legal burden to disprove an element of an
defence is always unconstitutional. Instead, it suggested, without elaboration,
that there might be situations where imposing a legal burden on a defendant
could be justified. It distinguished two English cases where the court upheld a
reverse onus provision imposing a legal burden in relation to an offence of
possession of a bladed knife in a public place on the basis that that act was
inherently dangerous in a public place whereas it was not necessarily the case
with possession of an imitation firearm, especially when it was possessed in
private premises. This distinction is hardly convincing and could not explain
why a defendant could still be convicted notwithstanding that he was able to
raise a doubt of the dangerous purpose of possessing a bladed knife in public. At
the same time, the Court of Final Appeal rejected an argument that the purpose
of possession of an imitation firearm was peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant. There was simply no inherent or abnormal difficulty of proving
knowledge, which in many cases was a matter of inference from facts proved.
Nor had the Court of Final Appeal found it convincing that the prosecution could
only be made with the consent of the Secretary for Justice, as the fairness of a
trial should not be dependent on someone’s decision of whether there should be
a prosecution. In light of these comments, it is difficult to see what those
situations where imposing a legal burden would ever be justified, albeit that
those situations have to be extremely rare and exceptional.

Another difficult issue is whether strict liability or absolute liability
defences can ever be justified. In this sense, strict liability offences refer to
offences which do not require the proof of a criminal intent, whereas absolute
liability offences do not require the proof of any criminal intent and do not allow
any defence. It is a fine distinction, and could well be a matter of legislative
drafting, whether a provision imposes the burden of proof of mens rea of an
offence on the defendant, or whether a provision creates a strict or absolute
liability offence so that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the mental
element for the purpose of conviction, with or without a possibility of a defence
of an absence of a criminal intent. The court has adopted a fairly liberal and
flexible approach not to be dictated by how the offence is formulated, but what in
substance the elements of the offence are. While the court would be slow to
accept that a strict or absolute liability offence is intended in the absence of clear
statutory language, it has also held that an absolute or strict liability offence is
not per se inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. They would have to
be justified by satisfying the rationality and proportionality tests, and in the case

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23 Para 40. The two English cases are *L v DPP* [2003] QB 137 and *R v Matthews*
of an absolute offence imposing a custodial sentence, it would have to be further justified as not being an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. In general, the court tends to view these offences with great suspicion and would readily read into these offences a defence of reasonable but mistaken belief. However, in rare circumstances when protection of a minor is involved, the court was prepared to uphold an absolute offence of having sexual intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 even when the offence admitted no defence of a lack of knowledge of the age of the girl, as the offence did satisfy the tests of rationality and proportionality.24

Despite the enlightening approach adopted by the Court of Final Appeal, the commitment to fundamental rights is only under real challenge when the courts begin to balance constitutional rights with other competing interests. Should it be considered just as one of the factors in the balancing process, or should it carry great weight which should only be displaced upon cogent and persuasive justifications and having considered the fundamental values of the rights concerned? Yeung Chung Ming v Commissioner of Police is a good illustration.25 In that case, a police officer who was charged with a criminal offence was suspended from duties pending his trial. At the same time, he had his salary withheld pursuant to section 17 of the Police Force Ordinance, which authorized the Commissioner to withhold not more than half of his salary. The withheld salary would be returned to the police officer if he was eventually acquitted. He challenged the withholding of his salary as a violation of his right to be presumed innocent, as such a decision appeared to treat him as a person who might be guilty and it was not demonstrably necessary to achieve any societal objective. This argument was rejected by the Court of Final Appeal by a majority, who held that the presumption of innocence was essentially an element of a fair trial. Where a person is at the beginning of the criminal process, and when the authority takes action in relation to a person charged with a criminal office merely on the basis that he might be guilty (as opposed to a view that he is guilty), there would be no violation of the presumption of innocence. It was held that the correct test was whether the Commissioner’s decision to withhold any proportion of the pay of an interdicted officer implied a view that the officer was guilty. As the police officer had been interdicted on the ground that such interdiction was in the public interest, and having been interdicted, he was relieved from his duties and not required to perform any work, the decision to withhold his salary did not imply that the officer was guilty.

This explanation is problematic. If the reason for withholding the salary is that the officer is not performing any duty during the period of interdiction, it

24 So Wai Lun v HKSAR [2006] 3 HKLRD 394 at 403H-404C.
would be illogical to return the full amount to him even if he is eventually acquitted. The Government argued that the withheld salary was to defray the expense of paying someone else to do the suspended police officer’s work. This was rejected by Bokhary PJ in his dissenting judgment, as the impact of withholding salary on a suspended police officer would be much heavier than the burden on the public purse, especially if the interdiction lasted for any considerable period of time. In any event, the logical conclusion of this argument is that the withheld salary should not be returned to the suspended officer as the withholding has nothing to do with his conviction or acquittal. The Government further argued that public sentiment found it objectionable that officers who were eventually found guilty and dismissed should be paid in the meantime. Yet this is precisely the prejudice that the presumption of innocence is to guard against. As Bokhary PJ pointed out, there was no evidence to warrant such a conclusion, as there could well be a wide variety of responses from the public. While the majority of the Court approached the issue from the societal point of view, Bokhary PJ adopted a starting point emphasizing the primacy of the right to be presumed innocent. As the learned judge put it:26

“As I see it, the presumption of innocence reflects the way in which the members of a free society generally approach each other unless and until there is good reason otherwise in any particular instance. And even then, that general approach is departed from only to the extent called for by such reason. The presumption of innocence stands in the way of arbitrary treatment generally. Many forms of treatment are recognized as arbitrary precisely because the persons subjected to it are presumed innocent. In a free society, persons are surrounded and protected by a network of interrelated rights and freedoms of a fundamental nature..... If a society is to remain truly free, the entirety of its network or continuum of fundamental rights and freedoms must be carefully kept in good repair. The thing to fear is too narrow an interpretation of the presumption of innocence, not too wide an interpretation of it.”

Thus, Bokhary PJ subjected the decision of withholding the salary of the suspended officer to great scrutiny. He took into account the need for a constitution to protect the weak, particularly in an employment relationship where the employee is normally the weaker party, and the general contractual right of an employee to be paid his wages in full unless and until he is lawfully dismissed. He did not find the justifications convincing, and held that section 17 of the Police Force Ordinance unconstitutional as it failed the test of legitimate need, rationality and proportionality. The difference between the majority and the minority lies not so much in the formal rhetoric of their approach, but how a

26 Ibid, at 397-398, paras 42-43.
court perceives the relative importance between a fundamental right and wider competing societal interests. Without reflecting on the fundamental values in our society, a balancing process could easily lead to the triumph of wider societal interests when protection of such societal interests may not have to undermine a fundamental right.

*HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa* presented a different type of challenge to the judiciary.27 After the decision in *Sin Yau Ming*, the Dangerous Drug Ordinance was amended. The amended sections 47(1) and (2) continued to provide for a double presumption of possession of the drug (albeit with a more limited scope), and of knowledge of the nature of the drug in the offence of drug trafficking, and they imposed a legal burden of proof on the defendant. Adopting a remedial interpretation, the Court of Final Appeal read down and upheld these provisions as imposing only an evidential and not a legal burden of proof on the defendant. The difficult issue in this case was that many defendants had been convicted of this offence on the basis that they failed to rebut the presumption of possession and knowledge of the nature of the relevant dangerous drug. The Government was anxious to ensure that the decision of the Court of Final Appeal would not disturb previous convictions. It invited the court to apply its decision only prospectively, or to limit the retrospective effect of its judgment.

This raises a difficult and complex issue in constitutional law of a constitutional judgment disturbing the past (by upsetting a large number of previous judgments) or jeopardizing the future (by creating a legal vacuum immediately after the judgment).28 It involves a delicate balance of one’s right to constitutional remedies with finality of the criminal justice system. The solution may depend on the judicial conception of the doctrine of separation of powers in a particular constitutional system, hence opening up the possibility that different jurisdictions may choose to adopt a different approach. Thus, the Australian High Court has rejected the existence of a power to pronounce its judgment prospectively,29 whereas the House of Lords was in favour of its existence, albeit

28 For a more detail discussion, see J Chan, ‘Some Reflections on Remedies in Administrative Law’ (2009) 39 HKLR 321-337; Andrew Li CJ, ‘Reflections on the Retrospective and Prospective Effect of Constitutional Judgments’ in Jessica Young & Rebecca Lee (eds), *The Common Law Lecture Series 2010* (University of Hong Kong), pp 21-55; and Kevin Zervos, ‘Constitutional Remedies Under the Basic Law’ (2010) 40 HKLJ 687-718. See also Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the HKSAR (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441 where the court dealt with the aspect of jeopardizing the future when striking down a legal provision on covert surveillance was said to create great difficulties for the law enforcement agencies.
the exercise of this extraordinary power was confined to the most exceptional circumstances. The Court of Final Appeal to some extent avoided the issue by treating the matter as one of discretion to allow an appeal to be filed out of time. It refused to grant leave to appeal out of time merely on the ground that an authoritative judgment subsequent to the conviction has reversed the previous understanding of the law, and hence minimized the impact of its judgment on past convictions. At the same time, the Court went to considerable length to argue in favour of the existence of a power of prospective overruling, and set out admirably in some clarity the principles to be applied in exercising this extraordinary power.

It is understandable that the Court was reluctant to define exhaustively the exceptional circumstances that would justify its decision to extend the time limit for filing an appeal on the ground that the law at the time of conviction was subsequently proved to be unconstitutional. In this regard, it expressed no opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Kwok Hing Man. In that case, 386 defendants were convicted of the offence of unlawful possession between the dates when the Bill of Rights came into effect and when the Privy Council upheld the decision of unconstitutionality of the offence in Lee Kwong-kut two years later. Most of the defendants had already served their sentence by then, and the time limit for appeal had long expired. They applied to expunge their criminal records. In an exceptional move, the Court of Appeal consulted its full membership and decided to allow an appeal out of time in these circumstances, hence expunging 386 criminal convictions. Although the Court of Final Appeal in Hung Chan Wa did not express any view on the correctness of Kwok Hing Man, and though it is understandable that any court would not find it attractive to expunge a large number of previous convictions when the time limit for their appeal had long expired, it is submitted that the court has no real choice in such circumstances. It would be difficult for any court to uphold the convictions of a non-existent offence by hiding behind a technical point of refusing to allow an appeal out of time. This would particularly be the situation if the defendants are still in custody. Ironically, the longer the Bill of Rights or the Basic Law is in existence, the greater the risk that this would happen. In that situation, it is submitted that liberty of the person shall prevail over the finality of the criminal justice system, and that the court should be slow to adopt prospective overruling even if it means setting aside a large number of previous criminal convictions, and should not do so if personal liberty is ever at stake.

Statutory Interference with the Right against Self-Incrimination

One of the consequences flowing from the presumption of innocence and hence the burden of proof being on the prosecution is that an accused has a right to remain silent. He has no duty to assist the prosecution and has a right not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Although commonly described as a “privilege”, this is indeed a fundamental right that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent. This common law right is “primarily designed to protect against improper compulsion by the authorities and the obtaining of evidence through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.” It is so deep-rooted in English law that reliability of the evidence by itself was held to be insufficient to justify an abrogation of this right. This right exists at different stages of the criminal process, and embodies a cluster of rights or immunities which differ in nature, origin, incidence and importance. Unfortunately, this common law right is also ameliorated by numerous statutory inroads, which are almost as old as the right itself. In this chapter, we will focus on statutory interference with the right at the investigation stage, leading to direct or derivative use of the incriminating material at a later criminal process.

The first case to reach the Court of Final Appeal on this issue is HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee. In that case the Court of Appeal ordered a permanent stay of prosecution for an abuse of process on the ground that compelled information collected in the course of a company investigation was disclosed to the police and led to subsequent criminal prosecution of the defendants for various counts of conspiracy to defraud and false accounting. Under section 143 of the

32 A v Commissioner of Independent Commission Against Corruption (2012) 15 HKCFAR 362 at 373, para 13, per Bokhary and Chan PP. In this chapter, the terms “privilege against self-incrimination”, “right against self-incrimination” and “the right to silence” are used interchangeably.
33 Allan v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 12, at para 50. [check for original source]
34 Lam Chi Ming v The Queen [1991] 2 AC 212 at 220, 222 (PC); R v S [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, para 16; Saunders v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 313
35 For a useful classification, see R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1 at 30, where Lord Mustill identified six different categories of immunities.
36 Ibid at 40. See, for example, Fu Kin Chi Willy v Secretary for Justice [1998] 1 HKL RD 271 (abrogation of the common law right against self-incrimination by the Police Force Ordinance in police disciplinary enquiry) and Chan Sze Ting v HKSAR (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 46 (abrogation of the common law right against self-incrimination by s 13 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance). No Bill of Rights arguments were invoked in these cases.
37 For a helpful analysis, see S Young, ‘A Decade of Self-Incrimination in the HKSAR’ (2007) 37 HKLJ 475.
38 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 133.
Companies Ordinance, the Financial Secretary may order an investigation by an Inspector into the affairs of a company. Section 145(3A) further provides that the officers of the company could not refuse to answer a question from the inspector on the ground of self-incrimination, save that the question and answer could not be adduced as evidence against them in subsequent criminal proceedings if the person claimed privilege before answering the question. The defendant relied, inter alia, on Article 11(2)(g) of the Bill of Rights, which provided that ‘in the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled... not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilty’, and argued that the derivative use of incriminating evidence contravened Article 11(2)(g) or more generally, the right to fair trial. The Secretary for Justice appealed and argued that section 145(3A) did not prevent derivative use of the self-incriminating material, and such use did not violate the Bill of Rights.

The Court of Final Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of permanent stay. Riberio PJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, held that there was no free-standing common law right against derivative use of incriminating evidence, and as a matter of statutory interpretation, once the right against self-incrimination was abrogated without any express restriction on their use, it necessarily permitted unrestricted use of the incriminating information. Insofar as the Bill of Rights is concerned, it was held that Article 11(2)(g) has no application as there was no criminal proceedings at the time when the information was elicited, and there was no inherent unfairness in permitting derivative use of incriminating evidence, taking the trial process as a whole and the court’s discretion to exclude evidence.

In that case, the prosecution gave an undertaking not to rely on any of the oral interviews of the defendants or any of their comments on the draft transcript or on the draft report, or to seek to cross-examine them on the basis of such materials. Nor had the defendants been able to identify any matters that were to be used at the trial as specifically derived from the compelled information.39 Thus, arguably the question of a violation of the right against self-incrimination through derivative use of compelled information did not arise at all and the decision could be supported on that basis. Indeed, in a case relying on derivative use, it would not be unfair or unreasonable to require the accused to identify the matters that were said to be derived from incriminating information, and to show that but for the incriminating information such derived matters would not have been available, and once the accused is able to discharge the evidential burden, it would be for the prosecution to show that it had acquired the evidence independently and without reliance on the compelled information, or if it fails to do so, to show that the court should still exercise its discretion to

39 At 157D-F and 157J-158A.
admit the evidence despite its being obtained in violation of the accused's right against self-incrimination. This is indeed the position in Canada, where the court tried to strike a balance between the right against self-incrimination and the public interest in protecting the public from corporate fraud.

Instead, the Court rejected the Canadian approach, not on any principle but merely on a vague assertion that the Canadian approach was developed in a highly specific context. It is true that the protection against self-incrimination in section 13 of the Canadian Charter was regarded as too narrowly formulated and hence the Canadian courts tried to extend the constitutional protection through “the principle of fundamental justice” under section 7 of the Charter. It does not follow therefore that the constitutional principles developed thereunder are necessarily inapplicable beyond the Canadian context. Indeed, “the principle of fundamental justice” is derived from the basic tenets of the justice system. Riberio PJ was contended to rely on the English common law decision of Brown v Scott, which was a highly criticized decision and which was in any event a case of direct use rather than derivative use of incriminating information.40

Derivative Use: A Free Standing Right under the Common Law?

Is there no basis for a free-standing right against derivative use in the common law? This may require a consideration of the fundamental values of the protection of the right against self-incrimination. In Lamb v. Munster, Stephen J described the right in these words: 41

“When the subject is fully examined, it will I think be found that the privilege extends to protect a man from answering any question which ‘would in the opinion of the judge have a tendency to expose the witness, or the wife or husband of the witness, to any criminal charge’: Stephen’s Dig. of the Law of Ev. 3rd ed. art. 120, p. 121. That is what I understand by the phrase ‘criminating himself’. It is not that a man must be guilty of an offence and say substantially, ‘I am guilty of the offence, but am not going to furnish evidence of it.’ I do not think the privilege is so narrow as that, for then it would be illusory. The extent of the privilege is I think this: the man may say, "If you are going to bring a criminal charge, or if I have reason to think a criminal charge is going to be brought against me, I will hold my tongue. Prove what you can, but I am protected from furnishing evidence against myself out of my own mouth."

If the right against incrimination means that an accused cannot be compelled to give evidence that he has made a video record of his committing a crime, what is the justification for admitting the video in evidence when the video would not have been discovered but for his compelled testimony? This would be no different from convicting

41 (1882), 10 Q.B.D. 110, at pp. 112-13:
him “out of his own mouth”, metaphorically if not literally. It would of course be different if the police was able to find the video independently without his compelled testimony. The position was best explained by the US Supreme Court in *Katisgar v United States*, where the majority of the Court held:42

“We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being “forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of ‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.’” Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. [Emphasis original.]

Thus, it seems that, as a matter of logic and principle, there is a powerful case that the protection against self-incrimination must include the prohibition of both direct and derivative use. The underlying concern is the same be it direct or derivative use, namely that a person cannot be compelled to give incriminating evidence against himself and be forced to convict himself out of his own mouth.

Riberio PJ, however, held that there was no common law derivative use immunity and if there is any such common law derivative use immunity, it has been abrogated by s 145(3A). It appears that the learned judge has failed to distinguish four different though inter-related issues. Firstly, does the common law recognize derivative use immunity? Secondly, has section 145(3A) abrogated such common law immunity? Thirdly, there is the court’s general residual discretionary power to exclude relevant evidence in order to ensure a fair trial; and fourthly, it is necessary to establish a causal link between the derivative evidence and the compelled incriminating evidence. The learned judge was preoccupied with the second question and his categorical denial of a free-standing common law derivative use immunity

(the first question) has to be considered in the light of his pre-occupation, rightly so on the facts, with the second question of statutory abrogation.

The learned judge first referred to *Sorby v The Commonwealth*, and was prepared to accept that “an unabrogated privilege against self-incrimination, that is, privilege to decline to answer questions, necessarily carried with it not only protection against direct but also derivative use of any self-incriminating answer.” This must be correct (the first question). The learned judge distinguished this case on the particular wordings of section 6DD of the Royal Commissions Act 1902, which imposed a general restriction on direct use of compelled evidence without expressly abrogating the right against self-incrimination, and held that the expressed abrogation of the right in section 145(3A) left no room for the survival of any common law derivative use immunity (the second question). *Hamilton v Oades and Corporate Affairs Commission of New South Wales* could be explained on the same ground, namely that section 541(12) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code expressly abrogated the right against self-incrimination and that was sufficient to abrogate both direct use and derivative use. Mason CJ gave a further reason that it would be difficult for Parliament to provide for specific protection against derivative use by reason of the problem of proving that other evidence was derivative. The difficulty of proving a causal relationship between the derivative evidence and the incriminating evidence (the fourth question) is a real limit on the effectiveness of protecting derivative use, but it is not an answer that there is no derivative use immunity or that the statute necessarily abrogates derivative use, the latter of which remains a question of legislative intent in each case.

Riberio PJ next referred to *Lam Chi Ming v The Queen*, the issue of which was whether certain video recording of re-enacting the crime scene and the discovery of the murder weapon were admissible evidence when the confession made by the accused which led to the re-enactment of the crime scene and the recovery of the murder weapon was held involuntarily made and hence inadmissible. It held that where a confession was ruled to have been involuntary made and inadmissible, evidence derived by the police from the knowledge acquired through that confession might still be admissible provided that the derivative evidence could be adduced without any reliance on the excluded confession. This goes to the fourth question above (causal linkage) and reinforces the point that if there is a causal linkage, the derivative use must be protected unless otherwise abrogated. The learned judge’s statement that “the common law admits independent evidence against the accused even though it is derivative evidence obtained by using the excluded confession (subject to the court’s discretionary power to exclude such evidence)” begs the question of what ‘independent evidence’ means. It is not supported by the fact of

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43 (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 293-293, per GibbS CJ.
44 At 166E.
45 (1989) 166 CLR 486 at 496.
46 [1911] 3 AC 212.
Lam Chi Ming where the Privy Council held that there was a strong causal link between the video recording and the involuntary confession and therefore the video was inadmissible, thus confirming the derivative use immunity. The statement of Lord Hoffmann in R v Hertfordshire County Council, ex p Green Environmental Industries Ltd,47 which referred back to Lam Chi Ming and the 18th century case of R v Warickshall,48 have to be considered in the same light.

Finally, the learned judge dismissed the relevance of two civil cases concerning Anton Piller Order. In Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre, Lord Wilberforce held that the judicial order did not abrogate the right against self-incrimination, thus protecting the defendant from both direct and derivative use of any answer provided. Lord Wilberforce expressed the concern that even if there were an undertaking not to use the information obtained in criminal proceedings, it would not sufficiently protect the defendant from derivative use of the information. Thus, whether an undertaking is wide enough to prevent derivative use would depend on its wordings, and it may be jumping the gun to conclude from this that if the right against self-incrimination were to be abrogated by judicial order, there would be no residual common law derivative use immunity,49 or that an abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination, even if accompanied by an undertaking against direct use, would not prevent derivative use.50 It is very much a matter of drafting in each case.

In conclusion, the learned judge’s statement that there was no free standing common law derivative immunity is probably unnecessarily sweeping. It is submitted that the right against self-incrimination must include protection against both direct and derivative use. Whether a statutory provision abrogates both direct and derivative use is a matter of construction the outcome of which depends on the context of each case. There are two possible approaches. The first is that an expressed restriction on direct use does not preclude derivative use: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This is typical of the common law approach to statutory interpretation and is the approach adopted by the learned judge. The other is that unless otherwise expressly excluded, a fundamental right is deemed not to be excluded, and hence, in the absence of clear and unambiguous language, the common law derivative use immunity is preserved. This approach is more consistent with the modern liberal approach to construing constitutional rights. The learned judge cannot be faulted for choosing one of the two approaches, especially when this case was decided in the early days of the transition of sovereignty when the court was still feeling its way towards constitutional law interpretation, though the approach that he has adopted is not as rights-friendly as the other approach. If the statute does not abrogate derivative use, it is argued that the court should determine whether the causal link between the compelled evidence and

47 [2000] 2 AC 412 at 421.
48 (1783) 1 Leach 263.
49 At 168E-169H.
50 Indeed, in AT&T Istel Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45, the House of Lords found the undertaking wide enough to cover both direct use and derivative use.
the derivative evidence is so remote that it could not be considered rationally that the derivative evidence came from the mouth of the compelled (the rationality test). If such rational relationship cannot be established by the accused or is rebutted by the prosecution by showing that the incriminating evidence could be obtained independent of the derivative material, the derivative evidence should be admissible, subject to the court’s residual discretion to exclude evidence to ensure a fair trial. On the other hand, if an accused could establish a causal link between the compelled material and the derivative evidence and that the prosecution could not show that it would be able to obtain the derivative evidence but for the compelled material, then the derivative evidence should be inadmissible as its admissibility would in the circumstances compromise the fair hearing or the dignity of the judicial process, or that it would be disproportionate to admit such incriminating derivative evidence. Thus, instead of a categorical permission to use derivative evidence, its admissibility becomes a matter of remoteness and could be determined by the usual tests of rationality and proportionality.

**Determination of Criminal Charge**

Article 10 of the Bill of Rights provided for the right to fair hearing in the determination of a criminal charge. Article 11(2) then elaborates on the procedural protection in the determination of a criminal charge. Thus, to engage both Articles 10 and 11(2), there has to be a ‘criminal charge.’ Decisions from the Strasbourg Court and English decisions on the Human Rights Act have consistently held that this is an autonomous concept which is not to be determined solely by domestic classification and that the concept is a matter of substance rather than form, for otherwise a State would be at liberty to avoid the protection of a fair trial by reclassifying its domestic process or by transferring what is essentially a criminal decision to an administrative body. The logical conclusion would therefore be that if Article 10 is engaged because there is a criminal charge, then Article 11(2) should equally be engaged insofar as the procedural guarantees are applicable. The two articles should rise and fall together. Strangely, this is not the effect of the Hong Kong decisions.

In *Lee Ming Tee*, as far as Article 11(2)(g) is concerned, the Court took a literal meaning of ‘criminal charge’ without much discussion and held that it did not apply as no charge had been preferred on the defendants at the time when the compelled information was sought. It also confined the protection of Article 11(2)(g) to testimonial immunity. The Court then turned to Article 10. It pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights felt able to derive the right against incrimination

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51 Both decisions may be seen to be rather restrictive, though this could be justified on the facts of this case as it would have to stretch one’s imagination of the meaning of ‘criminal charge’ when such charges were laid only four years after the taking of incriminating evidence.
from the equivalent of the right to fair trial in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and then assumed Article 10 was applicable and proceeded to consider whether derivative use was a violation of the right to fair hearing. This was hardly satisfactory, as the right to fair hearing under Article 10 is also engaged only ‘in the determination of criminal charge.’ Unless the meaning of this phrase differs in Article 10 and 11(2)(g), the decision of the Court is internally inconsistent.

The same point was made by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Latker that Article 11(2)(g). Ma CJHC (as he then was) and Stuart-Moore JA held that Article 11(2)(g) of the Bill of Rights had no application as this article was only engaged when a person had actually been charged with a criminal offence. However, they agreed that the right to a fair trial under Article 10 was engaged, as once the identity of the driver of a vehicle that was involved in a traffic offence was provided, the inevitable reality was that a charge would have been laid. In contrast, Stock VP went into greater details by adopting an extended meaning of a “criminal charge” as “the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence”.52 This liberal meaning would widen the scope of protection to the pre-trial investigation stage where the right against self-incrimination could arguably be of much greater significance. Stock VP adopted a realistic view in assessing the nature of the notice requiring the provision of information of the identity of the driver, noting that the inquiry was conducted solely in order to seek information or evidence in order to support a criminal charge,53 and realistically the police did have an “element of suspicion” against the registered owner. While the identity of the driver would not complete the traffic offence, it is an important element of the offence, and indeed, in most cases, the only missing part in the prosecution. The realistic approach adopted by Stock VP is much preferred over that of the Court. However, Stock VP was silent on whether Article 11(2)(g) applied. Indeed, if “criminal charge” bears the wider meaning as Stock VP has held, there is no reason why the same meaning should not apply to Article 11(2)(g), in both cases there was a criminal charge when the statutory notice to provide information was served.

The meaning of “criminal charge” was thoroughly considered in Koon Wing Kee v Insider Dealing Tribunal.54 The issue in this case was whether Articles 10 and 11 of the Bill of Rights applied to proceedings before the Insider Dealing Tribunal. The Court of Final Appeal accepted the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights that in determining whether there is a ‘criminal charge’, the court would take into account (a) domestic classification of the offence; (b) the nature of

52 At 137I, para 120.
53 At 139, paras 123 and 131-133, preferring the minority view in Weh v Austria (2005) 40 ECHR 37, at para 0-11. Since then the police has introduced a standard clause in the notice that consideration is given whether criminal prosecution would be taken out.
54 [(2008) 11 HKCFAR 170.]
the offence; and (c) the nature and severity of the potential sanction. While domestic classification would be taken as a starting point, it would not be conclusive. Indeed, the nature of the offence and the proceedings are more weighty consideration. Thus, disciplinary proceedings, which do not concern the public at large, are usually taken to be of a non-criminal, non-penal character. Proceedings under regulatory legislation whose purpose is essentially protective rather than punitive or deterrent may also not be considered “criminal”. Likewise, the revocation of a parole licence, which purpose was to protect the public and not to punish the offender, is not ‘criminal’ in nature. On the other hand, if the purpose is punitive in nature, or when a heavy penalty is imposed, these are strong indicia of a “criminal” process. In that particular case, the Court found that insider dealing was an “insidious mischief” which threatened the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in the markets. It involved dishonest misconduct of a misuse of price-sensitive information, and the penalty, which sought to leave a person engaging in such conduct out of pocket irrespective of any personal gain, was clearly punitive in nature. The absence of a formal charge or a conviction that constituted a criminal record, and the absence of a provision for imprisonment did not attenuate its criminal character.

In this regard, the Court expressly endorsed a substantive approach that looked to substance rather than form. Sir Anthony Mason held that “it is necessary to look beyond the absence of a formal charge and to ascertain whether a person is being called upon to answer an allegation of serious misconduct which, if determined against him, will result in punishment. To hold that the absence of a formal charge and the absence of a provision for the recording of a conviction in such circumstances take the proceedings outside the protection conferred by Arts 10 and 11 of the BOR would reduce substantially the protection conferred by these articles and facilitate the triumph of form over substance.”

A similar approach has been adopted by the Court of Final Appeal in *Yeung Chung Ming v Commissioner of Police*, where the Court endorsed the application of the presumption of innocence to cover a declaration of guilt by the State following an arrest when no criminal charge was preferred. This approach is to be commended, and in light of these holdings, the remarks made by Riberio PJ in *Lee Ming Tee* and Ma CJHC in the *Latkers* case regarding the applicability of Article 11(2) must now be regarded as dubious.

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55 At 192, para 51.
57 In light of the decision in *Koon Wing Yee*, it is possible to argue that the notice requiring a registered owner of a vehicle to disclose the identity of the driver at the material time in the *Latkers* case amounted to a “criminal charge” and hence attracted the protection of Art 11(2)(g). Since this case, the Government has inserted a new clause in the standard notice that the prosecution has not decided at this stage whether to prosecute or not. This clause may not achieve its purpose if the statistics show that there is criminal prosecution in the
Approach to Constitutional Right against Self-Incrimination

The Court’s decision in Lee Ming Tee on the right to a fair hearing is equally disappointing. It took as a starting point that direct use of compulsorily obtained self-incriminating materials might be justified if it was not a disproportionate response to a serious social problem and did not undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial viewed in the round. The Court then treated the issue as primarily one of a fair balance between meeting a serious social concern of corporate fraud that called for strong regulation, and ensuring an accused of a fair trial, taking into account the court’s inherent power to exclude evidence. It had no difficulty in coming to a conclusion that “there is no inherent unfairness in establishing a person’s guilt by the use of reliable objective evidence obtained from an independent source, even if the acquisition of that evidence was facilitated by clues contained in the excluded admission.”

As noted above, the problem of this conclusion lies in what “independent source” means. If it means that there is no causal relationship between the derivative evidence and the incriminating information, the conclusion is not controversial. This seems to be what the learned judge has in mind, as his conclusion is preceded by a statement that “the privilege has no application to evidence which exists independently of the will of the accused.” There is of course no violation of the right against self-incrimination if there is no causal relationship between the derivative evidence and the incriminating information, but if this causal relationship is established, then the court has not really addressed the balancing process as such. In this connection, it is disappointing that the learned judge was too ready to brush aside the Canadian authorities, which addressed separately the need to establish a causal relationship between the derivative evidence and the compelled incriminating matters. Instead of applying the proportionality test in the balancing process, the learned judge readily assumed the position that the judicial discretion to exclude remedy would be sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

Derivative use was cursorily mentioned in passing in A v Commissioner of Independent Commission Against Corruption.

The issue in that case was primarily whether a person being compelled to provide information to the ICAC pursuant to the famous section 14 notice could claim the right against self-incrimination. There was no expressed abrogation of the right, but the Court of Final Appeal concluded that the overwhelming majority of cases following the identification of the driver, which is likely to be the case. The court will consider the substance rather than the form.

At 177F-G.

(2012) 15 HKCFAR 363, at 405, para 118: “It is no part of the appellant’s case that such derivative use would be unconstitutional. That is unsurprising since, in the light of Lee Ming Tee and Koon Wing Yee, such a challenge would have little prospect of success.” (per Ribeiro PJ) Thus, derivative use was not in issue at all.
Legislature clearly intended to abrogate the right. This conclusion was impeccable. There was a general prohibition of direct use of the information in all proceedings, and the Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the only permissible use was to challenge the credibility of the person concerned on the inconsistencies between the compelled materials and his viva voce testimony in court. Given this limitation, it was held that there was a proper balance between societal interest and the right to a fair trial, and hence there was no violation of the Bill of Rights.

While the case could be decided on that basis, the Court made obiter remarks about derivative use. Bokhary and Chan PJJ, in their joint separate judgment, asserted that “there would be no point at all to s 14 or to the abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination in regard thereto if derivative use cannot be made of material compelled under that section. Derivative use is plainly necessary and a rational and proportionate response to such necessity. It is constitutional.” This obiter statement was made without any argument and is unnecessarily sweeping if it means that derivative use is always constitutionally permissible. Riberio PJ was more restrained, yet his treatment also shed light on the real justification of his decision in Lee Ming Tee. The learned judge first referred to the common pattern of those statutes that abrogated the right against self-incrimination to prohibit or restrict direct use. He then made the point, following Lee Ming Tee, that such prohibition did not in general seek to prohibit or had the effect of prohibiting derivative use, the reason being:

“Thus, there is usually no prohibition against using the compulsorily obtained answers to develop new lines of inquiry; to identify sources of independent evidence; to assist in formulating applications for search warrants; and so forth. Such derivative use of the compelled answers does not raise any issue concerning self-incrimination or admissibility since it is use which does not involve any attempt to adduce the answers in evidence in any curial setting. The law has always drawn a distinction between (inadmissible) compelled answers themselves and (admissible) derivative evidence independently developed from indications contained in the compelled answers.” (emphasis provided)

This justification is consistent with the above argument that ultimately the issue is one of remoteness. When the derivative evidence can be independent developed, the causal link between the compelled material and the derivative evidence is too remote to warrant any finding of a violation of the right against self-incrimination, but the right would be upheld if such causal link could be established. The real issue would then be what kind of causal link would be considered constitutionally acceptable.

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60 At 383, para 38.
61 At 394, paras 76-77. Ma CJ and Lord Hoffmann NPJ concurred with Ribeiro PJ.
While direct use is severely restricted in *A v Commissioner for the ICAC*, the direct use in *Secretary for Justice v Latker* goes to the heart of the criminal offence.\(^{62}\) Section 63 of the Road Traffic Ordinance compels the registered owner of a vehicle to provide information to the police on the identity of the driver at the time of a suspected offence, in that case the offence being failing to comply with traffic signals. Failure to provide the information is itself an offence, which attracts a fine of $10,000 and six months’ imprisonment. The requirement to provide information applies to all road traffic offences, irrespective of their nature or gravity. The issue is whether this requirement violates the right of the registered owner against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeal found no violation.

Ma CJHC approached the issue as one of a fair balance, namely, what is the fair balance to be struck between, on the one hand, the demands and interests of the general community and, on the other, the fundamental rights of the individual?\(^{63}\) This approach is reminiscent of that adopted by Ribeiro PJ in *Lee Ming Tee* as well. Taking into account the strong public interest in the effective regulation of motor vehicles and their use, the sheer number of motor vehicles on the road and the exposure of most members of the population to them, the minimal intrusion to the right against self-incrimination, and the availability of a defence of lack of knowledge, the Court considered that a fair balance has been struck. This conclusion is not surprising, and is most likely to result from the fair balance test as formulated by Ma CJHC. After all, it is difficult to balance individual right against societal interest and, in most cases, the logical consequence is that societal interest prevails. Stock VP, whilst agreeing with the conclusion of the Court, pointed out the danger of this fair balance approach:\(^{64}\)

“I would myself prefer, as a general rule when addressing derogations from rights, to avoid an approach or test articulated in terms of a ‘fair balance’ between ‘… on the one hand, the demands and interests of the general community and, on the other, the fundamental rights of the individual.’ A test expressed in those terms runs the danger, in my opinion, of undermining the primacy of fundamental freedoms which, after all, reflect the interests of the general community. In cases where fundamental freedoms are absolute, no derogation is permitted, so no question of ‘balance’ can arise. Where the freedom is not absolute, the starting point is always the freedom and any derogation from it must, both as to the need for derogation and its extent, be fully justified, albeit on societal grounds, by he who seeks to derogate.’

Adopting this approach, Stock VP addressed the respondent’s arguments in a more meticulous manner. He considered it unfair to categorize the respondent’s arguments as treating the right against self-incrimination as an absolute right. Unlike

\(^{62}\) [2009] 2 HKC 100.
\(^{63}\) At 118, para 37.
\(^{64}\) At 152, para 160.
the majority who was prepared to accept readily that there was a serious problem caused by motor vehicles despite the unsatisfactory state of the statistical evidence, Stock VP was sympathetic to the magistrate who was troubled by the absence of evidence justifying the legislative measure under attack. He found that the evidential gap was bridged by the legislative history and the debates in the Legislative Council. The learned judge also dismissed the suggestion that the identity of the driver was only one element of the traffic offence, as realistically this was the only crucial piece of evidence in the prosecution.

The respondent relied on three salient features in this case, namely custodial sentence, indiscriminate nature of the requirement irrespective of the gravity of the offence, and available alternatives. He attempted to distinguish Brown v Stott on the ground that, in that case, a custodial sentence for non-compliance was not an option and that the requirement to supply information applied only to serious or mere regulatory offences. Ma CJHC found support for the need for custodial sentence in the legislative debates, and was prepared to accord the Legislature a margin of appreciation regarding such need. He pointed out that custodial sentence would only be imposed in the more serious situations, and that Hong Kong was not unique in imposing custodial sentence for non-compliance. Nor did he consider the indiscriminate scope of application a weighty factor. Once ‘all offences under the Road Traffic Ordinance were regarded as part of an overall regulatory scheme to govern effectively the use of motor vehicles in Hong Kong and to protect the public from harm, it is of little consequence whether serious or minor offences are affected by section 63.’ This is again exemplary of how the fair balance approach as advocated by Ma CJHC applied in practice. In contrast, Stock VP considered that the threat of imprisonment carried a threat of compulsion which had to be justified with reference to the subject matter of the case. A six month custodial sentence for non-compliance might not be incommensurate with a serious offence of causing death by dangerous driving which carried a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, but it might appear disproportionate if it was applied to a minor offence of speeding with a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment. What degree of compulsion is proportionate in a particular case was a matter of factual assessment for the tribunal, which had a power to exclude an admission if the circumstances in which it was obtained in a particular case were found to be oppressive. Stock VP reviewed the legislative history, which had given an account of the problems encountered (the hit and run situations) and the justifications for the introduction of the custodial sanction. Finally, he also considered the available alternatives, as ‘those who seek to justify

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65 At 119, para 42.
66 At 148, paras 148-149.
67 At 133, para 132.
68 At 121, para 54.
69 Ibid, para 55.
70 At 147, para 144.
restrictions upon fundamental rights are bound to show that the restrictions go no further than are necessary for the protection of legitimate interests. While a reverse onus clause which placed a burden on the registered owner to prove that he was not the driver of the vehicle at the material time may be a possible alternative, it was a more onerous violation of the right to be presumed innocent than the compulsory disclosure requirement. In conclusion, given the significantly limited nature of the questioning permitted, and the fact that the provisions were directed at a class of persons who had subscribed to a regulatory regime, the problems that have been encountered, and the power of the tribunal to exclude the evidence if the circumstances in which it has been obtained in a particular case were oppressive so as to render the admission unsafe, Stock VP agreed with the majority that the compulsory requirement to disclose the identity of a driver was a proportionate response. While the learned judge had come to the same conclusion as the majority of the court, the approach adopted by Stock VP is intellectually more rigorous and more in tune with the primacy of the fundamental rights. In the words of Silke VP, the balance between the interests of the individual against the interests of society generally is not an exercise to be done on equal plane, but with a bias towards the interests of the individual.

While exclusion of incriminating evidence is a natural remedy for a violation of the right against self-incrimination, the Court of Final Appeal came up with a novel, albeit surprising, remedy in Koon Wing Yee v Insider Dealing Tribunal. In that case, sections 33(4) and (6) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance conferred on the Securities and Futures Commission wide investigatory powers and abrogated the right against self-incrimination. It also expressly permitted the use of potentially self-incriminating answers “for all purposes of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance”. That is, direct use of self-incriminating material was permitted for proceedings before the Insider Dealing Tribunal. The Court of Final Appeal found that such direct use constituted a substantial intrusion into the right against self-incrimination and that the compelled answers “formed an important element in the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in the findings which it made against the respondents.” In coming to this conclusion, the Court was heavily influenced by the fact that the Tribunal had power to impose a very heavy penalty, which was punitive in nature and which sought to deter insider dealing by leaving a person who engaged in such dealing substantially out of pocket, irrespective of whether that person had made any personal gain. Instead of excluding the self-incriminating evidence or striking down the provision

71 At 149, para 151.
72 R v Sin Yau Ming, supra.
74 Ibid at 199, para 79.
75 Section 23(1)(c) provides for an order of a penalty ‘of an amount not exceeding three times the amount of any profit gained or loss avoided by any person as a result of the insider dealing.’
compelling the disclosure of information and allowing direct use of self-incriminating material, which seems to be the obvious remedies, the Court decided to strike down the penalty provision which by itself did not infringe any provision of the Bill of Rights. The argument was that without this penalty clause, the proceedings would no longer be classified as “criminal” and therefore there would not be any violation of Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. Sir Anthony Mason explained:

“Section 6(1) [of the Bill of Rights Ordinance] should be construed, in accordance with its terms, as conferring a power which will enable the courts to resolve the tension which exists between the legislative will and the protection given by the BOR by striking down only that part of the statute that causes the violation or breach, even if it does not itself infringe the BOR, when to do so best gives effect to the legislative intention.... Had it not been for the existence of the power [to impose a heavy penalty], the proceedings would not have acquired a substantially criminal character and there would have been no violation of the BOR. The fact that the relationship or connection is indirect rather than direct is not a matter of any consequence.... The history of the matter demonstrates that the legislature would have preferred to sacrifice the power to impose a penalty and retain the other provisions in SIDO rather than lose the investigatory powers which have resulted in violations of the BOR... Whether the remedy is appropriate and just from the perspective of the respondents is a more difficult question. The remedy is less satisfactory to them than the relief granted by the Court of Appeal because it preserves the findings made by the Tribunal and the orders for disqualification.”

This is the first time that the Court fashions a remedy by striking down a provision which by itself does not infringe the Bill of Rights in order to bring the regime in line with the Bill of Rights. While this is an innovative approach, two questions need further consideration. Firstly, the right to a fair trial applies to both criminal and civil proceedings. Therefore, the mere fact that the proceedings are no longer classified as criminal does not detract the protection of the right to a fair hearing, and direct use of self-incriminating material may still constitute a violation of the right to a fair hearing even when the consequences may not be as drastic as in criminal proceedings. The Court has either not considered this question at all or implicitly assumes, somewhat prematurely, that there is no issue of fair hearing once the proceedings are no longer characterised as criminal. Secondly, the suggestion that the legislature would prefer sacrificing a penalty clause than to lose the investigatory power may be a bold assertion. One of the problems of the previous regime is that it had no teeth. Thus, a heavy penalty lies at the core of the new regime, without which the investigation may serve no

76 At 208-210, paras 113, 117-118. Section 6(1) of the BOR provides that a court or tribunal may ‘grant such remedy or relief, or make such order, in respect of such a breach, violation or threatened violation as it has power to grant or make in those proceedings and as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.’
deterrent purpose. It is unclear what materials were before the court to enable it to make such a judgment. Legislative history is not one-sided and it may be dangerous to rely on legislative history to predict what the legislature would do in light of the insidious activities of insider dealings now.

Conclusion

This chapter focuses on two aspects of criminal law, and hence the conclusion cannot fairly represent the overall impact of the Bill of Rights or the Basic Law on the development of criminal law in Hong Kong. However, one issue stands out, namely that the impact of the Bill of Rights or any constitutional instrument will depend a lot on how it is approached and interpreted by the judiciary. Constitutional law is about values. The constitution sets out the primacy of fundamental rights, but it is in applying those rights that the judiciary is put to the test. The outcome may depend on a wide range of factors, including the predisposition of the judges as influenced by their previous training, experience, and their perception of the relationship between the judiciary and other branches of the government, as well as the wider socio-political environment. Judges in a common law system are generally not used to the interpretation of the general constitutional provisions. In the interpretation of such general provisions, it is inevitable that they resort to their common law training, and on some occasions, they approach the interpretation of the constitution in a way that is no different from the interpretation of any domestic legislation, focusing on what the intention of the legislature as revealed by a literal reading of the law rather than exploring the values underlying the constitutional protection of fundamental rights and how best such rights could be protected within the confines of the constitutional framework. Some judges even take the view that constitutional protection of fundamental rights, at least insofar as procedural rights are concerned, are no more than a codification of the common law principles. In so doing, consciously or unconsciously, the court would be more ready to give deference to the legislative will, as supremacy of the legislature has long been engrained in their common law learning. In the traditional common law system, judicial personality tends not to have a major impact on the outcome of any case. Yet individual predicament tends to have more profound impact in a constitutional regime where there is much more room for judicial creativity (or non-creativity).

At the same time, the courts are not immune from wider socio-political changes. In the days leading to and shortly after the changeover when there was a lot of political uncertainty, the judiciary was conscious of establishing a liberal regime emphasizing the primacy of fundamental rights. The court stands for independence, professionalism, and liberalism. It is the last fortress for the
protection of fundamental rights and liberties. Thus, the Court of Appeal before the changeover, and the Court of Final Appeal after the changeover, are sensitive to the paramount importance of the protection of constitutional rights at a particularly sensitive historical moment of Hong Kong. They are more ready to adopt a liberal approach and to be guided by the underlying values in approaching constitutional interpretation. In this regard, the Hong Kong judiciary has no hesitation in exercising rigorous scrutiny over the Legislature, and its approach towards reverse onus provision is exemplary of any liberal regime. Reverse onus provisions represent a direct challenge to the entrenched belief that the burden of proof of a criminal charge lies with the prosecution. The court will not lightly allow derogation from this principle, which could only be displaced by satisfying the tests of rationality and proportionality.

Conscious of its role as a guardian of fundamental rights and anxious to build up a liberal tradition, the Court of Final Appeal tends to deliver mostly unanimous decisions in the first decade after the changeover. However, as time passes, when the court has become more confident, the differences in judicial predicament become more apparent. The differences in approaching the balancing exercise are most illuminating in this regard. Despite its repeated emphasis on the importance of the right to be presumed innocent, it is disappointing that the court is reluctant to make a categorical finding that any attempt to place a legal burden of proof on the defendant is unconstitutional in light of the risk of the defendant being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. In Yeung Chung Ming, the distinction between the authority treating someone as guilty, and hence the presumption is violated, and the authority treating someone as possibly guilty, and hence the presumption is not violated, is bordering on a distinction without difference.

Likewise, the way the courts deal with the right against self-incrimination is not encouraging either. This may be partly due to the existence of numerous statutory inroads into such a right even under the common law system, so that judges are more ready to accept the propriety or constitutionality of such statutory restrictions. In Lee Ming Tee, it found that prohibition of direct use of self-incriminating material did not prevent derivative use. In A v Commissioner for the ICAC, the Court was prepared to uphold a restriction of the right against self-incrimination when there was no expressed provision to such effect, and the judicial safeguard lies in restricting the circumstances of permitting direct use of self-incriminating materials. In Latkers, the court went further to uphold direct use of self-incriminating materials, and applied the fair balance test in a way without giving any primacy to the fundamental right. In Koon Wing Yee, instead of striking down the infringing provision, the court struck down a different provision, which by itself did not infringe the Bill of Rights, so as to save the investigatory regime. One may legitimately ask what else is left with the right
against self-incrimination that is not already protected by the common law. Some of these are difficult cases, but on a more general level, what is of concern is how the courts approach a constitutional right. Is it just one of the factors in the balancing equation which can readily be outweighed by other factors, or is it so fundamental that the State will have to tilt the balance with cogent and persuasive evidence after a rigorous scrutiny of the justifications? The fair balance approach adopted by Ma CJHC in *Latkers* and Riberio PJ in *Lee Ming Tee* is typical of the type of fair balance in the common law system that involves nothing more than a weighing of conflicting factors with little discussion of why the right against incrimination is so valuable in the criminal justice system. The constitutional right does not seem to have any impact on the balancing process. On the other hand, Stock VP’s approach in *Latkers* and Bokhary PJ’s approach in *Yeung Chung Ming* are what one would expect in a constitutional regime, giving primacy to the protection of fundamental rights as much as possible.

Hong Kong is moving into the second decade of its constitutional era. With a number of senior judges at the highest courts having retired in the last two years or soon approaching retirement, and with a legal profession that is ready, willing and able to mount respectable constitutional challenges, it will be interesting to observe whether Hong Kong is writing a quiet epilogue or beginning another new and noble chapter in its constitutional development.